Aristotle’s Metaphysics
A COMMENTARY, Vol. 3

STEFAN GROSSMANN
Abstract for all Three Volumes: A New Type of Metaphysics Commentary

This is a new type of Commentary to Aristotle’s key text, entitled *Metaphysics* after his death. In three volumes, burning modern issues are worked in, revealing the lost ancient meaning as a meditation text of inner alchemy (the middle books) and logical cosmology (the late books). *The Metaphysics* is about the cosmic circuit of man, a spiritual tradition still alive today in the unrelated parallel transmission (from a pre-ancient common ancestor) of Kalachakra Tantra, a main part of Tibetan spiritual cosmology, and Daoist Neidan. As to modern western science, the *Metaphysics* book lambda (not a “theology” as often claimed) provides keys for the recent discovery, to the bafflement of materialist science, of the variable acceleration rate of the expanding universe, especially through the Planck satellite mission 2012/2013. On the side of textual criticism, it is shown that Aristotle was not the only author of the *Metaphysics*; instead, the *Metaphysics* is a carefully groomed school text of Aristotle and his successors in the Lykeon, a text that matured over, likely, two centuries, until it reached its mature form that has come down to us today. The difficult (not to say impossible) concept of “ousia” is explained through Daoist Neidan (inner alchemy) as a specialized term for the fluidic changes of inner alchemy, the only explanation that makes sense, supported by the entire newly elucidated context of the *Metaphysics*. The inner alchemy (middle books) and the logical cosmology (late books) are dovetailed into one system for transforming man, confirming the argument that the *Metaphysics* has, ultimately, practical goals. The most difficult book of the fourteen constituent books of the *Metaphysics* is identified as book iota (book ten, first book of the late books), since that is the book that requires the volumes 2 and 3 of this Commentary presenting exotic stuff both from modern scientific esotericism and traditional Merkaba wisdom of the Light-Body of man (main example in volume 3 the phenomenon of the “rainbow body” from Tibetan Vajrayana).
Metaphysics is the unitary mode.
What passes is unreal.
Life is eternal.
Ultimate reality is a logical fiction.
None of this is knowledge.
These are notes on a book *Metaphysics* by Aristotle.

One! (verb, imperative) Oneing, to one, is Metaphysics, or, Greek Non-Duality (Advaita).
You cannot avoid making decisions, but you can become aware of it.
Stop counting. Stop deciding to count. Become aware that you are counting, that is, twoing.
Aristotle wrote a mirror for the soul. That is part of his logical fiction.
In Metaphysics, the soul is the author, and the written book for the eyes is just the mirror.
Reality is created by vision of what is.
Beliefs are the visions of sleeping beings.
Awakeness is the natural state of lucidity when all is one since no-one counts.
Humans are entrapped in duality because they are internally at war with their intelligent part.
That is a construct that arises from counting. Your mind counts when it is afraid. It does not see that all is one, and there is no all. You are something that the mind is doing.
Human thoughts are incomplete. They end prematurely. Their proper end is always the beginning. It is circular, but is not circular since it has not moved.
Thoughts never end when they do not start.
The intellect is your temporal survival mode, to be suspended.
The Truth is to stop existing. Stop doing yourself and watch.
Truth is in observation, not in knowledge. Knowledge is a shifting set of lies.
The *Metaphysics* is a book that answers your questions before you ask them.
There are as many different Truths as there are observations.
Wisdom means to find unity of observation.
Metaphysics is the pursuit of wisdom.
Unity of observation depends upon the observer, not the observed.
In unity of observation there is no observer, only an observed/observing whole.
Facts are disappearing things, memories taken for reality.
Metaphysics has no opposite.
Titles in this two-part series:

Stefan Grossmann, *A Framework Commentary on the Fifteen Emerald Tablets of Thoth:*

*volume 1:* *Byzantine Philosophy: A Framework Analysis*

*volume 2:* *Atlantean Philosophy: The Nine Bodies of Man*

I have since published five additional books at archive.org that, partly or in whole, touch upon subjects of Byzantine philosophy, adding detail for certain questions, such as, the Renaissance transition, pagan survival (Euhemerism), general approaches in the study of Byzantine philosophy, strangeness in Turin shroud, general spirituality, Michael Psellos and the method of illumination, higher criticism and its research on the invention of the New Testament under emperor Constantine as the founding document of the intellectual history of Byzantium, reference to research on essences and energies in book Lambda of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (predating St. Gregory Palamas by 1600 years), etc. Completeness has been no aim. The titles of these additional books are:

Volumes 3-7:
- *Jesus and His Gnostic School, Dionysios to Plethon to Giordano Bruno*
- *Jesus and His Gnostic School, Part 2, Workbook: Towards a Spiritual Science*
- *Michael Psellos and the Method of Illumination*
- *Henology and Ontology in Byzantine Philosophy, Their Ancient Akroamatic Mental Powers*
- *Wisdom in Byzantium, New Chapters of Old Philosophy*

This Commentary weighs in as volumes 8-10:
- *Aristotle’s Metaphysics, A Commentary, Vol. 1*
- *Aristotle’s Metaphysics, A Commentary, Vol. 2*
- *Aristotle’s Metaphysics, A Commentary, Vol. 3* (the present volume)

throughout this book, abbreviated citation as: vol. 1, vol. 2, ..., vol. 9, (vol. 10),

or cited expressly as, e.g., vol. 2 “of this Commentary”.

Volume 2 is a study on: *Formal Consistency and Spirituality, Overcoming Psychosis.*
Volume 3 is an occult source book with photographs, a destruction for western materialists.
Both foregoing volumes are required for Metaphysics, book iota (10).
THE ORBS OF THE GODS

PLATO’S PARMENIDES MERKABA THEORY IN THE MIRROR OF VAJRAYANA (DIAMOND VEHICLE)

by Dr. Stefan Grossmann
Scholarship has so far overlooked the Greek Merkaba teaching of Plato in his dialogue “Parmenides”. The Merkaba is considered to be a Hebrew domain. Most hidden of all, however, and profoundest of extant Merkaba teachings, is Vajrayana, the esoteric Japanese and Tibetan Buddhism. This book looks into the connections and meanings. It is not written for specialists, since such do not yet exist for this question. The viewpoint comes from spiritual science as explained in the eight earlier books in this series (see series overview on one of the following pages.) The importance of the Chariot-Merkaba-Vajrayana is that it controls our paranormal powers. Further, it is the functional center of human biological immortality. This book expands on Appendix 10, the end of foregoing vol. 8. The overall subject is the ninth body of man, the Light-Body of the gods (with a small “g”). In the early writing stage of this book, something dawned on me that is described at the end of chapter 2 – I call it the “Jean Piaget Hypothesis”.
What Plato knew when his Parmenides entered in a chariot, a vehicle of inner golden Light – the Dalai Lama also knows.
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I try not to repeat myself directly, so please review what has been said to avoid such questions.
I refer to my eight foregoing pro bono books above.
The present book is the ninth and last.

In hindsight, I call my nine books: *Atlantis Awakening* series,
because this is not the first time it is being seen and said.
1 Review of Merkaba Theories

The Vajrayana

“This is the kind of Buddhism predominant in the Himalayan nations of Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and also Mongolia. It is known as Vajrayana because of the ritual use of the vajra, a symbol of imperishable diamond, of thunder and lightning.”

Quote (2016-09-06):
http://www.buddhanet.net/e-learning/history/b3schvaj.htm

“Vajrayana is a term describing the tantric or esoteric practices of Buddhism. The name Vajrayana means ‘diamond vehicle.’ ”

Quote (2016-09-06):
I

The steeds that bear me carried me as far as ever my heart
Desired, since they brought me and set me on the renowned
Way of the goddess, who with her own hands conducts the man
who knows through all things. On what way was I borne
along; for on it did the wise steeds carry me, drawing my car,
and maidens showed the way. And the axle, glowing in the socket
- for it was urged round by the whirling wheels at each
end - gave forth a sound as of a pipe, when the daughters of the
Sun, hasting to convey me into the light, threw back their veils
from off their faces and left the abode of Night.
There are the gates of the ways of Night and Day, fitted
above with a lintel and below with a threshold of stone. They
themselves, high in the air, are closed by mighty doors, and
Avenging Justice keeps the keys that open them. Her did
the maidens entreat with gentle words and skilfully persuade
to unfasten without demur the bolted bars from the gates.
Then, when the doors were thrown back,
they disclosed a widepening, when their brazen
hinges swung backwards in the
sockets fastened with rivets and nails. Straight through them,
on the broad way, did the maidens guide the horses and the car,
and the goddess greeted me kindly, and took my right hand
in hers, and spake to me these words:
“Welcome, noble youth, that comest to my abode on the car
that bears thee tended by immortal charioteers ! It is no ill
chance, but justice and right that has sent thee forth to travel
on this way. Far, indeed, does it lie from the beaten track of
men ! Meet it is that thou shouldst learn all things, as well
the unshaken heart of persuasive truth, as the opinions of mortals in which is no true belief at all. Yet none the less shalt thou learn of these things also, since thou must judge approvedly of the things that seem to men as thou goest through all things in thy journey."

II

Come now, I will tell thee - and do thou hearken to my saying and carry it away - the only two ways of search that can be thought of. The first, namely, that It is, and that it is impossible for anything not to be, is the way of conviction, for truth is its companion. The other, namely, that It is not, and that something must needs not be, – that, I tell thee, is a wholly untrustworthy path. For you cannot know what is not - that is impossible - nor utter it;

III

For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be.

