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V.1
A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Of the Importance and Certainty of Morality.
Of Morality in general, and of the Nature of Happiness.
Of the necessity of fixing right our Chief End.
Of the Chief Good which Reason can prove to be designed for Man, and the Characteristics of it.
Of the highest Happiness attainable in the present life.

By the late Reverend and Learned
Mr. HENRY GROVE, OF TAUNTON.

Published from the Author's MANUSCRIPT.

VOL. I.

LONDON.

Printed and Sold by J. WAUGH, at the Turk's Head in Lombard-Street. M.DCC.XLIX.
ADAMS 291.4
V. 1
To the Right Honourable

Hugh, Lord Willoughby of Parham.

My Lord,

AD the worthy Author lived to publish this Work himself, which I have now the honour to present to You, he would, I am
Dedication.

I am persuaded, have chosen to send it into the world under your Lordship's Patronage: nor could he have easily found a more proper Patron, than a Nobleman, whose Character and Conduct have given so bright a specimen of the excellence of the Principles, and of the dignity and beauty of the Virtues, recommended in it; and whose fine Taste and good Learning qualify him so well to determine the Merit of such a Performance.

Though your Lordship's high relish of the ease and dignity of Social Freedom and Learned Converse, may have indeed
Dedication.

indeed prevented your pushing into the more active scenes of ambitious life; yet it must have been observed, with what assiduity and disinterested attention, your Lordship has answered your important Trust, as a Member of the Supreme Judicature of the British Nation. Nor can it but be matter of some concern, that Abilities so extensive, and Industry so unwearied (under the conduct of Principles that alone can add dignity to human nature) should move in a sphere less enlarged than the Benevolence of your heart.
Dedication.

It would have heightened with Mr. Grove the satisfaction of doing justice to so much Merit, that he could reflect on his having formerly cultivated, by the Work now tendered to your Lordship, the seeds of those excellent dispositions, which have produced fruits so honourable; and have enabled him with more confidence of success to offer it to the world.

That which his too early Death prevented him from doing, your Lordship will please to accept now it is done by one, to whom he particularly recommended this his favourite Production. Nor shall
Dedication.

Shall I esteem it a small recompence for the pains taken to give it to the Publick, in a manner not wholly unworthy of its Author, that it has the honour of your Lordship's approbation, and has given me this opportunity to express the very great esteem with which I am,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's

most Obedient,

most Humble Servant,

Thomas Amory.
THE

PREFACE.

It will be thought needless for me to say any thing by way of Preface, on the Usefulness and Importance of Moral Philosophy, after what Mr. Grove has so largely discoursed on this subject in the Introduction; but it may be necessary, to speak something of this particular System, which is now offered to the Publick.

It
PREFACE.

It was compos'd by Mr. Grove, for the direction and assistance of Youth in the study of Morality; and during more than Thirty Years that he used it for this purpose, he was continually correcting and improving it. A little before his Death he had begun to transcribe it for the Press, and to insert in their proper places the additional Observations and Reflections, which were, as they had occurred, written in the margin of his original Copy. On his Death Bed he recommended the Work to my care, and I have endeavoured to answer the Trust, by making the best use I could of his additional Observations and Corrections; inserting these in their proper places, and making such alterations in conformity to the other, as were necessary to render the whole consistent with his latest and most exact sentiments.

I am far from thinking, after all, that this Work will appear in that beauty and perfection, which the Author himself would have given it, had he lived to compleat his Design. Yet I flatter myself, that the evidence
dence of his *Principles*, the clearness and strength of his *Reasonings*, and the beauty and justness with which he has described the several *Virtues*, are such, that the friends of true Religion and Goodness will think the Work well deserving of the publick notice.

The Illustrations from the antient *Moralists* and *Poets* will also recommend the Work to Readers of Taste, the Translations of which are added for the sake of the English Reader; but for the exactness of these Mr. Grove is not answerable. To render this Treatise more useful to the Students of *Morality*, there is added at the end of every Chapter a List of the principal Writers, who have treated the particular subjects of each Chapter. But the judicious Reader will (as it is reasonable) determine as to the merit of this Work from an attentive and impartial perusal of it, rather than from any thing here offered by way of recommendation: I will not therefore detain him longer from the Work itself, but finish this Preface with returning my
PREFACE.

my thanks to the many worthy Persons, who by their Subscriptions have encouraged this publication; and with assuring them, that no care shall be wanting as to the remaining Volume, which it is hoped will be ready to be delivered in December.

Thomas Amory.

Taunton.
April 1. 1749.
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SEVERAL Names came too late to be inserted in this List, but shall, with any others sent in, be prefixed to the Second Volume.

N.B. There being a larger number of Subscribers than Copies printed, a Second Edition is in the Press, and will be finished with all expedition.
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p. 47. l. 11. dele full point after the word Philosophy, and put comma. p. 51. marg. for Endaim. r. Eudaim. p. 67. l. 27. for bear r. bears. p. 75. l. 8. for Naicom. r. Nicom. p. 79. l. 22. r. ἀνθρωπους. p. 80. l. pen. r. ignorari. p. 112. l. 15. r. notion. p. 121. l. 16. r. appetites. p. 123. l. 11. r. pleasures. p. 133. l. 14. r. Ψυχη. p. 140. l. 4. for to r. in;
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THE

INTRODUCTION.

Of the Importance and Certainty of Morality.

SECTION I.

MORALITY, being nothing else but the knowledge and practice of those things that concern man as a Moral Agent, a Being endowed with understanding, and liberty of choice, capable of acting in a reasonable manner, that is, in a manner suitable to the dignity of his nature, and his rank and station in the universe, and thereby contributing to his own happiness, and that of his fellow-creatures, cannot, from this general idea of it, be supposed to be an idle or intricate speculation, a mere amusement of the mind, of little or no use
Of the Importance

in life, presenting us only with ingenious hypotheses, and specious conjectures, and better fitted to ingage a man in endless doubts and perplexities, than to settle him in a state of solid and lasting satisfaction. On the contrary, Morality is of the utmost importance to all mankind, lies level to the apprehensions of the weakest minds, that are but sincere and well disposed, and is attended with all the certainty that any impartial and considerate person can desire.

Sect. II. I. It is of the utmost importance to all mankind. If there be any thing that deserves the name of important; if it be not a thing indifferent in what state of mind, and condition of life a man finds himself, whether his Being is a pleasure, or a burthen to him, his faculties are used or not used, employed right or wrong, whether he enjoys life or suffers it, is in favour with his Maker, and with himself, and approved by other intelligent Beings, or at war with the whole world; if there be a difference in these things, the importance of Morality, which instructs us to observe this difference, and to conduct ourselves by it, must be undeniable.

Sect. III. The importance of Morality is just the same as that of happiness, with which it hath an immediate and necessary con-
connection. All men desire happiness, the inclination sticks close, and is never to be put off. And, in general, they are not wrong in their notion of happiness, apprehending it to be a state which hath no good wanting to it, no evil mingled with it; and the nearer any state approaches this idea of perfection, the happier it is; but when they come to particulars, as they must do, in order to act rationally and consistently, they are extremely divided. Now the design of Morality is to unite the distracted opinions of mankind in one uniform invariable idea of happiness, to lead them to the injoyments in which it is to be found, and to direct to the means for the attainment of it. Their interest both in the present and future state of their existence depends upon it. Without some observation of its rules there could be no society, or none but what was worse than solitude; Virtue is the cement that makes the union, in greater or lesser combinations, from a community consisting of many millions down to a friendship between two single persons, delightful and lasting; and it supplies the sweetest pleasures, and most exalted entertainments of retired life. In the conduct of his actions, the wise man, rejecting fancy and passion, and example, fetches all his measures from hence. It was this led Monsieur Rapin to conjecture, that the daemon of Socrates was no-
thing else than his knowledge of Morality, an habitual Prudence, which he had gained by his experience of things, and his reflections on their events, in which he was seldom mistaken. This character of his Prudence is confirmed by Xenophon, who faith, in praise of it, that he never erred in his judgment of what he was to choose or reject, and needed not any one's assistance herein, being self-sufficient in this sort of knowledge. Had the Poet carried the same justness of thinking into every part of the doctrine of Morals that he discovers in some parts of it, and acted up to the account he gives of himself, none of the Philosophers, not even Socrates himself, would have surpassed him. What can be more agreeably expressed, or with more spirit, than the sentiments are in the following passages?

*Quid verum, atq; decens, curo et rogo, et omnis in hoc sum.*

*Virtutis vera custos, rigidusq; satelles.*

---tarda fluunt ingrataq; tempora, quae spem Consiliunq; morantur agendi gnativur, id quod Æquè pauperibus prodeś, locupletibus æquè, Æquè neglectum pueris senibusq; nocebit. Restat, ut his ego me ipse regam solerq; elementis.

Invidus,

---

*a Reflections upon Morality.
*b Xenophon's Memorabil. L. 4.
*c Hor. L. 1. Ep. 1.*
and Certainty of Morality.

Invidus, iracundus, iners, vinosus, amator; Nemo adeò ferus est, ut non mitescere possit, Si modo culturae patientem commodet aurem.

If you believe him, the inquiry, what is true and decent in manners, took him up entirely—he was an inseparable follower of Virtue—impatient of every thing that interrupted him in the pursuit of that which is alike useful to the poor and the rich, and not to be neglected without equal danger to the young and the old—and resolved that this should be the rule of his life, and the source of his joys—whatever distemper the mind labours under, here is the cure, only listen to the instructions of Virtue, and you will quickly find an alteration.

Sect. IV. The practick part is undoubtedly the chief thing to be regarded, but not the only one. If the theory, without the practice, be like the advantage of eyes to one who hath no active powers to be guided by them, or is too indolent to make use of them; the practice, without the theory, may too justly be compared to the strength and vigour of a blind man, which for want of light to direct them, cannot be so usefully employed, either for his own, or the benefit of mankind. The conduct must necessarily fluctuate in uncertainty, when it is not
Of the Importance

not fixed by steady rules, of which the virtuous man had need have the same clear view, as the traveller of his way, that he may not wander from it. There is a very great satisfaction in knowing what a man does, and why he ought to do it; but very little without it.

Sect. V. It is true, the study of Morality, in a philosophical method, is not the province of all. It is not necessary that all should enter into the depths of this science, and pursue the chain of moral ideas, link after link, as far as it will lead them: but it is greatly to be wished that all, who have leisure and capacity for it, would apply themselves to these inquiries; and even necessary that some should, in order to propagate juster notions among those who have not time, or patience, or ability, to think for themselves, and to guard them against the dangerous impulses of enthusiasm, the fallacious insinuations of their passions, and the influence of prevailing customs, and pernicious maxims, that by length of time have gained too much authority in the world. The Gentleman, who owes it to his birth and quality, and the superior advantages of his condition, to get his mind more brightened and adorned, his judgment more correct, his sentiments more generous and exalted, his actions more exquisitely finished,
and Certainty of Morality.

finished d, according to the exactest rules of truth, honour, and equity, than those of the Vulgar; who is capable of doing so much good or harm by his opinions and example, whose Virtue is in so much the greater danger as he hath more frequent and inviting opportunities to gratify all his inclinations, and who is expos'd to the attempts of persons who make it their business to corrupt his Morals, that he may become the easier proselyte to their wretched schemes of Infidelity. The Lawyer e, who hath it so often in his power to clear or confound the rights of mankind, to compose or widen their differences, to patronise or betray injured innocence, to vindicate a good cause, or to put a fair gloss on a bad, urged, on one hand, by a sense of duty, and the conscious pleasure of always espousing the juster side; tempted and solicited on the other by the prospect of gain. The Divine, who

B 4

not

--- animo cog'ites,
Quam vos facillime agitis, quam eflis maxume
Potentes, dites, fortunati, nobiles,
Tam máxume vos æquo animo æqua noscere
Oportet, si vos voltis perhiberi probos.

Terent. Adelp.

d Juris consulti itaque, quod inter omnes conflat, plerique cum legum studio philosophiam olim conjunxere, ex ejusque principiis leges sunt interpretati. Heinecci Anti-
His explicatis, fons legum et juris inveniri potest. The explication of those things (fe. of the nature of man, the du-
ties
not only stands in the room of the Priest in other Religions, but of the Philosopher, is by profession an instructor and guide in the ways of Virtue, reads publick lectures on the whole duty of man, and is supposed in a readiness to answer those who privately consult him in dubious cases: all these are under peculiar obligations to be well versed in the science of Morals, that they may do all the service to the world that their characters and advantages give others a right to expect from them.

Sect. VI. This, in a particular manner, is the concern of the persons last named, I mean the Guides and Ministers of the Christian Church. For how is it possible he should be a good Preacher, who is not thoroughly

ties we are born to fulfil, and the bonds of society) will point us to the fountain of Laws and Right.——And again, Non a Praetoris Edicto, &c. The discipline of the Civil Law is not to be fetched from the Praetor’s Edicts, which is the method now most followed, nor from the Twelve Tables, by the authority of which our Ancestors were determined, but from the depths of Philosophy. Cicer. de Leg. L. 1. §. 5. And afterwards to the same purpose, aliè vero, et, ut oportet, a Capite, &c. you are in the right to run up the subject of our inquiries to its original, and they who handle the Civil Law after any other manner, do not so properly teach Justice as the art of Wrangling.

and Certainty of Morality.

thoroughly acquainted with moral subjects? The Doctrines of Religion being intended to promote the observation of its Precepts, it is of the last consequence that people should be well instructed in their duty, and the bounds of Virtue and Vice be exactly marked out, not by telling them quam prope ad peccatum liceat accedere sine peccato, how near they may venture to approach to a sin without sinning (which hath been charged, not without reason, on the Casuists of the Roman Church) but by stating, characterising, and circumscribing them, that they may not be mistaken one for the other. But instruction is not all. After the Understanding is convinced, the harder task is still behind, to bring over the Will to the interests of Virtue, which, as far as it is effected in a moral and rational way, is best done by demonstrating the necessity of moral duties; painting Virtue in its native charms, and setting before men the several motives to it; in the choice of which a great deal of prudence is required, as well as skill in the manner of representing them, suitably to the time and place, and to the various characters, views, and dispositions of men. The art of governing his own passions, which is taught by this science, will open him a way into the human heart, enable him better to understand its weaknesses, and unfold its artful doublings, and, in a word, by
by well ruling his own (in which consists a great part of the character of a virtuous man) will give him an ascendant over the passions of others, which he will know how to lead this way and that at pleasure; the chief praise of the accomplished Orator. Upon this head, what a judicious Writer hath observed merits well to be considered; who, speaking of the Defects of the Clergy as one cause of the present corruption of Christians, takes notice, that Morality of all things is that which is the most superficially handled in the greatest part of Sermons; either from a prejudice against Morality, or a vain conceit of Learning, which makes men foolishly imagine, that to preach Morals argues but an ordinary measure of parts, and little skill in Divinity; or from its being more difficult to treat of Morality in a proper manner than to explain doctrinal subjects. The faults of Preachers in this kind, which he remarks as most ordinary, are, that their Morality is too general, defective, and sometimes false; being either too remiss, or too severe, and sometimes contradictory.