(IV, V, missing in the text fragment)

VI

It needs must be that what can be thought and spoken of is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for, what is nothing to be. This is what I bid thee ponder. I hold thee back from this first way of inquiry, and from this other also, upon which mortals knowing naught wander in two minds; for hesitation guides the wandering thought in their breasts, so that they are borne along stupefied like men deaf and blind. Undiscerning crowds, in whose eyes the same thing and not the same is and is not, and all things travel in opposite directions !
VII

For this shall never be proved, that the things that are not are; and do thou restrain thy thought from this way of inquiry. Nor let habit force thee to cast a wandering eye upon this devious track, or to turn thither thy resounding ear or thy tongue; but do thou judge the subtle refutation of their discourse uttered by me.

VIII

One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that It is. In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and indestructible, alone, complete, immovable and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one. For what kind of origin for it will you look for? In what way and from what source could it have drawn its increase? I shall not let thee say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be thought nor uttered that what is not is. And, if it came from nothing, what need could have made it arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at all. Nor will the force of truth suffer aught to arise besides itself from that which in any way is. Wherefore, Justice does not loose her fetters and let anything come into being or pass away, but holds it fast.

"Is it or is it not?" Surely it is adjudged, as it needs must be, that we are to set aside the one way as unthinkable and nameless (for it is no true way), and that the other path is real and true. How, then, can what is be going to be in the future? Or how could it come into being? If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future. Thus is becoming extinguished and passing away not to be heard of. Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, and there is no more of it in one place than in another, to hinder it from holding
together, nor less of it, but everything is full of what is.
Wherefore all holds together; for what is; is in contact with what is.
Moreover, it is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without
beginning and without end; since coming into being
and passing away have been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away.
It is the same, and it rests in the self-same place, abiding in itself.
And thus it remaineth constant in its place; for hard necessity
keeps it in the bonds of the limit that holds it fast on every side.
Wherefore it is not permitted to what is to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing;
while, if it were infinite, it would stand in need of everything. It is the
same thing that can be thought and for the sake of which the thought exists;
for you cannot find thought without something that is, to which it is
betrothed. And there is not, and never shall be, any time other, than that which
is present, since fate has chained it so as to be whole and immovable.
Wherefore all these things are but the names which mortals
have given, believing them, to be true –
coming into being and passing away, being and not being,
change of place and alteration of bright colour.
Where, then, it has its farthest boundary, it is complete on
every side, equally poised from the centre in every direction,
like the mass of a rounded sphere; for it cannot be greater or
smaller in one place than in another. For there is nothing
which is not that could keep it from reaching out equally, nor
is it possible that there should be more of what is in this place
and less in that, since it is all inviolable. For, since it is equal
in all directions, it is equally confined within limits.
Here shall I close my trustworthy speech and thought about the truth.
Henceforward learn the opinions of mortals,
giving ear to the deceptive ordering of my words.
Mortals have settled in their minds to speak of two forms, one of which
they should have left out, and that is where they go astray from the truth.
They have assigned an opposite
substance to each, and marks distinct from one another. To the
one they allot the fire of heaven, light, thin, in every direction
the same as itself, but not the same as the other. The other is
opposite to it, dark night, a compact and heavy body. Of these I tell thee the whole arrangement as it seems to men, in order that no mortal may surpass thee in knowledge.

IX

Now that all things have been named light and night; and the things which belong to the power of each have been assigned to these things and to those, everything is full at once of light and dark night, both equal, since neither has aught to do with the other.

X

And thou shalt know the origin of all the things on high, and all the signs in the sky, and the resplendent works of the glowing sun’s clear torch, and whence they arose. And thou shalt learn likewise of the wandering deeds of the round-faced moon, and of her origin. Thou shalt know, too, the heavens that surround us, whence they arose, and how Necessity took them and bound them to keep the limits of the stars . . .

XI

How the earth, and the sun, and the moon, and the sky that is common to all, and the Milky Way, and the outermost Olympos, and the burning might of the stars arose.

XII

The narrower circles are filled with unmixed fire, and those surrounding them with night, and in the midst of these rushes their portion of fire. In the midst of these circles is the divinity that directs the course of all things; for she rules over all painful birth and all begetting, driving the female to the embrace of the male, and the male to that of the female.
First of all the gods she contrived Eros.

Shining by night with borrowed light, wandering round the earth.

Always straining her eyes to the beams of the sun.

On the right boys; on the left girls.

Thus, according to men's opinions, did things come into being, and thus they are now. In time (they think) they will grow up and pass away. To each of these things men have assigned a fixed name.

The Poem of Parmenides is an ancient Greek text fragment. Its title is On Nature. The author was Parmenides of Elea in the fifth century B.C. (thus, a philosopher of the Pre-Sokratic period). The poem is counted as difficult and is not fully understood. The first major exegesis was by Plato in fourth century B.C. Athens, the pupil of Sokrates and the teacher of Aristotle, in Plato's dialogue Parmenides. There are commentaries on Plato's Parmenides by later philosophers. Scholarship does not recognize that the text and commentary tradition is a Greek Merkaba tradition, on the face of it being independent of the Hebrew Merkaba tradition. From Plato on, the Parmenides is fundamental for dialectics, and from it (in Aristotle), also, logics. The secrets of the akroamatic understanding of Aristotelian logics are within the gamut of Parmenides, and thus, of the Merkaba (Hebrew), or Vajrayana (Tibetan). We have here the major transcultural spiritual universal of man.
Today, there is no unified Merkaba theory. Scholarly theories cover the Hebrew literary aspect. The spiritual function of the Merkaba is largely unknown, but there is already a growing research community in alternate spirituality, largely thanks to Drunvalo Melchizedek. The Platonic dialectical Merkaba is prominent but not recognized as such. Part One, on western Merkaba theories, includes preliminaries leading to the high Merkaba esoteric science of Tibetan Buddhism (or “Vajrayana”), who call the esoteric thing the “Diamond Vehicle” as the epitome of their system. Part Two delves into the currents of that ocean, Tibetan Buddhism, in quest of the Diamond Vehicle (Sanskrit: Vajrayana).

The “gates” mentioned early in the poem (read carefully) are, to my mind, the same as what, in Caballa, is called the “Tree of Life”. It is a visionary thing, actually the high point, of the poem. Caballa is, in that respect, an incomplete teaching as far as its present public availability is concerned. Jewish Merkaba mysticism has more to say on that in openly available literature.

Study should first and foremost be the study of the “gates”. The practice of the gates is their passage, which is formative of the add-on chakra system of the “Tree of Life” for the psychic control of the powerful Merkaba and its Light. A direct study of the Merkaba is not possible unless one is already a sufficiently advanced bird.

The traditional yantra for what is here called the Merkaba is the “Sri Yantra” that is shown on the internet. It instals in one’s energy bodies, over time, through meditation and dedicated breathing, the triangular / hexagonal / tetraedric geometrical self. The functional part is the inner visualization of the geometry without distracting particulars from the sensory memory. That takes places at the template level. A sign is when the Sri Yantra appears in a dream (lower energy body activity). “Lucid dreaming” is awakening Merkaba dreaming.

The “gates” exemplify a geometrical structure of spirit Light that is held in the Ketheric Template (seventh aura level, eighth body of man). The Ketheric Template has the ability to hold geometric forms. This comes from mathematics, geometry, logics, and dialectics. According to Thoth to Kerstin Simoné (in German), it is (thus) possible to transmute one’s inner workings into a crystalline phase. That is, to my mind, a prerequisite to a naturally functioning Merkaba. The “gates” open a departure venue from mortality via the Light-Body (Merkaba, orb, Unified Chakra, and other descriptions and names.) This can be envisioned of oneself in a self-reflective way in meditation, like in a spirit mirror. The best way for people on Earth to go about this is to stop believing in religions, and to believe in God.

Aarioe’s Pistis Sophia, mentioned late-on in my vol. 7, is a potent direct Merkaba installer text, with template level non-sensory geometries, golden spiritual Light and other goodies, in many ways comparable, but not as intellectual as, Plato’s dialogue Parmenides. The Pistis Sophia is simply overwhelming in this regard, for those who are ready (enough) for it. It is a worthy legacy to have been left.
The Sri Yantra, geometric universal of Merkaba assimilation. There are other renditions, e.g. without the round rim, lines only, etc. What is meant is: the archetype.
Advanced technology also uses the Merkaba. For example, a frequent “saucer” type of “UFO” (often observed, some are real) needs to arrange its triple propulsion externals in 120° angles. That is part of the invisible Merkaba mechanic. Researchers have noticed the principle behind this as “Shape Power”; see introductory in my vol. 4 Workbook: Towards a Spiritual Science, chapter 12 on Gustav Fechner.

The electrical engineering of Nikola Tesla was based primarily on this principle (even though a principle does not make a machine.) Similarly, author Col. Thomas E. Bearden struggles with the geometries without seeing the light (or without making it public in a dangerously censored research field.) Others, such as John Bedini, have successfully built prototypes of such electrical machines (overunity machines, also called “free energy” devices such as in the book title by Patrick Kelly.) There are many patents granted by state authorities to inventors to such effect.