Sect. VII. But against this there lies a popular and plausible objection—What need of our going so far about? Morality is best studied

studied in the Scriptures. To examine these matters by Reason, when we have Revelation, a privilege so much superior, is like lighting up a candle at noon-day. Dr. Mather, a Divine of New England, is so severe in his censure of Moral Philosophy, as to call it by no better name than Impietas in artis formam redacta. And though I know of none who have run the charge so high as this Gentleman, yet too many out of a mistaken (though it should be a real) zeal for Christianity, have said things not very favourable to it, and which, if true, would oblige us to own, that the loss would not be great if it were quite banished the Schools. Dr. Waterland, particularly, seems to apprehend, that one thing which hath occasioned the growth of Deism, hath been mens advancing Morality so much as they have done. He more than insinuates the needlessness of this study by citing the authority of Mr. Locke with applause, who, faith he, when entreated to draw up a System of Morals, returned this very wise and just answer. "Did the world want a rule, I confess there could be no work so necessary, nor so commendable; but the Gospel contains so perfect a Body of Ethics, that Reason may be excused from that inquiry,"

h Manu ductio ad Ministerium.

i Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments.

Of the Importance

"queries, since the may find man's duty
clearer and easier in Revelation, than in
herself."

Sect. VIII. But now, what Horace 1 faith
of the conjunction of nature and art in poetry,

--- alterius sic

Altera poscit opem res, et conjurat amicè.

seems to me justly applicable to the as-
assistance that Reason and Revelation mutually lend one the other in these searches.
There can be no doubt that Morality is ex-
tremely indebted to the Christian Revelation
on several accounts. For dispelling the
mists in which it was involved, clearing
its sight, restoring its liberty, and exciting
it to the pursuit of Virtue by the promise of
divine aid, and the prospect of the most
glorious rewards, Reason is to thank Revela-
tion, without whose help man would not
have been able to discern his duty so plainly
and easily, or to have discharged it so suc-
cessfully as he may now do. Of which
more at the conclusion of this Work. But
then after all this, and much more, to the
advantage of Revelation, is granted, it will
still remain true, that inquiring into the
foundations of moral goodness, as laid in
the nature of things, and carefully fixing
and distinguishing the ideas of the several
virtues

1 De Arte Poetica.
and Certainty of Morality.

virtues by right Reason, is not only a very innocent and agreeable entertainment, but of singular use to the Christian.

Sect. IX. It is a guard against the ill consequences that may be shewn to have proceeded from an unfamiliar acquaintance with these inquiries. From whence but from the want of just notions of right and wrong, reasonable and unreasonable, fit and unfit, of what is true, honourable, and lovely, and the contrary, came that unworthy idea of the Deity, which in effect leaves out his Moral Attributes, or most miserably disfigures and misrepresents them? As the Heathens would never have had that opportunity to corrupt the principles of Natural Religion, had they not begun with those of Morality, first of all fuiting their moral belief to their immoral practices, then in their vain imaginations setting up Gods like themselves; after much the same manner hath Revealed Religion suffered among the professors of it. Their Reason hath been first set wrong, and then their Religion. Can it be supposed that the distinction between God's secret and revealed Will, in the sense it is meant by some persons, the doctrine of the Divine Sovereignty, as stated by the same men, and of Absolute Decrees, would have got footing in the Christian world, if the essential and everlasting differences in things had been right-
ly understood, and men had considered that the Moral Perfections of God, signifying nothing else but the unchangeable determinations of his Will, in conformity to these differences; all such notions concerning the Decrees of God, and his dealings with mankind, as are absolutely repugnant to the clearest conceptions of Justice, Goodness, Sincerity, &c. must needs be false, and therefore cannot be taught men by God? From the same source the wrong apprehensions of Christianity so common in the world had their original. Had not men been shamefully ignorant of the nature of Moral Truth, must they not have seen the indispensible obligation of the Moral Law; and, while they saw this, could they, unless depraved in the disposition of their minds, have represented the Gospel as a contrivance of Divine Wisdom to conduct men to happiness by a shorter and easier way than that of a sober, righteous and godly life, as it is well known the Antinomians have done?

Sect. X. The unhappy use of Scripture-Examples, is another thing prevented by this soundness in the moral understanding. Desipit exemplar vitiiis imitabile. An example, for the greater part good, that hath faulty mixtures in it, which are easily imitated

m Hor. L. 1. Ep. 19.
tated, will deceive without care. In the Sacred Writings we find persons commended, because of their general character, who nevertheless had very great failings; or actions, on account of something praiseworthy in them, though in other respects culpable. This will help us in understanding the elegiums given to the Worthies, mentioned in the Eleventh to the Hebrews, for their Faith, which either formed their general behaviour, or influenced them upon particular occasions, of whom there were several who had things exceptionable in their character. When the intrinsic good or evil of actions is not regarded as it ought to be, too many, without distinguishing betwixt the good and the bad, follow that they like best; as the example of Rahab, particularly, when they are tempted to lie. And so when they observe, that David bears such a high character in sacred History, as to be stiled a man after God's own heart (notwithstanding those passages of his life which can by no means be justified) especially when it is added, that he did that which was right in the sight of the Lord, excepting in the matter of Uriah; having no clear and settled notions as to these things, and glad to lay hold on any pretence, they conclude, that, setting aside the crimes of murder and adultery, the things objected against him, if generally blameworthy, yet were not so in him; and that it is not
not so much the sins committed, as the persons committing them that we are to consider, together with the circumstances; which may be so peculiar as almost to sanctify any action; as when a good cause is promoted, though by means not the most honourable, and against the enemies of the true Religion. And then taking it for granted, that the circumstances they are in are of this nature, they will not scruple what others, who have better studied the true foundations of moral good and evil, or been taught them in the discourses they have heard or read, regard as highly criminal. And, accordingly, this hath too often in fact been the use made of such Scripture-Examples. Thus Cromwell being asked, "how he could excuse all the prevarications, and other ill things of which he and his party were visibly guilty in the conduct of their affairs," replied, they believed there were great occasions on which some men were called to great services, in the doing which they were excused from the common rules of Morality; such were the practices of Ehud and Jael, Sampson and David; and by this they fancied they had a privilege from observing those standing rules. It is very obvious (faith the n Historian) how far this principle may be carried,

and Certainty of Morality.

ried, and how all justice and mercy may be laid aside on this pretence by every wild Enthusiast.

Sect. XI. How easily are the Precepts of Scripture misunderstood by people of weak heads, or a wrong turn of mind, when they have never been accustomed to reason about moral duties, nor been well instructed in them by others? Where commands are delivered in a parabolical and figurative style (as many of those in our Saviour's Sermon on the Mount are, if thine enemy smite thee on the one cheek, turn the other also, &c.) or in general and unlimited terms, as lend, hoping for nothing again—resist not evil—servants obey your masters in all things—swear not at all. &c.: the meaning of such precepts, though easy enough to men of sober sense, that think it no crime to use their Reason in Religion, is liable to be mistaken by persons who with an enthusiastic imagination have not sufficient strength of judgment to guide it; or, which is as bad, to be misrepresented to such by others that have their designs to serve upon them.—Of so great use is a rational view of things to keep the Christian from those misapprehensions, and misapplications of the Doctrines, Examples, and Precepts of Scripture, which he might otherwise be apt to run, or be led, into.

C Sect.
Sect. XII. It is further highly proper that, as Christianity is a most reasonable institution, all that profess it should be made sensible of its being so, to the end they may give it the honour due to it above all other Religions, be the more firmly established in the belief of its truth, admire and adore the divine perfections therein displayed, and have their hearts more delightfully and immoveably attached to it. But now of this superior reasonableness of the Christian Institution, none have so clear a discernment as those who are the best judges of the incomparable beauty and excellence of its Precepts; as, cæteris paribus, none can pretend to make so exact an estimate of these, as persons, who being habituated to moral and divine contemplations, are able to demonstrate the general plan of the Gospel to be formed on the highest Reason. And as such persons do best apprehend the reasonableness of Christianity, so likewise its truly noble and excellent design; finding the entire scheme, after the closest survey of it, to be intended and admirably adapted to the exaltation and improvement of human nature, that, being made conformable to the divine in

*Certi interim sumus nihil unquam veris Rationis nostræ disstatis contra dictorum a Deo unquam revelari posse. Immo Sacras Scripturas ideo credimus a Deo feu Naturæ authore proficiscì, quoniam leges naturales ubique illuïrant, muniunt, promoventique. Cumberland de L. N. Prolegom.*
in purity and holiness, it may by this means be more and more fitted to resemble it in felicity too.

And whereas some are ready to think we pay more respect to the Revealer, by taking every part of the Revelation solely upon his authority, without inquiring into the reasons of his commands any further than he hath been pleased to point them out in the Scriptures; this is certainly a mistake, since, besides the dependance which the proof of Christianity, from its intrinsic evidence, hath upon it, we may truly say, that God hath shewn us what is good, and why it is good, by our own frame, and that of the universe, in which he speaks to us as properly, though not so fully, as he does in the Scripture. And why hath the Supreme Being thus discovered to us by our Reason the ground and foundation of moral duties, but with an intent we should take notice of it? Some will think it a judicious observation of Chrysostom, examining that question, why God, when he commanded men to honour their parents, not to kill, &c. adds not any reason to shew the equity of these laws, that the reason of this was, that these things were already known to the whole world, being maxims of natural light; whereas, the Law, which regards the Sabbath, being a positive Law (meaning, I suppose,
pose, as it challenges a *seventh part* of time, and such a *particular seventh*, with some other appendages of the *Law*) is followed with a large account of the reason that led the Creator to impose the observation of this feast on the *Jews*. Since by being Christians we do not cease to be men, and the light of Reason, instead of being extinguished by that of *Revelation*, shines the brighter, it cannot be improper that, among the motives and principles of our obedience to the divine commands, those drawn from the reason of things should conspire with such as are peculiar to the *Gospel*; by which alliance they will, indeed, receive the greater force one from the other: nor will our obedience be the less acceptable to God, the *Father of Lights*, whether of *Reason* or *Revelation*, and the *Author of Nature*, as well as the *God of Grace*.

**Sect. XIII.** The same thing is necessary in order to adjust the respective value and importance of duties. Duties equally commanded in the *Word of God* may happen to interfere in the exercise of them, on some occasions. In such a juncture, which shall take place? Doubtless, those that are of the greatest weight. But which are these? Persons used to resolve the obligations of mankind into the reason and nature of things will not find it very difficult to be able to tell
tell which. The Christian Lawgiver himself calls moral duties the weightier matters of the Law; which is a plain intimation that these are to be preferred to positive Institutions, purely as such; and this not only in theory, but practice, unless when the positive appointment hath some superior moral duty mixed with it, that requires more immediate notice; in which case, it is not really the positive duty that is preferred to the moral, but one moral duty to another: for among moral duties themselves there are degrees of excellence and dignity, and, consequently, of obligation to perform, and of guilt in the violation of them. To be able to marshal all the virtues and duties of the christian life, and assign to each the degree of inward respect, as well as the proper time and place to the exercise of it, we had need know what it is, in the nature of things, that constitutes moral excellence, and be used to compare ideas with one another by some common and immutable standard.

Sect. XIV. Add this consideration more; that the objection against Christianity from the severity of its Precepts is better capable of being answered this way, to the satisfaction of the professors of it, who may be tempted to think it might have born less hard upon their inclinations; and the silencing its enemies, who are glad of any thing
thing at which to cavil. For when it is demonstrated, that the best and most refined Reason gives its suffrage to the same duties, such as self-denial, the forgiveness of injuries, and the like; and that some or other of the most virtuous and knowing Heathens have seen and taught the reasonableness of such duties, the objection vanishes; the enemies of the Gospel have nothing to say against it that will bear examination; and they that own the obligations of it go on more cheerfully in the way of their duty, and dare not, for shame, mention the difficulty of virtues, that were not only acknowledged, but practised too, in an inferior degree, by men who had not the same glorious motives, and powerful assistances to animate them.—In fine, the Prophets appeal to the natural sense of men's minds, 

He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God.

And the same do the Writers of the New Testament, Whatever things are true, whatsoever things are venerable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things. Of which goodness of the things commanded by God, and love-

1 Micah. vi. 8. 7 Phil. iv. 8.
and Certainty of Morality.

loveliness of Virtue, two men of equal piety have more distinct or confused conceptions, according to the clearness and adequateness of their ideas on moral subjects; and the perfection of the practical judgment, which, no less than that of the speculative, must very much depend on the frequent and right exercise of it. I have spent more time upon this objection than it deserves, upon the account of its being so common, and represented as a dead weight on all attempts to support the credit of Moral Philosophy.

Sect. XV. II. Morality lies level to the apprehensions of the weakest minds, if sincere and well disposed. It doth not require an uncommon capacity to understand the character of an honest and good man, what are his predominant qualities, and what the duties by the uniform constant discharge of which he approves his integrity; nor to see the beauty of such a character. Not that the light of truth, even moral truth, and the objects discoverable by it, are to be perceived with as little trouble and pains as this corporeal light, and the general spectacle of nature, which forces itself upon the sense whether we will or no. Moral objects are only to be discerned in a moral way, by the exercise of those intellectual faculties with which our Maker hath endowed us. There must be some degree of attention, and freedom from
from prejudice, otherwise, we shall be no judges of this sort of beauty and proportion. We may have a general idea of something owing from us to God, and our fellow-creatures, and of a right behaviour as to ourselves, but then it will be confused and indistinct, like the first view of some excellent piece of perspective, which only offers to the eye a few rude irregular parts of a noble building, or other object, lying without any order, till the eye hath dwelt upon it for some time; and then the hidden beauties come forth to light, every part appears to be nicely framed, and all together make one elegant and harmonious whole. And it is the praise of this sort of knowledge, that where there is this attention and liberty of mind, little else is necessary to make a man a tolerable master of it; which cannot be always said of abstract and metaphysical, or mathematical and physical discoveries. These lie quite out of the way of common minds, they strain their faculties, and perplex their thoughts. Even nature itself, whose superficial beauties are so obvious to the sense, and strike it so strongly, is a perfect mystery to the greater part of its spectators, as to the connection of the parts, the extent of the whole frame, and the laws by which she conducts her operations; they know nothing of these things, and can hardly be made to conceive them.