Details of the machine aspect are not subject of this book. I refer to the authors mentioned and to many others. The key mistake of school physics to this day is to assume a crypto SI unit “money” (haha).
Above: A Merkaba with a human inside it. The Merkaba is the elusive “ninth body” or Light-Body. The ninth body was destroyed in the fall of Lemuria and Atlantis. The graphic does not show the birotational spin of the dual tetrahedra, nor does it show the fragmented paraphysical ten-chakra system (Cabala).
Cephalus rehearses a dialogue which is supposed to have been narrated in his presence by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus and Glaucon, to certain Clazomenians.

We had come from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora. Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?

Yes; that is why I am here; I wish to ask a favour of you.
What may that be? he said.
I want you to tell me the name of your half brother, which I have forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but that was a long time ago; his father's name, if I remember rightly, was Pyrilampes?

Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?

Let me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was intimate with a certain Pythodorus, a friend of Zeno, and remembers a conversation which took place between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides many years ago, Pythodorus having often recited it to him.
Quite true.
And could we hear it? I asked.
Nothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful study of the piece; at present his thoughts run in another direction; like his grandfather Antiphon he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near, and he has only just left us to go home.

Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. When he had done with the smith, his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to Athens, as he said, at the great Panathenaea; the former was, at the time of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favoured. Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, tall and fair to look upon; in the days of his youth he was reported to have been beloved by Parmenides. He said that they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither Socrates, then a very young man, came to see them, and many others with him; they wanted to hear the writings of Zeno, which had been brought to Athens for the first time on the occasion of their visit. These Zeno himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides, and had very nearly finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles who was afterwards one of the Thirty, and heard the little that remained of the dialogue. Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before.

When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis of the first argument might be read over again, and this having been done, he said: What is your meaning, Zeno? Do you maintain that if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like-is that your position?

Just so, said Zeno.
And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according to you, being could not be many; for this would involve an impossibility. In all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of the many? and is not each division of your treatise intended to furnish a separate proof of this, there being in all as many proofs of the not-being of the many as you have composed arguments? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?

No, said Zeno; you have correctly understood my general purpose.
I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno would like to be not only one with you in friendship but your second self in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and would fain make believe that he is telling us something which is new. For you, in your poems, say The All is one, and of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he on the other hand says There is no many; and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence. You affirm unity, he denies plurality. And so you deceive the world into believing that you are saying different things when really you are saying much the same. This is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.
Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not fully apprehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really such an artificial work as you imagine; for what you speak of was an accident; there was no pretence of a great purpose; nor any serious intention of deceiving the world. The truth is, that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who make fun of him and seek to show the many ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the affirmation of the one. My answer is addressed to the partisans of the many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon them that their hypothesis of the being of many, if carried out, appears to be still more ridiculous than the hypothesis of the being of one. Zeal for my master led me to write the book in the days of my youth, but some one stole the copy; and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not; the motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an elder man, but the pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one.

I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself, and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate-things which participate in likeness become in that degree and manner like; and so far as they participate in unlikeness become in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike, by reason of this participation? Where is the wonder? Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a wonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both. Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of all the rest: I should be surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite qualities; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In both instances he proved his case. So again, if a person shows that such things as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the coexistence the one and many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism. If however, as I just now suggested, some one were to abstract simple notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and then to show that these admit of admixture and separation in themselves, I should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have shown to exist in visible objects.
While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but still they gave the closest attention and often looked at one another, and smiled as if in admiration of him. When he had finished, Parmenides expressed their feelings in the following words:-

Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell me now, was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many, and of the other things which Zeno mentioned?

I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates.

Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?

Yes, he said, I should.

And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water?

I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or not.

And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the mention may provoke a smile?-I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into contact, or not?

Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them.

Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at your age, you are too much disposed to regard opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty?

Yes, certainly, said Socrates that is my meaning.

Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of participation?
There cannot be, he said.
Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many?

Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.
Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself.

Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may be one; and the same in all at the same time.

I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, there would be one whole including many—is not that your meaning?

I think so.
And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it only, and different parts different men?

The latter.
Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them?

That seems to follow.
Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?

Certainly not, he said.
Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many great things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than absolute greatness—is that conceivable?

No.
Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of equality less than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by virtue of that portion only?

Impossible.
Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater; if the absolutely small be greater, that to which the part of the small is added will be smaller and not greater than before.

How absurd!
Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?

Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily answered.
Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?
What question?
I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each kind is as follows: -You see a number of great objects, and when you look at them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them all; hence you conceive of greatness as one.

Very true, said Socrates.
And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one view the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea, and -to compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of all these?

It would seem so.
Then another idea of greatness now comes into view over and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, over and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each idea instead of being one will be infinitely multiplied.

But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication.

And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?
Impossible, he said.
The thought must be of something?
Yes.
Of something which is or which is not?
Of something which is.
Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature?

Yes.
And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in all, be an idea?

From that, again, there is no escape.
Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates in the ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and that all things think; or that they are thoughts but have no thought?

The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one. In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other things are like them, and resemblances of them-what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.
But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of like.

Impossible.
And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?

They must.
And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself?

Certainly.
Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always be coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another; and new ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?

Quite true.
The theory, then that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised?

It would seem so.
Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the ideas to be absolute?

Yes, indeed.
And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single idea, parting it off from other things.

What difficulty? he said.
There are many, but the greatest of all is this:-If an opponent argues that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must remain unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who denies their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge, and is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will remain unconvinced, and still insist that they cannot be known.

What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.
In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who maintains the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they cannot exist in us.

No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.
True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to one another, their essence is determined by a relation among themselves, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that name
when we partake of them. And the things which are within our sphere and have the same names with them, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the ideas which have the same names with them, but belong to themselves and not to them.

What do you mean? said Socrates.
I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:-A master has a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them, which is simply a relation of one man to another. But there is also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we with them; they are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?

Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.
And will not knowledge-I mean absolute knowledge-answer to absolute truth?

Certainly.
And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being?

Yes.
But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?

Certainly.
But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?

No, we cannot.
And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge?

Yes.
And we have not got the idea of knowledge?
No.
Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?

I suppose not.
Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us?

It would seem so.
I think that there is a stranger consequence still.
What is it?
Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest?

Yes.
And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?

Certainly.
But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?

Why not?
Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are not valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation to them; the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres.

Yes, that has been admitted.
And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the things of men.

Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.

These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of the difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we determine each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears what may be said against them will deny the very existence of them-and even if they do exist, he will say that they must of necessity be unknown to man; and he will seem to have reason on his side, and as we were remarking just now, will be very difficult to convince; a man must be gifted with very considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated them is able to teach them to others.

I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much to my mind.

And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his attention on these and the like difficulties, does away with ideas of things and will not admit that every individual thing has its own determinate idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to have particularly noted.

Very true, he said.
But, then, what is to become of philosophy? Whither shall we turn, if the ideas are unknown?

I certainly do not see my way at present.
Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine; but there is an art
which is called by the vulgar idle talking, and which is of imagined to be useless; in that you must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp.

And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend?

That which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I give you credit for saying to him that you did not care to examine the perplexity in reference to visible things, or to consider the question that way; but only in reference to objects of thought, and to what may be called ideas.

Why, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing by this method that visible things are like and unlike and may experience anything.

Quite true, said Parmenides; but I think that you should go a step further, and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis, but also the consequences which flow from denying the hypothesis; and that will be still better training for you.

What do you mean? he said.
I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno’s about the many, you should inquire not only what will be the consequences to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the being of the many, but also what will be the consequences to the one and the many in their relation to themselves and to each other, on the opposite hypothesis. Or, again, if likeness is or is not, what will be the consequences in either of these cases to the subjects of the hypothesis, and to other things, in relation both to themselves and to one another, and so of unlikeness; and the same holds good of motion and rest, of generation and destruction, and even of being and not-being. In a word, when you suppose anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the consequences in relation to the thing itself, and to any other things which you choose-to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all; and so of other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.

That, Parmenides, is a tremendous business of which you speak, and I do not quite understand you; will you take some hypothesis and go through the steps?-then I shall apprehend you better.

That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.
Then will you, Zeno? said Socrates.
Zeno answered with a smile:-Let us make our petition to Parmenides himself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the extent of the task which you are imposing on him; and if there were more of us I should not ask him, for these are not subjects which any one, especially at his age, can well speak of before a large audience; most people are not aware that this round-about progress through all things is the only way in which the mind can attain truth and wisdom. And therefore, Parmenides, I join in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the process again which I have not heard for a long time.
When Zeno had thus spoken, Pythodorus, according to Antiphon’s report of him, said, that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole company entreated Parmenides to give an example of the process. I cannot refuse, said Parmenides; and yet I feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in his old age, against his will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old racehorse, who was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he knew so well—this was his simile of himself. And I also experience a trembling when I remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of life. But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we are alone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypothesis the one? and consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not being of one?

By all means, said Zeno.
And who will answer me? he said. Shall I propose the youngest? He will not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what he thinks; and his answers will give me time to breathe.

I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for I am the youngest and at your service. Ask, and I will answer.

Parmenides proceeded: If one is, he said, the one cannot be many?
Impossible.
Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole?
Why not?
Because every part is part of a whole; is it not?
Yes.
And what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole?
Certainly.
Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as having parts?
To be sure.
And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?
True.
But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?
It ought.
Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not have parts?
No.
But if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle, nor end; for these would of course be parts of it.
Right.
But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything?
Certainly.
Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?
Yes, unlimited.
And therefore formless; for it cannot partake either of round or straight.

But why?
Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the centre?