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Sect. XVI. Not that it can be expected the notions of common people should have the regularity and exactness which we look for in Systems; that they should be able to deduce the rights or duties of human-kind from their first principles, and to explain and unfold them to others. In these things it is the Scholar hath the advantage of the Mechanick, and ought to be a better Moralist than he. But though it is not for every one to be able to trace up the stream to its fountain-head, or to find out truth by his own unguided searches, much less to do it with any degree of perfection, yet every one hath an ability of distinguishing right and wrong when they are fairly proposed to him, to understand the foundations of them, and the agreement or disagreement of this sort of ideas when they are set before him in a plain and judicious manner. Morality, being the concern of all, must be within the reach of all. And it may be observed to the honour of the divine wisdom and goodness, that there is something in the human frame that very much facilitates our intimacy with objects of this nature. Moral truths have a double congruity with the mind of man, that of truth, and that of goodness, by one of which they take hold of the understanding, by the other of the heart. And it is often seen that the rectitude of the heart
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heart is, in these matters, a great help to the weakness of the head. This is no little encouragement to the study of Morality, to all those that are in a situation for it, that they have such a prospect of success in their inquiries, and shall be able to communicate the result of their searches to others with so little trouble, and by this means diffuse light and happiness all around them; especially, when it is added,

Sect. XVII. III. Morality is attended with all the certainty that any considerate and impartial person can desire. The certainty is proportionable to the importance. And what but this hath made the Mathe-
matics so much courted? Truth will always be agreeable to an inquisitive mind. And if all, how much more ethical truth, supposing the taste of the mind not to be vitiated, which is at once fitted to rouse the affections, and to satisfy the understanding; under the conduct of which every faculty hath its proper employment, and the whole man as a sensitive, a moral, and an intellectual Being, finds his advantage? The Data, on which Morality is established, the Duties it prescribes, and the Happiness it promises, are too evident to be justly called in question.

Sect.
Sect. XVIII. 1. The Data, or things taken for granted, and that serve as first principles to this science, are indubitably certain. Particularly these two, viz. that there is such a Being as God, and such a creature as Man. These are supposed as objects, without which Morality could have no existence; the former, likewise, as the original cause of all being, action, and enjoyment, the very life and soul of moral agents, and of moral duties. It is presumed, as already proved, that there is a God, a supreme intelligence, the first and best of Beings, possessed of every moral, as well as of all other, excellence, in the most transcendent degree, the Parent, Governor, and Judge, of the universe. That there is such a species of reasonable Beings as mankind, related after various manners to God, and to one another, is also laid down as an uncontroverted truth. Let the divine, or even the human nature be in other respects never so mysterious and unknown, we have yet all the knowledge of both that is absolutely necessary to regulate our behaviour according to the present state and circumstances of our Being; nor does the unavoidable ignorance we labour under argue the uncertainty and imperfection of our Morality,

1 See the Author's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, in his Posthumous Works. Vol. IV.
Of the Importance of the Metaphysicks, and Natural Philosophy. What though we are not able to conceive of self-existence, eternity, omniscience, or any other attribute as infinite? Notwithstanding this, the general idea of God as the center of all perfection, and the fountain of all good, as a Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, and Ruler, this idea, I say, so fruitful of practical propositions, is plain enough, how little forever we comprehend of the mode of existence of any one attribute, or of exerting any one operation. And so of the soul of man, as a cogitative, self-determining Being, what it is, and how it acts, of the secret tie that unites it to the body, and their mutual dependence upon each other, we are able to frame but very dim notions, and uncertain conjectures. But the idea of man, by which every man’s own actions, and those of others towards him, are to be formed, being only that of a rational, free, and sensitive agent, (of all which we have experience every moment in ourselves) is easy and obvious to all. The intrinsick nature of these several powers, is an abstruse speculation, more curious than useful.

Sect. XIX. And then, as to the existence of other Beings, besides himself; since no man can have the least reason to make a serious doubt of it, every man’s obligations will
will be the very same, though there should be a bare possibility of things not existing that appear to exist; inasmuch as the rule of judgment, and consequently of action, to reasonable Beings, is, or ought to be, what appears, not what appears not; otherwise, it will not be unreasonable to act against every appearance of truth and reality, that is, to choose utter darkness to walk in, as better than the clearest day-light, which is absurd. This, by the way, shews the folly and guilt of a life abandoned to inclination, without all regard to God and man, upon the principles of the Sceptick himself; there being few, I believe, so given up to a doubting humour as not to allow one thing to be more probable than another; in particular, that there is a world of men and other Beings, and a God that ruleth over all. And if this be acknowledged but probable, the obligation is not only probable but certain to act after the same manner, as if the supposition of God or man's not existing could be reduced to an express contradiction.

Sect. XX. 2. Answerable to the evidence of the things given, or demanded, in Morality, is that of the Duties prescribed. This will be shewn more distinctly and largely under the Demonstration of the Law of Nature, and in treating the Particular Virtues.
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Virtues. At present, I shall only make two or three general Observations. The first is concerning the fundamental duty of all Morality, viz. a sincere endeavour to know, and, as far as known, to perform all the duties we stand obliged to. This inquiry, being previous to all particular duties, is very properly called the fundamental duty. And nothing more certain, than that neither less, nor more, than this is required of any man. That less than this will not acquit us may be easily demonstrated. For upon the first glance of his thoughts every reasonable Being must be invincibly conscious that not existing alone in the universe, but only as a small part of a vast system, to which himself and all his actions bear some relation, it is very possible that every kind of behaviour may not be, and highly probable that it is not, alike proper; (not to put the case of a reasonable Being supposed to know of no other existing, which is purely imaginary) that therefore he ought to inquire what behaviour is most proper in order to make it the rule of his own conduct. It is next to impossible for any one that thinks and reasons to avoid this reflection, or to withstand the conviction it carries along with it. So much then is necessary, and no more, because more than this is impossible. We can do no more than inquire impartially, and then honestly act according to the best judg-
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judgment we can make of things, after having inquired into them; all beyond this is impossible, and therefore no part of our duty.

Sect. XXI. The next observation or step is, that behaviour must apparently be most reasonable that bears the greatest correspondence to my own, and the nature of other intelligent Beings, and to the relations subsisting between us. Other Beings, unless they have a false notion of things, must needs be best pleased with such a behaviour, as the same behaviour must naturally yield most pleasure to my own mind, it being the only one that I can approve in myself or others. And here too I tread on firm ground as before. Do I take care of my Being and faculties, and pursue my own true happiness? And am I affected after a friendly manner to other intelligent Beings? This is the deciding point. Virtue immediately consists in the acts and dispositions of the mind, and as these are capable of being well known, and are invariably the same, the idea of Virtue is determinate and immutable. In regard of external actions, the moral good or evil of these is not intrinsic and immediate, but wholly depends upon those inward acts and principles with which they are connected, and from which they take their rise. Whatever conduct or beha-
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behaviour proceeds from a prevailing regard to my own real improvement and happiness, and amicable affections towards other Beings that come within my cognizance, is demonstrably right.

Sect. XXII. Concerning these outward actions then, the only question is, how in every circumstance I shall be able to approve the integrity and rectitude of my heart? Or which way of acting is most adapted to answer this end? And it is very happy that, excepting in some extraordinary cases, there is no one, solicitous to find the right road, but may do it without much difficulty, and be very sure of it too. In the common train of life is it so hard to determine whether by doing or not doing an action proposed, or doing the contrary, I shall be my own friend, and the friend of mankind, shall keep closest to the character of a good man, a good neighbour, a good member of a family, a good citizen, a good magistrate or subject, and of one grateful to the Deity on whom he constantly depends? Let us only observe how the case stands between us and those whose interest we heartily desire and rightly apprehend. Are we often at a loss about our actions as they respect such persons, or apt to mistake in those things which justice and benevolence demand from us? No more should we ordinarily be
in other cases, relating to self-government, justice in our intercourses with mankind, and piety and devotion towards God, if our judgments were not perverted by wrong affections, and much more if they were helped and enlightened by right ones.

Sect. XXIII. As to actions confessedly doubtful we have another way of coming at certainty even in these; for duty being a relative term, bearing a constant proportion to the knowledge and abilities of the agent, the difference between several agents in the degrees of understanding, and, in consequence of that, in the appearance of the same action, which by one of them is esteemed disputable, by another not, makes no odds, as to the certainty of the general rule of proceeding, which is always to act according to the greatest evidence. Though a person of superior knowledge should be at a certainty where one of a lower class can reach no further than probability, yet that this latter is bound to follow the greater probability (I mean, as it appears upon the whole, or in the final question, all things considered, ought the action to be done or left undone, or may it be done or not?) is no more to be doubted than that the former ought to govern himself by his certain knowledge. Were there no absurdity in counteracting a lesser degree of evidence, there would be
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none in resisting the highest, these two differing only as a greater quantity from a smaller, not as more or less real. The magnitude of a Mite, is as truly magnitude, though it be not so sensible, as that of an Elephant. So a lesser fault or folly, may be as certainly a fault, or folly, as a greater one.

Sect. XXIV. Upon the whole then, in what constitutes a virtuous temper and character, greater certainty cannot be desired, there being all that is necessary, supposing a conformity of practice, to secure self-approbation, the approbation of the Deity, and that of all wise and good men; abundantly enough to answer all the needs and exigencies of the moral world, in the present state of it; the preservation and good order of which depend upon the knowledge we have of the moral distinctions of actions, and the influence this knowledge hath upon us, in like manner as the health and vigour of our natural constitution do on our knowing and observing the qualities of our food and physis, and other things relating to the body; with this difference, that the knowledge of the nature of actions, morally considered, is generally as much clearer and more certain than that of physical causes and effects, as our moral life is more important than our natural.

Finally;
Finally; we have all the certainty concerning moral duties that is requisite to our attaining the happiness of moral agents; as will be presently shewn. It is judiciously observed by an admirable Writer in this way, that in external operations, where the question is often perplexed by the multiplicity of circumstances, our not being able always to arrive at precise determinations, no more affects the certainty of Morality, than it does the truth and usefulness of the principles of Geometry about the measuring of Lines, Surfaces, and Solids, that neither by the Senses nor the help of Instruments it is possible to effect a Line perfectly strait, or a Surface perfectly plain or spherical, or a Body perfectly regular. It is enough that we approach so near to the utmost exactness, that nothing of any moment to human use is wanting. And so much may be attained by the principles of moral doctrine.

—the method, the rules of operations, and the way of deducing one thing from another are the same (in Morality, as in Mathematicks) neither do the uses of life require a compleat accuracy, any more than the same is necessary in measuring Planes and Solids.

D 2  Sect.

* Cumberland de Leg. N. C. 4. Where there is a most ingenious comparison between Algebra and Morality as to the method of finding out Truth, and teaching it when found.*
Sect. XXV. Another celebrated Author hath remarked that moral quantities, as they are not capable of being adjusted in their mutual proportions with so much exactness as physical quantities are, so they do not need such a precision, but allow of a latitude. Thus in estimating the merit of persons, the value of things and actions, the proportion of the punishment to the crime, and in the exercise of the greater part of the virtues, excepting Justice, e. g. Liberality, Gratitude, Equity, Charity, &c. there is a certain latitude or extent. It cannot be denied that the nature of the subject matter is different in moral and mathematical sciences; and according to this difference in the subject there is a like difference in the kind of evidence; from which it will by no means follow, that because the evidence to be expected in Morality is not the same as that of the Mathematicks, that therefore it is not satisfactory. What hath been said, if I mistake not, shews the contrary. To this let it be added.

Sect. XXVI. 3. Morality gives satisfaction, where it is most of all desirable, in the inquiry after happiness. The end of Morality is happiness; and will any one say that


**u υποκείμεν uλν. Arif.
that happiness is an impossible attainment? A most wise and good God hath made ample provision for other creatures, that they might reach the ends to which they incline, and for which by their several natures he hath fitted them; and it is hard to conceive, that man only should be under a necessity of falling short of the happiness of which he is capable. It is possible for God to make man happy, the thing does not imply a contradiction; nor is there any incapacity in the subject to oppose it; for being furnished both with Understanding and Will, man wants not the principles of fruition. And who can doubt, but that infinite power can supply objects of enjoyment adequate to the faculty. Certain it is then that God can make man happy, and because he is infinitely good we are justified to infer that he will do it, with this only condition, that man be not wanting to himself.

But as man is not now in a state of innocence, but degeneracy, this argument may be thought to lose somewhat of its force and evidence; I will therefore place the matter in a different light. We will not then make the end of Morality to be the highest point of happiness, that it is absolutely possible for man to enjoy, but the highest attainable by man in the present circumstances of his Being, considered as frail and degenerate, whatever that happiness should
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should prove to be; and of this Morality is secured, as the certain portion of those who faithfully follow its rules. For since there is a God, a Being of almighty power, and the fountain of all moral perfection, this God cannot but love those most who most resemble him; not only as all Beings delight in a similitude of nature, but as that which constitutes this likeness is in itself most excellent and lovely. And what God delights in and approves, he cannot but distinguish by suitable marks of his favour; and all whom God wills to be happy, must be as happy as he wills them to be, since he wants not power to accomplish his Will. This not only proves the greatest happiness to be the assured reward of the virtuous, but that there must be an after life, when this reward shall be bestowed; forasmuch as it is not fully and exactly conferred in the present state. The natural tendencies and effects of Virtue and Vice obvious to all, show them with certainty what God approves or disapproves. Virtue naturally produces happiness, Vice misery; so that if the virtuous man always enjoyed the natural effects of his Virtue, and the vicious man suffered the natural effects of his viciousness, there would be no comparison between them in point of happiness. But forasmuch as this order of things does not always take place in this life, it must be a satisfaction that
that we can have recourse to a supreme mind, whose future retributions will solve all wrong appearances, and make this truth secure, that in spite of every hindrance, the virtuous man will in the end, and upon the whole, be the happiest man. We now often see the most god-like souls in crazy miserable bodies, and the best of men placed in the worst circumstances of life; which introduces the necessity of a future state, when this seeming disorder in the conduct of things shall be rectified, and virtue receive its crown. A Heathen x Moralist reasons much after the same manner. "If as it is probable the gods have regard to human things, it is agreeable to Reason to suppose, they delight in that which is best and nearest akin to themselves, and will reward those who most love and honour them, and act rightly and becomingly."