Yes.
And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the extremes?

True.
Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook either of a straight or of a circular form?

Assuredly.
But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?
Right.
And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it cannot be either in another or in itself.

How so?
Because if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in which it was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts; but that which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular nature, cannot be touched all round in many places.

Certainly not.
But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be contained by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were really in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it.

Impossible.
But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained? for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will be no longer one, but two?

True.
Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?
No.
Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either rest or motion.

Why not?
Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in place or changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion.

Yes.
And the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be any longer one.

It cannot.
It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of nature?

Clearly not.
Then can the motion of the one be in place?
Perhaps.
But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another?

It must.
And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre; and that which goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different from the centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be carried round upon a centre?

Impossible.
But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place?
Perhaps so, if it moves at all.
And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything?
Yes.
Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not?

I do not see why.
Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can neither as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor be altogether out of it, if already coming into being in it.

Certainly not.
And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and then one part may be in, and another part out of that other; but that which has no parts can never be at one and the same time neither wholly within nor wholly without anything.

True.
And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has no parts, and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere, since it cannot come into being either as a part or as a whole?

Clearly.
Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot, not by going somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by change in itself?

Very true.
Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable?
Immoveable.
But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm.
Yes, we said so.
Then it is never in the same?
Why not?
Because if it were in the same it would be in something.
Certainly.
And we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?

True.
Then one is never in the same place?
It would seem not.
But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest?
Never.
One then, as would seem, is neither rest nor in motion?
It certainly appears so.
Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than itself or other.

How is that?
If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one.

True.
And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so that upon this supposition too, it would not have the nature of one, but would be other than one?

It would.
Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself?
It will not.
Neither will it be other than other, while it remains one; for not one, but only other, can be other than other, and nothing else.

True.
Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?
Certainly not.
But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not be other than anything?

Right.
Neither will one be the same with itself.
How not?
Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.
Why not?
It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it becomes one.
What of that?
Anything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many and not one.

True.
But, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing became the same, it
would always become one; and when it became one, the same?

Certainly.
And, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with itself, and will therefore be one and
also not one.

Surely that is impossible.
And therefore the one can neither be other than other, nor the same with itself.

Impossible.
And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to itself or other?

No.
Neither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other.
Why not?
Because likeness is sameness of affections.
Yes.
And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?
That has been shown.
But if the one had any other affection than that of being one, it would be affected in such a way as to
be more than one; which is impossible.

True.
Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another or with itself?

Clearly not.
Then it cannot be like another, or like itself?
No.
Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be affected in such a way as to be more
than one.

It would.
That which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be unlike itself or another, for sameness
of affections is likeness.

True.
But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never unlike itself or other?
Never.
Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?
Plainly not.
Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor unequal either to itself or to other.

How is that?
Why, because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that to which it is equal.

True.
And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it, the one will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer than that which is greater?

Yes.
And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will have greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that which is greater.

Certainly.
But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same measures or have anything else the same?
Impossible.
And not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either with itself or with another?

It appears so.
But again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as many parts as it has measures; and thus again the one will be no longer one but will have as many parts as measures.

Right.
And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure; yet it has been shown to be incapable of equality.

It has.
Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of few, nor of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be greater or less than itself, or other?

Certainly.
Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or of the same age with it?

Why not?
Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other, must partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one did not partake either of equality or of likeness?
We did say so.
And we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness.

Very true.
How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger than anything, or have the same age with it?

In no way.
Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself or with another?

Clearly not.
Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for must not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?

Certainly.
And that which is older, must always be older than something which is younger?

True.
Then, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older than.

What do you mean?
I mean this:-A thing does not need to become different from another thing which is already different; it is different, and if its different has become, it has become different; if its different will be, it will be different; but of that which is becoming different, there cannot have been, or be about to be, or yet be, a different-the only different possible is one which is becoming.

That is inevitable.
But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger, and to nothing else.

True.
Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, become younger than itself?

Yes.
But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a shorter time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become, and be about to be, for the same time with itself?

That again is inevitable.
Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every case, I suppose, be of the same age with themselves; and must also become at once older and younger than themselves?

Yes.
But the one did not partake of those affections?
Not at all.
Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?
So the argument shows.
Well, but do not the expressions "was," and "has become," and "was becoming," signify a participation of past time?

Certainly.
And do not "will be," "will become," "will have become," signify a participation of future time?

Yes.
And "is," or "becomes," signifies a participation of present time?
Certainly.
And if the one is absolutely without participation in time, it never had become, or was becoming, or was at any time, or is now become or is becoming, or is, or will become, or will have become, or will be, hereafter.

Most true.
But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?
There are none.
Then the one cannot possibly partake of being?
That is the inference.
Then the one is not at all?
Clearly not.
Then the one does not exist in such way as to be one; for if it were and partook of being, it would already be; but if the argument is to be trusted, the one neither is nor is one?

True.
But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?
Of course not.
Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor opinion, nor knowledge of it?

Clearly not.
Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor known, nor does anything that is perceive it.

So we must infer.
But can all this be true about the one?
I think not.

Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis; let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question appears.

I shall be very happy to do so.
We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is?

Yes.
Then we will begin at the beginning:-If one is, can one be, and not partake of being?

Impossible.
Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the one have participated in being, for the proposition that one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one; but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is:-am I not right?

Quite right.
We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?
Of course.
And when we put them together shortly, and say "One is," that is equivalent to saying, "partakes of being"?

Quite true.
Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have parts?

How so?
In this way:-If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?

Certainly.
And is each of these parts-one and being to be simply called a part, or must the word "part" be relative to the word "whole"?

The latter.
Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?
Certainly.
Again, of the parts of the one, if it is-I mean being and one-does either fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?

Impossible.
Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and is at the least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on for ever, and every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always involves one, and one being; so that one is always disappearing, and becoming two.

Certainly.
And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?
Clearly.
Let us take another direction.
What direction?
We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?
Yes.
And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many?
True.
But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it partakes-will this abstract one be one only or many?
One, I think.
Let us see:-Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?
Certainly.
If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is one that it is other than being; nor because being is being that it is other than the one; but they differ from one another in virtue of otherness and difference.
Certainly.
So that the other is not the same either with the one or with being?
Certainly not.
And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one, or the one and the other, in every such case we take two things, which may be rightly called both.
How so.
In this way-you may speak of being?
Yes.
And also of one?
Yes.
Then now we have spoken of either of them?
Yes.
Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?
Certainly.
And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other-in any such case do I not speak of both?
Yes.
And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?
Undoubtedly.
And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?
It cannot.
Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one?

Clearly.
And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three?

Yes.
And three are odd, and two are even?
Of course.
And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three?

Certainly.
There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice three?

Of course.
If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are two and thrice, there is thrice two?

Undoubtedly.
Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd times, and even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.

True.
And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be?

None whatever.
Then if one is, number must also be?
It must.
But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite multiplicity of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and partakes also of being: am I not right?

Certainly.
And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate?

Yes.
Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being?

In no way.
And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into being of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things; the divisions of it have no limit.
True.
Then it has the greatest number of parts?
Yes, the greatest number.
Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?
Impossible.
But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be none?

Certainly.
Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?

True.
But reflect: an one in its entirety, be in many places at the same time?

No; I see the impossibility of that.
And if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for it cannot be present with all the parts of being, unless divided.

True.
And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?
Certainly.
Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than the one, into parts equal to the one; the one is never wanting to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and coextensive.

Certainly that is true.
The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite?

True.
Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many?

Certainly.
Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained the whole?

Certainly.
And that which contains, is a limit?
Of course.
Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having limits and yet unlimited in number?

Clearly.
And because having limits, also having extremes?
Certainly.
And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

No.
Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.
It will.
But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it would not be in the middle?

Yes.
Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two?

True.
And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.

How?
Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.
True.
And all the parts are contained by the whole?
Yes.
And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?
No.
And the one is the whole?
Of course.
But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.

That is true.
But then, again, the whole is not in the parts—neither in all the parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one; for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?

It cannot.
Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.

Yes, impossible.
But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?

Certainly.
If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in another.

Very true.
The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and also in another.

Certainly.
The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in motion?

How?
The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.

True.
And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?
Certainly.
Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at rest, in motion?

True.
Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion?

Clearly.
And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the same with the others, and other than the others; this follows from its previous affections.

How so?
Every thing in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.

Clearly.
And is the one a part of itself?
Certainly not.
Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to itself as whole to part?

It cannot.
But is the one other than one?
No.
And therefore not other than itself?
Certainly not.
If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself?
Certainly.
But then, again, a thing which is in another place from "itself," if this "itself" remains in the same place with itself, must be other than "itself," for it will be in another place?

True.
Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?
Yes.
Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?
True.
Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other than that which is other?

Certainly.
And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the one other than the not-one?

Of course.
Then the one will be other than the others?
True.
But, consider:-Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another?

Of course.
Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?
They will not.
If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the game. Is not that true?

Yes. And since the other-is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is.

True.
Then the other will never be either in the not one, or in the one?
Certainly not.
Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the not-one other than the one.

No.
Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other.

How can they be?
But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another?

They will.
Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.
True.
Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all.

It would not.
Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?

It would.
If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one?

No.
But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another: -so we said?

Yes.
Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it?

Let us say so.
Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself and the others.

That appears to be the inference. And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?

Perhaps.
Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also be other than the one.

Yes.
And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?

True.
And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?
Yes.
In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and the others like the one.

How do you mean?
I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing?

Yes.
And you may say the name once or oftener?
Yes.
And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once?