Sect. XXVII. Upon the whole then, it seems sufficiently evinced that certainty belongs to Ethicks; and in concluding after this manner we are far from being singular. Mr. Dryden tells us concerning Plutarch, in his life of that celebrated Philosopher, that Moral Philosophy was his greatest aim, because the principles of it admitted of less doubt,

* Εἰ γὰρ τὶς επιμελεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων, &c. Aristot. Eth. ad Nicom.
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doubt, and were most conducive to the benefit of human life. And though Cicero professes himself an Academic even in Morality, pretending to no more than probability in the things he discourses of, yet when it is considered, that his design herein was not to represent Ethicks as less evident than those sciences, which are accounted to have the greatest certainty; and that by probability this Philosopher intended all that evidence which admits of the least possibility of mistake, which notion of the word will perhaps comprehend what we call moral certainty, I shall not be afraid to reckon him of our side. Nay, which at first sight appears strange, Hobbs himself, the man that denies all natural distinctions of moral good and evil, affirms Morality to be capable of demonstration; but then the odd reason which he gives for this shows, that he meant it no kindness. "Morality may be demonstrated, because we ourselves are the authors of the difference between Justice and Injustice, by the establishment of Laws and Conventions, to which moral good and evil owe all their being." His meaning is, that men may certainly know what actions are violations of those laws or rules, which they themselves have settled.

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1 Cic. de Offic. L. 2. §. 2. et Græv. in loc.
2 De Homine. C. 10.
Sect. XXVIII. Mr. Locke's opinion is well known, that Morality is capable of demonstration; but it is doubted whether the reason he gives for it be conclusive. "Up-on this ground it is (says this great man) "that I am bold to think, that Morality is "capable of demonstration, as well as Mathemathicks; since the precise real essence "of the things moral words stand for, "may be perfectly known; and so the "congruity or incongruity of the things "themselves be certainly discovered, in "which consists perfect knowledge." The meaning seems to be this, that moral terms standing for ideas in the mind, which are not considered as existing in any real patterns without it, as is the case in Natural Philosophy, it is our own fault if we do not clearly define the terms we make use of in moral Propositions. And this being done, a certain judgment may be easily formed concerning the Propositions, whether they be true or false. But methinks this supposes rather than proves the certainty of Morality; or at most proves no more than this, that having a demonstration of it in our own minds, we can convey this knowledge to others, by first laying down precise definitions of the terms we imploy; by means of which others may as easily conceive our mean-

meaning in the words *Justice*, *Probity*, *Fraud*, or the like, as they can of the words *Square*, *Circle*, *Triangle*, and the like, when the figures themselves are exhibited before them. But with submission, something more is necessary than this, *viz. proving* that my ideas as connected with praise or dispraise, with good or ill desert, have a foundation in the nature of things. Justice being first defined, it may not be difficult to show that an action is just or unjust according to the definition; but is it reasonable, is it praise-worthy and deserving the approbation of God and men? To demonstrate this, which is demonstrating the moral obligation of the action, something more is evidently necessary, than exactly defining the terms. What this is which is further necessary will be shown in the proof of the Law of Nature.

**Sect. XXIX.** Against the certainty of Morality these *two* things are commonly objected.

1. The *different* sentiments of mankind concerning the same actions, which some are ready to think were hardly possible, if they had one plain uniform rule by which to judge. The answer to this will be more conveniently placed under the Demonstration of the Law of Nature, where I shall have occasion to consider it at large, for which reason
reason I only mention the objection now, with this general remark upon it, that men not using the rule is no proof of their not having it in their possession.

2. There are many actions confessedly of a doubtful nature, and what becomes of the certainty of Morality in these cases? I answer, our doubts here are not so much about the moral, as physical nature of actions. Virtue immediately consists in the disposition of the mind, and what this ought to be in every case may be easily demonstrated. But as to external actions the good or evil of them depending upon the disposition of mind with which they are or ought to be connected; though it be demonstrable that whatever actions flow from right dispositions are right, and whatever actions are owing to a want of such dispositions, and much more to the prevalence of the contrary are not right but wrong; yet in such cases it may be doubted, what actions are on account of their physical nature (or aptitude to express and promote good dispositions) to be chosen. Yet here it is plain, as long as this ignorance or doubt is not to be ascribed to a faulty disposition of mind, they do not at all affect the certainty of Morality. A man acting wrong in such a case does it from an ignorance or mistake, like that of a person who drinks an intoxicating liquor, not knowing the quality of it, which deprives
prives him for a time of the use of his Reason; here is the appearance but not the crime of drunkenness. A virtuous man is not infallible in opinions or facts; but though destitute of certainty in one sense, he has it in another. Though he may not be certain of the intrinific nature of an action, that is, whether it be good or evil itself, yet he may be certain of its relative nature, whether it be good or evil to him, all circumstances considered. For either the doubt concerns the necessity of the action only, or our being obliged to do it, the lawfulness of it being out of dispute; on which supposition it is our undoubted duty to perform the action: or the doubt is of the lawfulness of the action, at the same time that we are persuaded of its not being necessary to be done; in which case it is manifest that I am bound to forbear. Or a doubt lies on both sides, that the doing of the action may be sinful, and so likewise the forbearance of it, and yet one or the other must be chosen; in this uncertainty we are not without sure footing, nor without sufficient light to direct us; for having sought divine illumination humbly and fervently, and done all we are morally capable of doing to extricate ourselves from the strait, laying aside all prejudices from passion and interest: if after all no more reason appears for one side of

\textsuperscript{b} See this matter more largely treated. \textit{P. II. §. 2. C. 1.}
of the question than the other, it is certain, which way forever we act, there is no danger of our sinning. But in case the probabilities after all appear unequal, we must act on that side which we apprehend has the greatest to justify it. In every vicious action the Will is in fault, either directly or indirectly, which it not being here, the action must be pronounced innocent.