Of course it is the same.
And is not "other" a name given to a thing?
Certainly.
Whenever, then, you use the word "other," whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?

True.
Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others, in repeating the word "other" we speak of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?

Quite true.
Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than the one, in that the word "other" is applied to both, will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?

Yes.
Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every thing.

True.
Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
Yes.
And the other to the same?
True again.
And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?
Yes.
And to be, the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others?

Certainly.
And in that it was other it was shown to be like?
Yes.
But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite affection to that which made it and this was the affection of otherness.

Yes.
The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite of the other.

True.
Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as it is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.

Yes, that argument may be used.
And there is another argument.
What?
In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected otherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is like; but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.

True.
Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like and unlike the others?

Certainly.
And in the same way as being other than itself, and the same with itself on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike itself.

Of course.
Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?-Consider.

I am considering.
The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?
True.
And also in other things?
Yes.
In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them, and would touch itself only.

Clearly.
Then the inference is that it would touch both?
It would.
But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to touch another be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy the place nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?

True.
Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?

It ought.
And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places at once, and this, while it is one, will never happen.
No.
Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?
It cannot.
Neither can it touch others.
Why not?
The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no third thing can be between them.

True.
Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?

They are.
And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two?

Yes.
And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like manner; and for every one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is added to the contacts.

True.
Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one less.

True.
But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?
How can there be?
And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one and have no part in the one?

True.
Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?
Of course not.
Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name of any number?

No.
One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?
Clearly not.
And if there are not two, there is no contact?
There is not.
Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact?

Certainly not.
For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others?
True.
Further—is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?
How do you mean?
If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other in virtue of their being the one and the others; but, if in addition to their being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another, or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the one had greatness and the others smallness—whichever kind had greatness would be greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller?

Certainly.
Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if they were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which is.

How could they?
If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole?

Certainly.
Suppose the first; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the whole one, or will contain the one?

Clearly.
If it be co-extensive with the one it will be coequal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?

Of course.
But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?

Impossible.
Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only?

Yes.
And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole will recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.

Certainly.
Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part; nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.

True.
Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there will be something greater other and besides greatness itself, namely, that in which greatness is; and this too when the small
itself is not there, which the one, if it is great, must exceed; this, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.

True.
But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.

Very true.
Then other things not greater or less than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness; nor have greatness or smallness any power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to one another; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, if it has neither greatness nor smallness.

Clearly not.
Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them?

Certainly not.
And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality; and being on an equality, must be equal.

Of course.
And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself; having neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.

Certainly.
Then the one will be equal to both itself and the others?
Clearly so.
And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself; and, as contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than itself.

It will.
Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others?

Of course not.
But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?
Yes.
But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will be greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.

True.
And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in the others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere?

That is clear.
But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the others, because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the others are in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.

True.
The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others?

Clearly.
And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more and less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if of measures, also of parts?

Of course.
And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to the others?

How is that?
It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as many parts as measures; and so with that to which it is equal, and that than which it is less.

True.
And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself; and if of measures then also of parts?

It will.
And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself?

Certainly.
And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and inasmuch as it is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal in size to other things, it will be equal to them in number.

Certainly.
Once more then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal to and more and less than both itself and all other things.

It will.
Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older and younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, by virtue of participation in time?

How do you mean?
If one is, being must be predicated of it?
Yes.
But to be (einai) is only participation of being in present time, and to have been is the participation of being at a past time, and to be about to be is the participation of being at a future time?

Very true.
Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?
Certainly.
And is not time always moving forward?
Yes.
Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves forward in time?

Certainly.
And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger?
I remember.
Then since the one becomes older than itself, it becomes younger at the same time?

Certainly.
Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?
Yes.
And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming, it gets to the point of time. between "was" and "will be," which is "now": for surely in going from the past to the future, it cannot skip the present?

No.
And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and no longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be reached by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to touch both the present and the future, letting go the present and seizing the future, while in process of becoming between them.

True.
But that which is becoming cannot skip the present; when it reaches the present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to be becoming.

Clearly.
And so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become, and is then older.

Certainly.
And it is older than that than which it was becoming older, and it was becoming older than itself.
Yes.
And that which is older is older than that which is younger?
True.
Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present?

Certainly.
But the present is always present with the one during all its being; for whenever it is it is always now.

Certainly.
Then the one always both is and becomes older and younger than itself?

Truly.
And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself?

An equal time.
But if it becomes or is for an equal time with itself, it is of the same age with itself?

Of course.
And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger?
No.
The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself?

I should say not.
And what are its relations to other things? Is it or does it become older or younger than they?

I cannot tell you.
Above: A stellated octahedron (dual tetrahedra) with a crystal ball inside. The geometry is a schematic depiction of a human Merkaba, not spinning.
2  Plato’s Parmenides, What It Is

Unlike Sokrates and Aristotle, Plato was an immortal, one of nearly 40,000 living on this planet in our dimensional plane of reality. He was also Leonardo da Vinci. At death, a fake body shell is left behind, a type of bilocation. He is a master of the human life energy system, a medical doctor from a higher plane, if you like. What his dialogue Parmenides can show us is that the heart chakra (see especially in vol. 7) is vastly reduced. The full-fledged heart chakra (anahata) is the same as the Merkaba (same as, Light-Body, same as, unified chakra). There is a great disconnect about the Merkaba, as something quite inexplicable, if that is not the anchor point of our understanding.

The Parmenides is arguably the dryest, and the most cerebral, of Plato’s dialogues. The energetic trick is to move the dialogue from the brain (rational intellect) to the heart mind. That is the way to unlock the esoteric content. When the anahata “feels” the Merkaba into existence, that is the way to awaken it, and to heal its presently fragmented state from the fall of Lemuria and Atlantis. That type of seeing is similar to seeing the perspective lines which are implied in geometric paintings, such as many famous and less well known realistic paintings of the European Renaissance period.

Admittedly, that has not overly much to do with the present “Merkaba” discussion that, just now, I once again reviewed on the internet (evening of 2016-09-06). The Merkaba is not the construct of the spiritually separated rational ego mind; but there are ways of getting to an understanding of what it is and what it does. It is not an external “Saviour” mechanism, either, which is another false expectation of the unawakened people of all historical epochs. The fully developed Merkaba is a Unified Chakra, and at the same time the ninth body of man, the Light-Body, which forms in the cosmic paraphysical context above individual man under the deific Cosmic Center, the main GOD presence in a local universe such as ours; it is a connection field and is within the domain of the Fourth Force, Holy Spirit, Christ Michael, overflowing with spiritual Love-Light. It is man becoming Love again.

Working through Plato’s Parmenides is, unfortunately, tough. That is part of the exercise, however. The sentences are clear, but what they tell us somehow shakes us until much of the Shadow has dissipated. Only then can our low mind actually make sense of what Plato is writing. His argument is formal, about dialectics. It is a dialectics of his forms/ideas, which really spins our rational mind. At some point - click! - our system grasps it and switches over to the heart mind. That is the message which is actually a therapy for coming out of the brain cave into the Light of the heart reality. Our life center thereby ascends to a higher dimension in our life energy system of plasmatic energy bodies. With that, I recommend reading Plato’s Parmenides so often until it goes click. Slow reading is better if you can get your brain waves to slow down (through yoga, breathing entrainment, etc.) This might take a week or two.
Above: psychic Orbs in Clearwell Caves (source: Wikipedia). These orbs were photographed. They are aura phenomena made of consciousness plasma (Levengood plasma), which is, expressed in particle physics terms, electron plasma. (Continued on next page.)
Above: graphic of a Merkaba, approximated to action (luminous, rotating to form a sphere, dual tetrahedral geometry left in place to still be visible.) The Merkaba (Light-Body, ninth body of man, fragmented today from the Fall of Man) is a psychic Orb (see photo on foregoing page). The Orb/Merkaba, practically invisible coming from a mortal human, is that which leaves the physical body and the three lower energy bodies at death. The Orb projects all bodies and is that which reincarnates. The astral body (soul, fourth energy body) sheds around 19% of its electrons after death and thus can partly renew itself. After each fourth incarnation, the astral body is thereby practically renewed. Orbs can vary their size psychically and have an extremely information-laden fine structure down to subatomic levels.

An Orb forms the center of a human bio-computer. During the incarnation, it is the dan tien with three regular simultaneous locations relative to the physical body. It is the most finely vibrating part of a human and is twelve-dimensional (or eleven dimensional if one counts dimensions 10 and 11 as one dimension.) There is an orb in every living being. The planets, stars, galaxies and universes are Orbs, also, as far as they are not dead (as far as their internal “Flower of Light” astral fire is still alive.) All Orbs are networked, by non-local and non-temporal means, with the Cosmic Center. Orphaned Orbs who entirely lose their connectivity fall into dark realms (“hell”). Orbs that finish their Creation process through many reincarnations (and, many parallel incarnations in many worlds) leave the material Creation worlds upwards to Paradise, the Great Ether, or World of Light. Orbs are immortal and can be destroyed only by angels of the Light after a complicated court proceeding. (Graphic by me, SG.)
Impression from the Bible, Old Testament: Ezekiel – Vision – Merkaba
Leonardo – Merkaba – Man
The Dainichi Nyorai (Great Sun Buddha), Enjō-ji, Japan (see in chapter 6 below). (Negative + sepia.)
The Dainichi Nyorai (Great Sun Buddha), Enjō-ji, Japan (see in chapter 6 below). (Negative + sepia.)
The scholarly literature is quite helpful. Plato’s *Parmenides* is an interesting subject under scholarly aspects. Along the way of doing what I recommended on the first page of this chapter, inwardly and outwardly, the reader goes through a master course in philosophical formal intelligence. I did that in my student years and have found that very useful (thinking back to that now.) That is slightly more than thirty years ago for me now. That might suggest not to expect results over night but to plant the right seeds in yourself.

Here is some selected literature. Due to the gravity of the subject, I will add some comments below. The basis for all this is reading, and re-reading, the text of Plato’s *Parmenides* provided above (or a good newer translation, or the original classical Greek if you happen to be literate in that.) It settles, over time, as an energetic structure like a shining star in one’s inside, somatically in the heart region. It does not have a rigid geometry, but is pulsating and radiant. I find the translator Benjamin Jowett’s style most appropriate.

You want to familiarize yourself with chapter 6 below, which was written down, and was assembled pictorially, between the foregoing paragraph and the following.

There are movements as to the text of Parmenides’ poem “On Nature”. Mainly, however, Parmenides (the philosopher in Elea, lived earlier than Plato) has finally found a turn-around modern interpretation in Michael V. Wedin.


Christopher John Kurfess; *Restoring Parmenides’ Poem: Essays toward a New Arrangement of the Fragments Based on a Reassessment of the Original Sources*; PhD Thesis, University of Pittsburgh 2012

Michael V. Wedin; *Parmenides’ Grand Deduction, A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of Truth*; Oxford 2014

The flyer text for Wedin reads:

“Michael V. Wedin presents a new interpretation of Parmenides’ Way of Truth: the most important philosophical treatise before the work of Plato and Aristotle. The Way of Truth contains the first extended philosophical argument in the western tradition—an argument which decrees that there can be no motion, change, growth, coming to be, or destruction; and indeed that there can be only one thing. These severe metaphysical theses are established by a series of deductions and these deductions in turn rest on an even more fundamental claim, namely, the claim that it is impossible that there be something that is not. This claim is itself established by a deduction that Wedin calls the Governing Deduction. Wedin offers a rigorous reconstruction of the Governing Deduction and shows how it is used in the arguments that establish Parmenides’ severe metaphysical theses (what Wedin calls the Corollaries of the Governing Deduction). He also provides successful answers to most commentators who find Parmenides’ arguments to be shot through with logical fallacies. Finally, Wedin turns to what is currently the fashionable reading of Parmenides, according to which he falls squarely in the tradition of the Ionian natural philosophers. He argues that the arguments for the Ionian Interpretation fail badly. Thus, we must simply determine where Parmenides’ argument runs, and here there is no substitute for rigorous logical reconstruction. On this count, as our reconstructions make clear, the argument
of the Way of Truth leads to a Parmenides who is indeed a severe arbiter of philosophical discourse and who brings to a precipitous halt the entire enterprise of natural explanation in the Ionian tradition.”

It is Wedin’s Parmenides, not the Parmenides of those before Wedin who fail to see the monumental metaphysical (paraphysical) philosophical stature of the poem “On Nature”, that Plato pulled into his dialogue Parmenides. (Sorry for the bluntness, but of course their work has helped and informed Wedin.) With this caveat:

John A. Palmer; Plato’s Reception of Parmenides; Oxford 1999

Samuel C. Rickless; Plato’s Forms in Transition, A Reading of the Parmenides; New York 2007

Rickless, while interpreting Plato’s dialogue, already recognizes the turn in the interpretation of Parmenides. The older literature, as far as it is still pertinent, can be found in Wedin, Palmer and Rickless; reference to their voluminous apparatuses is made.

What follows is my critical reading of Palmer, Rickless, and Wedin (in this sequence), under the aspects of Merkaba theory as predisposed above and in chapter 6 below. A fundamental insight of this exercise is that Plato’s dialogue Parmenides, having drawn numerous comments from philosophers, is actually itself a commentary on the chariot poem of Parmenides.

Enough is said in the above vein. The initial concept of this difficult and experimental book has met a wall. I have now changed the numbering of chapter 6 (finished on Sept. 11) to chapter 3 (the next chapter). Alas, the Tibetan materials, for good reasons, are restricted, even though they are not unavailable. I do not want to circumvent the restriction of those materials.

At the very end of chapter 3 (formerly, in the initial draft stage, chapter 6), I made a conjecture, more or less jestingly, about “reverse birth” and Jean Piaget. I now come to the conclusion that there is more to that, and that that may enable the development of the Merkaba subject to take a less philosophical, and more medically oriented, course, after Jean Piaget’s developmental psychology of the childhood stage.

I will explore more in what is now the newly conceived chapter: 4. The Jean Piaget Hypothesis. It will deal mainly with the formation of abstract geometrical archetypes. The evidence in chapter 3 suggests that that may be the key to the Merkaba which is, after all, a geometric formation in our energy body system.
The Dainichi Nyorai (Great Sun Buddha)
in Japanese Shingon Buddhism

Buddhism was brought to Japan by a Chinese monk, Jianzhen (鑒真, Chinese: Chien-chen, Japanese: Ganjin, 688-763) in the eighth century A.D. While this was not the first contact of Buddhism with Japan, Jianzhen reformed the Ritsu “school”, or monastic school aspect, of Buddhism in Japan, establishing a study group emphasizing strict rules of monastic discipline (vinaya). Yuzhi Zhou writes (p. 49):

"In 753, the vinaya master Ganjin and his disciples finally arrived in Japan after experiencing extreme hardships during five failed attempts to cross the sea, during which Ganjin lost his eyesight. After his arrival in Japan, an adequate number of monks able to perform ordination ceremonies emerged.”

That is arguably the founding event that allowed monastic Buddhism to take an organized lasting foothold in Japan to this day. It is not actually the founding of Buddhism in Japan in the sense of a first contact.

In Japan, Buddhism transformed in a complex insular tradition of great beauty, building on the structures of the original Theravada Buddhism from north India, the work of the “Second Buddha” Nagarjuna and other Mahayana founders, and the many Chinese differentiations as far as they proved to be suitable for Japan, also from transmissions of Buddhism via Korea. By the time Buddhism established its hold in Japan, the recondite concept of a “vehicle”, grown out of the lofty problem(s) of “Buddha-body”, was already deeply rooted in the secretive movements.

This overall history of Buddhism in Japan is quite accessible today, see, for example:
Kenji Matsuo; *A History of Japanese Buddhism*; Folkestone 2007
Charles Eliot; *Japanese Buddhism*; London, New York 2005
Christoph Kleine; *Der Buddhismus in Japan, Geschichte, Lehre, Praxis*; Tübingen 2011 (German, very detailed)
Yuzhi Zhou; *Ganjin: From Vinaya Master to Ritsu School Founder*; in: Journal of Asian Humanities at Kyushu University 2016, volume 1, Spring issue, pp. 47-52

Japanese Buddhism is strongly “esoteric” (meaning, for insiders/initiates). Its texts have a face meaning (possibly, trivial) and deeper meanings to be discovered. There is research about this dominant esoteric strand throughout Japanese Buddhism:
Consult the aforementioned three general histories (Matsuo, Eliot, Kleine), and in particular (examples):
Alison Badassano; *The Indian Aesthetic in Ninth-Century Japan; A Study of Foreignness in Early Japanese Esoteric Buddhist Art*; Master’s Thesis, City College of New York, 2014


Ruben L.F. Habito; *Tendai Hongaku Doctrine and Japanese Buddhism*; Tokyo 1996

Justin Harris; *Shingon Buddhism and the Tantras*; pdf, from academia.edu (retrieved 2016-09-08)


Bernhardt Scheidt, Mark Teeuwen (editors); *The Culture of Secrecy in Japanese Religion*; Milton Park, New York 2006

Charles D. Orzech et al. (editors); *Esoteric Buddhism and the Tantras in East Asia*; Leiden, Boston 2011

A research question remains if such descriptors as “esoteric Buddhism”, “Tantric Buddhism”, “Vajrayana”, and “occult Buddhism” have any meanings as to their philosophical, religious, and possible visual contents (versus ritual, mantras, and other non-content forms). At best outlining a hazy field of mental reflection, there is not much clarity to be gained about these “chameleon” [my word, SG] expressions as they can exhibit a colourful range of meanings and shadings, and are used in a cover function coming from secretive groupings. It is a bit like listening to our modern-day politicians’ nontalk. See the overview in:

Henrik H. Sørensen; *On Esoteric Buddhism in China: A Working Definition*; paper 11 on Orzech et al.; pp. 155-175

I have determined for myself that, in this situation of secrecy, helpful information comes from a media channel other than verbal, namely, from the visual symbolic. The verbal is, then, merely referential to the symbolic.

See on pages 52 and 53 above for two illustrations, belonging to Shingon (artist’s adaptations of two black and white photos).

Shingon is a branch of Japanese esoteric Buddhism. It is related less closely to Chinese permutations of Mahayana Buddhism than to Vajrayana, which Shingon has in common with Tibetan Buddhism. Shingon is an east Asian, mainly Japanese, branch of Vajrayana, thus being on the path of the “Diamond Vehicle”. The Japanese branch of Vajrayana is a Fourth Force contact system (to my volume 4, there: chapter 4.)

Bibhuti Baruah; *Buddhist Sects and Sectarianism*; New Delhi 2000 (general guide, with Shingon chapter)

Rolf W. Giebel; *The Vairocana Bishambhodi Sutra*, Translated from the Chinese (Taisho Volume 18, Number 848), BDK English Tripitaka Series; Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research 2005

Kukai; *Major Works, Translated, with an Account of His Life and a Study of His Thought, by;* Yoshito S. Hakeda; New York 1972

Ryuichi Abé; *The Weaving of Mantra, Kukai and the Construction of Esoteric Buddhist Discourse*; New York, Chichester 1999

Minoru Kiyota; *Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice*; Los Angeles, Tokyo 1978
The essence of these publications about Shingon is the figure of the Dainichi Nyorai (Great Sun Buddha). Shingon is a visualization of same, both in statuary, and in textual form. As a personal development system, in keeping with the Buddhist goal, the particular goal of Shingon is to attain \textit{such} Buddahood. Since Shingon is a Vajrayana branch on the path of the Diamond Vehicle, I find no viable interpretation except that this is a system of the Merkaba, Light-Body, the Orb of the Gods.

The proposed identification of a person (the Buddha) with a phenomenon of man’s energy anatomy (the Merkaba, or dan tien, or orb) is of critical importance. In Mahayana, this is hinted at, but, in terms of reading such hints, unmistakeably. The China Buddhism Encyclopedia (online, 2016-09-09, blue hyperlinks original), http://www.chinabuddhismencyclopedia.com/en/index.php/Dainichi_Nyorai_The_Chief_Deity_In_Shingon_Buddhism says:

\textit{“Mahayana Buddhism teaches that there are three bodies (kayas) or modes of manifestation of the principal of enlightenment in the world:}

1. the Dharmakaya (hosshin)
2. the Sambhogakaya (hojin)
3. the Nirmanakaya (ojin)

\textit{In other words, there are three way in which we may view the Buddha, The Enlightened One.}

The follower should always remember that these three are one truth, or in the words of the Shingon Tradition, ‘the three bodies are one (sanjin soku itsu).’ ~

The three bodies (kayas) are not actually “bodies”, but are aspects of seeing, or understanding: three views. To my mind, that refers not to the Buddha but, in a cryptic way, per the secrecy in Japanese religions, and Chinese religions, to the dan tien in its three simultaneous locations relative to the physical body. That is the same as the orb when it is incarnated (“wrapped around” a physical body). That is, again, the same as the Markaba, ninth body, Light-Body, or Unified Chakra. As the end of the Encyclopedia quote points out, that is the esoteric (hidden) central theorem of, especially, Japanese Shingon around the Dainichi Nyorai, more a branch of Vajrayana (Diamond Vehicle path) than of Mahayana.

Systematically, it is very important for all of spiritual science to identify that there is a key nexus here, coming in “Buddha body XYZ” terminology, but actually meaning, “human energy body XYZ”. An example for this is a lesser realization of the Light-Body (orb, Merkaba), namely, the little discussed “rainbow body”.

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This is a related Vajrayana specialty that we should look into now as far as information is available. Suitable search terms are, for example: “rainbow body” Tibetan “rainbow body” Dzogchen Searches are feasible for: web pages, pdf documents, images, video.

Posted by Alan Tan http://dowsingtochangeyourlife.blogspot.de/2013/08/orbs-and-merkaba.html :

“A Friend sent this beautiful picture to me, I thought I share this picture with everyone.

This photo was taken after a simple ceremony and meditation. Around Father Sun are many Rainbow Orbs and lower and nearer to me is a beautiful blue Hexahedron Orb, dowsed to be Archangel Michael.

Many of you know what a Merkaba is (...). Everyone of you have a Merkaba seed within you, something similar to your original pure essence but it has to be activated through learning certain technique. Likewise, you have to put in effort in spiritual practice to peel the layers of veil covering your pure essence to reach it. Activating the Merkaba is very important but I will not go into any details here. It is up to each individual to find out if you can resonate with this from your heart using your human free will and discernment.”
WARNING: THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION
RELATES TO SPIRITUALLY EXPLICIT PHOTOGRAPHS.
IF YOU DO NOT WANT TO BE CONFRONTED WITH SUCH MATERIAL
YOU SHOULD CLOSE AND DELETE THIS PDF E-BOOK.

THE PRACTICE OF “YANGTI” IS CONSIDERED EXREMELY DANGEROUS.
INFORMATION IS PROVIDED “FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY”.
ANYTHING YOU DO BASED ON THIS IS AT YOUR OWN RISK.
Here are some search results, including book vending pages and library pages, and www.worldcat.org:
Three pages with awesome photographs (belief system/disbelief system spoilers!):
www.thenon2.com/rainbow-body
https://soonyata.home.xs4all.nl/sorubasamadhi.htm (heavily annotated, not repeated by me)
http://www.buddhism.uk/forums/english/tibetan-buddhism/first-time-you-see-pictures-rainbow-body
Two photo examples from the second link:

The small figure is Lama Chokgyur Lingpa while still alive and already in a rainbow body. When he passed on, his body was five centimeters in size.
The Ascendor, Lama Tasha Lamo, left a body forty centimeters small.

The phenomenon of the “shrinking rainbow body” is well documented in history, and is sparking interest in recent scholarship. There is a dire need for spiritual science to overcome the long prevalent disbelief system that kills hecatombs of people year by year from willful ignorance. The rainbow body, in three levels of attainment (see in the second link above), may be acquired by few through hard and long meditative practice, such as Tibetan monks excel in. The rainbow body is reserved for those who attain mukti (liberation from the wheel of Samsara and reincarnation). They ascend and manifest in fifth dimension.

Francis V. Tiso (Father -); *Rainbow Body and Resurrection, Spiritual Attainment, the Dissolution of the Material Body, and the Case of Khenpo A Chö*; Berkeley 2016
Google books describes Father Tiso’s through study:

“Francis V. Tiso, a noted authority on the rainbow body, explores this manifestation of spiritual realization in a wide-ranging and deeply informed study of the transformation of the material body into a body of light. Seeking evidence on the boundary between physical science and deep spirituality that might elucidate the resurrection of Jesus, he investigates the case of Khenpo A Chö, a Buddhist monk who died in eastern Tibet in 1999. Rainbow Body and Resurrection chronicles the dissolution of Khenpo’s material body within a week of his death, including eye-witness interviews. Tiso describes the spiritual practices that give rise to the rainbow body and traces their history deep into the encounter of religions in medieval Central Asia. His erudite exploration of the Tibetan phenomenon raises the fascinating question of whether there is a connection between the rainbow body and the dying and rising of Jesus.”

Correctly, the book locates the rainbow body mainly in the Tibetan system “Dzogchen” (“Great Perfection”) founded by Padmasambhava in the Middle Ages, also held by tradition as the author of the Tibetan Book of the Dead. Dzogchen, with a large explicit path literature translated into English, is practised to this day (see below in the concluding chapters).

Randy Eady,
https://www.academia.edu/24129683/Rainbow_Body_of_Great_Transference_Gamma_Waves_Thukdam_Pantom_Pain_and_Pineal summarizes little-known research concerning gamma rays after the heart stops:

“At the University of Michigan a team led by neuroscientist Jimo Borjigin measures brain waves in nine rats after cardiac arrest. In all of them high-frequency gamma waves (the ones associated with meditation) became more intense after the heart stopped – more coherent and organized, in fact, than they are during ordinary wakefulness.

IS THIS what NDEs are, the investigators wrote, a ‘heightened conscious processing that occurs during the limbo period before death’ perhaps becoming permanent and taking us into exploring the ‘gray zone’ of the phenomenon of thukdam or tudkam state (a rare occurrence in which a monk dies but there is seemingly no physical decomposition for a week or more).

Entering tudkam at the moment of physical death is said to be the luminal predecessor stage to the attainment of the ‘rainbow body,’ a transformation in which the body is converted in some fashion to ‘pure light.’ Long standing reports of lamas, whose bodies apparently didn’t seem to cool normally even after more than a week has been a guidepost for Richard Davidson of the University of Wisconsin (who has spent years studying the neuroscience of meditation) and has long been intrigued by this – especially after he saw a monk in tudkam at the Deer Park monastery in Wisconsin in the summer of 2015.”

According to one report, the phenomenon is also known in esoteric Yoruba tradition,
https://www.academia.edu/9530160/SPIRITUAL_TRANSFORMATION_INTO_A_LIGHT_BODY_IN_ESOTERIC_YORUBA_TRADITION

Elisabete Taivane; Dimensions of Mystical Anthropology of the XX Century: Hesychasm and Tibetan Buddhism Compared; PhD Thesis, University of Latvia, Riga 2005
“May I tread the secret vajra path unhindered. 
And attain the rainbow body in the celestial realm.”
Chögyam Trungpa, Collected Works, vol. 4, p. 29
translating a Supplication of Jamgön Kongtrül

Chögyam Trungpa; The Collected Works of Chögyam Trungpa, volume 6 [of 8]; edited by Carolyn Rose Gimian; London, Boston 2010, is relevant to the “rainbow body”, especially the text included in this said volume: The Bardo (by Chögyam Trungpa and Rigdzin Shikpo as translators); supra, pp. 496-504
Paolo Roberti di Sarsina; Chögyal Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche: Dzogchen and Tibetan Tradition. From Shang Shung to the West; in: Religions 2012, 3, 163-182; doi:10.3390/rel3020163
Chögyal Namkhai Norbu; Rainbow Body, The Life and Realization of a Tibetan Yogin, Togden Ugyen Tendzin; Berkeley, Arcidosso 2012
Elizabete Taivane; Dimensions of Mystical Anthropology of the XX Century: Hesychasm and Tibetan Buddhism Compared; Thesis, University of Latvia, Riga 2005

The point has thereby been made that, systematically, it is very important for all of spiritual science to identify that there is a key nexus here, coming in “Buddha body XYZ” terminology, but actually meaning, “human energy body XYZ”. An example for this is a lesser realization of the Light-Body (orb, Merkaba), namely, the little discussed (outside specialised circles) “rainbow body”.

Ideally, a rendition should not be a scholastic reiteration of what has already been said. Ideally, a dialogue should be opened between the Tibetan in-depth scholastic descriptions (especially in Chögyam Trungpa, vol. 6 as quoted above), and the Japanese branch, Shingon, which has a beautiful way of visualization. There are many initial basic questions to ask which best may be answered in this way.

Preparatory assignment: Look up, especially for the very high and condensed text by Chögyam Trungpa and Rigdzin Shikpo, the following lemmata in: http://www.rigpawiki.org (or other source):
My comments in […] dated: 2016-09-10. Make sure to surf around in the Rigpa Wiki of Tibetan Buddhism until you gain an understanding of the parts and of the parts together. If you are new to Tibetan Buddhism, you might want to repeat this twice on different days. The method described in the text by Trungpa-Shikpo is a most advanced Jungian archetype clearing. (Basics see in my vol. 8.) The resulting benefit is to avoid the after-death state (bardo/bardo) that mechanically leads to reincarnation. The terminology, as evidenced by the key absences in the Rigpa Wiki, is not exactly mainstream Tibetan Buddhism. It reflects a low beginner’s knowledge level from Agartha.

I percolated the fifteen missing terms through the Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism (Buswell, Lopez, 2014):

devsha: n.a.
alokabhasa: n.a.
upalabdha: explained in lemma: alokasyopalabdhisa
alokapalabdha: n.a.
prabhasvara: n.a.
sarvashunya: n.a.
matyatita: n.a.
six lokas: n.a.
deva loka: n.a.
yana: n.a. (not searchable, is a frequent word ending)
trechö: n.a. Search alternate spelling in Rigpa Wiki: trekchö
törga: n.a.
yangti: n.a.
yangti yana:

That negative result means that the respective teachings are not suitable for release to the general public. A further search will thus remain futile. The risk is, damage to an unprepared person’s mind, which must be avoided.

The Highest Wisdom is restricted for good and valid reasons. Its translator Tony Duff notes that the Tibetan category of its teaching is Nyingthig (also spelled Nyingtig). I shall therefore proceed orderly with the next chapters, in the interest of the esteemed general readerhip. I was reminded while writing these cautionary remarks how potent the psychosomatic shock on a person can be, an advisory to proceed with utmost caution and with being gentle to oneself – an advisory that, I believe, Tibetan monks themselves might not always heed? There is a Tibetan medical website, in English, with chapter overviews of some teachings on this, “The Yuthok Nyingthig, A Perfect Journey to the Rainbow Body”, http://www.yuthok.org

Here is my own summary. I am not claiming that this is exactly the way the Tibetans see it. The summary of my own making uses different aspects, images, words. It is quite theoretical, like a scientific model should be. It is written, I hope, without desire (about abolishing desire as the key, see in vol. 8).

Death is an angel. There is a description by Thoth from his own experience in vol. 2. The name makes no difference. One name is: Kali. Death is very loving, and, of course, strict.

The ego of a mortal human is the self of separation. The ego is co-created by the human. It is an assembly - I would say: an inner garbage heap - for developmental reasons of things temporal, not lasting. The ego is
man’s mortal part. It must die from time to time. Death, Kali, ensures that that happens. That is a blessing in disguise.

The point is for the unenlightened human to realize something like: “You’re dead you know” (speaking to herself/himself). “I want to stop being dead.” Then the human, through spiritual self-development (either to the light side or to the dark side, makes no difference in this point) has to awaken, and make a choice of fate which side it takes (up or down, Heaven or hell, darkness or Light). Thoth says: Always follow the Light.

An enlightened human, in self-horror, will kick her/his ego out willingly, even eagerly. The free-will center in the orb has this ability, with the help of Death/Kali. That is when fear of death wanes. The death program is a fear program. There is inner separation from the self of separation, or ego. In the broadest brush stroke, in that enlightenment situation, the program end of the ego then no longer automatically means the death of the human who is disattached to her/his inner garbage heap called the Cartesian “I” (Freud’s “ego”). Burn the crap and get rid of it!

That is what the Tibetan masters do in attaining the rainbow body. They die a controlled slow death with the inner fire of burning the ego. They can then be reborn into higher worlds (fifth dimension), or even enter such worlds by birthless ascension, with de-incarnation and re-incarnation into a grown-up human (which is still rare on the fifth dimension.) Thus, there are different levels of rainbow body (three levels in Tibetan Buddhism). The third level was reached by Padmasambhava who did not die at all of it (of the surgical ego purge).

The closing session is between: Death/Kali, the orb of the ascending human, and the ego of the ascending human, with the ego being that which gets dissolved. The human then lives on without the ego. That is not the same as death of a mortal, since a mortal will continue forming the idiot heap of garbage inside, no matter what. This is therefore not well described by any type of analogy to near death experiences (NDEs). The process of rainbow body can be assisted through the guru, spiritual helpers, and, most importantly, by the Higher Self, which will always be the driving force behind this.

The Dainichi Nyorai (Great Sun Buddha) of Japanese Shingon is a model figure of a Lightful and loving immortal from the highest plane of the material Creation worlds (twelfth dimension). In that model figure as a spiritual mirror of the self, the self-horror of recognizing one’s ego, its distortions, and its negativity takes place. That is the effective mechanism of Shingon. It works through inner transrational visualizations in the higher bodies. There is a certain link to Christianity (Baruah, p. 365: ideas from Gnosticism, etc.)

It works even if you were to consider it fiction, despite the fact that it is not pure fiction but there is a most advanced person behind it (angelomorphic person/angel symbiosis – Usui Reiki is closely related.) The person can work with a human and Death/Kali in assistance for enlightenment and ego (partial) death but without total death. The overall technique remains a controlled death process of the ego, typically, slow and life-long.

Overleaf: Two photos of Lama Thubsher during his ascension in a rainbow body 2015, demonstrating the typical ego/mortal body projection shrinking. The body itself is not “rainbow”, but there are usually such lights in the surroundings.
The second photo shows an associate Tibetan Lama, helping the Ascendor by nearness and astral presence through loving energies. The energies of the ongoing ego death of the shrinking master thereby transfer to the helper for this lifetime or another future lifetime.

The technicalities are intricate. Bön and Tibetan Buddhism use a dark place technique to expose the mortal fears of death, to bring them to a crisis, and then to let their field (in terms of vol. 8, beginning: of perversion, of a monstrous “Entity”) collapse. That is a rather violent operation and must be done under supervision of a competent and knowledgeable guru with whom a long-term relation has been built up. The only other feasible and non-lethal way is to use the activated Higher Self (activated through high Samadhi) in the guru function.

The difficult and arduous process, not the same as Chöd (ritual demon-merging into a demonomorphic human, negative path of immortality), is still rare. It involves Light-Body activation of the Merkaba (the orb involvement at the metaphoric “closing table”). Another example of voluntary deincarnation is teleportation by a person with a full fifth-dimensional awareness and abilities. (The test case of abilities is self-levitation.)

The rainbow body process is a radical Varjarana technique of ego cleansing. It is a major medical paradigm of psychosomatic energy medicine that still needs to be assimilated by spiritually backward western ego medicine, standing at the brink of a paradigm change. One approach to the rainbow body phenomenon may be, physiologically, as a “reverse birth” (child body-mind analogy, Jean Piaget in reverse gear).
The hexagonal geometry, that we also see in the cells of the bees’ wax, is the natural key to mediating the round and the square. Jean Piaget showed, by geometrical experiments, that the children-mind interface develops during childhood. The hexagonal geometry of the “Flower of Life” is the natural geometry of children before they become stultified by the present ego culture (my theory, not in Piaget). When the mind is cleared to perceive the “clear light” in Tibetan Buddhism, it means as much as, that ego mind programming is drastically removed. At that point, the mind again is in its pristine state of receptivity to the Flower of Life and its hexagonal geometry. That does away with all, or at least most, cultural blocks against the natural formation of the Merkaba in the pristine human-mind interface.

Another way of training that is to train the Flower of Life geometry. You will find the website in English if you search for: Tomo Perish Sacred Geometry. I have mentioned it several times in earlier volumes. That is the natural key to mediating the round and the square.

I have taken an example from Tomo Perisha and have turned it into the negative. It shows the result of one of several ways, more geometrico, of the squaring of the circle. Modern mathematicians adamantly deny, in their disbelief system, that such exists. (They also deny the doubling of the cube, which is an even much simpler triangulation, see in volume 2.)

Overleaf is a graphic, taken from Tomo Perish, to meditate on. If your mental inside starts playing with the geometry in order to unravel in what sequence the various layers were drawn, then you have begun to activate your Light-Body (Merkaba, orb, Unified Chakra). There is very much in terms of detail to add to that, which I leave to you with the starting information that you now have.