Sect. XXX. The result of the whole is, that Morality is of the greatest moment, and capable of the most satisfactory proof. And this will justify the Oracle of Apollo in declaring "Socrates the wisest man of the age in which he lived; for this reason, that despising the sophistry and trifling of the Philosophy then in vogue, he directed his chief application to the study of himself, and the correction of his manners. As much as to say, the study of Morality is indeed the study of Wisdom. "Socrates recommended studying Geometry and Astronomy, as far as these sciences were practical and of use in life; but beyond this (as for instance abstruse and difficult theories in Geometry, and in Astronomy, inquiring into the mechanism by which God framed and

\[c\] A summary of his Moral Philosophy is given by Xenophon, in his four books de Memorabilibus Soc: et Cic. Academ. L. 1.

and moved the heavenly bodies) he did not approve an application to these studies; esteeming Anaxagoras to have been no better than a mad man upon this account. In this preference of moral science the Chinese agree with Socrates, whose e laws admits none to the Magistracy, but those who have for a long time and with success applied themselves to study the Moral Philosophy of Confucius, the Socrates of the Chinese. But then this preference of moral science must not be carried so far, as the treating other sciences with contempt, as it is in fact done by f Lord Shaftesbury; since by reason of the connection which Cicero observes there is between all the parts of learning, the most speculative sciences may be very assistant to those that are practical. Besides, we cannot be supposed to fill up all our hours of study with the study of Morality, other speculations are necessary to inlarge, entertain, and exercise the mind. "Philosophy " (as a fine Writer e observes) was putting " on a new face about the age of Philostratus; it was beginning to forfake the natural precepts of life and morals, to neglect that noble connection, which the " first masters had established between physical contemplations and this prime science " of

e Burnet’s Archæol p. 15.
f Advice to an Author. Part III. §. 1.
g Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer. §. 12.
of manners and actions. A connection never to be over looked; and which we have the satisfaction to see revived, since the sciences have gained a new lustre, and by the happy application of Geometry and Numbers to the appearances of nature have lost that uncertainty which was long their reproach, and the cause of their decay.” The Author quotes as instances, Sir Isaac Newton’s Principles of Natural Philosophy. Scholium the last, his Chronology, C. 2, and 3. Cumberland de Legibus, Wollaston’s Religion of Nature, Derham’s Astro- & Phyfico-Theology, and others. This observation shows the great usefulness of Natural Philosophy to the Moralift; the knowledge of nature being certainly a very good preparation to the study of morals. This science then being confessedly the most important, it may be of some use to remark, that God did not wholly neglect the heathen world, he raised up a Socrates in Greece, a Confucius in China; and the same is true of other nations, as teachers and examples of righteousness.

Sect. XXXI. Can we now help admiring the vanity of man, which diverts him from the pursuit of moral knowledge, that so nearly concerns him, and would reward his industry with the most solid satisfaction, and

h See the General Dictionary, Article Confucius.
and bewilders him among the distractions of human opinions, which commonly are as little profitable as certain? This shows the general taste to be extremely vitiated, and the need there is, not only of a resolute opposition to vulgar prejudices, but of some higher principle to correct it. For this reason I shall close this *Introduction* with some counsels, for the more successful pursuit of moral truth, after giving a necessary caution against the error of those, who as *Cicero* takes notice, "study Morality, that they may make a show of their learning, not that they may live according to its rules." In opposition to this error *Seneca* justly observes, "The design of Philosophy is not popularity or ostentation, and it consists not in talking plausibly, but acting well. It animates and forms the mind, directs the life, governs our actions, shows what we are to do, and what forbear, and fitting at the helm guides our course over the sea of life." The advice I would recommend to be observed by those who would study Morals with success, may be reduced to these *three* heads.

1. Be not so attached to any preconceived notions, however positive you may hitherto

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1 Moralem disciplinam ostentationem scientiae non legem vitæ putant.

2 Epist. 16.
hitherto have been of their truth, as to be backward to part with them upon better evidence, even though the discovery of your errors should deprive you of some pleasing delusion, and oblige you to the practice of something naturally ungrateful.

2. Impose an absolute silence on your passions, and guard against the flatteries of sense and imagination, resolving to be guided in your judgments only by sober, improved, and enlightened Reason. The clearness and stillness of the medium, as well as the goodness of the organ are necessary to an exact view of the object. The Platonists therefore define Philosophy, "the disengagement and abstraction of the mind from the body; that it might be capable of applying itself to things intelligible, and that have a true and proper being." As to the passionate part of the soul, says the same Author, a Philosopher ought to be furnished with the coldest and most different temper to corporeal delights. The mind or diviner part of man is often mislead by the corrupt affections of the heart, which having lost its relish of true good, seeks to draw the understanding into the same error. For this reason you should not only be aware of the artifices of the heart, and guard against them, but

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1 Alcinoi Introd. ad Philos. Platonicam.
Of the Importance, &c.

3. Labour incessantly to purge and reform the heart, and to have it inflamed with the love of truth and goodness; and for this end by fervent devotion to obtain from God, the great restorer of nature, that sacred light and influence, which will direct you to form right judgments of things, and enable you to act conformably.

Books proper to be consulted on the subject of the Introduction, besides those that are cited in it, are


Puffendorf's Preface to his Book De Officio Hominis & Civis.

Grove's Queries on Reason and Revelation. Vol. IV.

Lucas's Inquiry after Happiness. §. 1, and 2. C. 1, 2, 3.


PART I.

Of Happiness.

CHAP. I.

Of Ethicks or Morality in general, and of the nature of Happiness.

SECT. I. 

THICKS or Morality, Ἕθικς, is so named ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἡθοῦ, and Ἡθος again is derived ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑθος, as Aristole has observed, by an easy transmutation of a short vowel into a long one; between which two words there seems to be much the same difference, if we critically distinguish them, as between custom and habit in our language: Ἡθος or habit

habit signifying an internal rooted disposition of soul, acquired or improved by custom, or a frequent repetition of the actions proper to generate it. And even the word Mores, from whence Morality has its name, and so likewise our English word Manners, does not simply denote human actions, but actions to which men are accustomed. Dr. Grew indeed observes, "that though the Philosophy which treateth of Virtue, is by the Greeks called Ἀθροις, it is not because custom maketh Virtue, but because virtue is the parent of custom; so far as this is useful to all communities, or agreeable to the best Reason in any one." But I will venture to say, that custom is in some sense the parent of Virtue; not as if Virtue consisted in a conformity to publick custom, but because a custom of doing virtuous actions forms a habit of Virtue, from whence Ἀθροις has its derivation.

Ethicks or Morality is a Science directing human actions for the attainment of happiness. You see the genus of the definition is Science, for so Morality is in a proper sense; moral knowledge being fixed and certain. The objects of this Science, by which it is differenced from all others, are the actions of mankind, as capable of being directed.


directed by a moral rule, and made subservient to the acquisition of happiness.

Sect. II. In my division of Ethicks I shall follow one of the oldest and most common, not knowing where to find a better; and accordingly part it under these two general heads, of happiness, and of the method to be observed for its attainment. I give happiness the first place, not so much for the reason commonly assigned, that happiness is the end of Morality, and the end is still first in intention, but upon these two considerations.

1. The nature of the end regulates that of the means, and ought therefore to be first known and established; in so much that the end being low, sensual, and momentary, the means must be agreeable; as on the contrary the means must partake of the dignity of the end. If the happiness which a wise man is to pursue ariseth from sensuality, gratifications, or worldly power, wealth, and greatness, who does not see, that sensuality, covetousness, and ambition, within certain bounds, are not only lawful, but commendable? And

Supposing no happiness beyond this life, too many would be apt to think after this manner, and to reason concerning all mental pleasures, which cost us a pretty deal of pains to come at them, and after all could not be carried to any great degree, as Horace concerning the Philosophy of Archytas the Pythagorean,
And though the pleasures of the mind should in themselves be preferable to those of the body, yet supposing the duration of human happiness, whatever that happiness be, not to extend beyond this life, a very great change must follow in respect of moral obligations. It would, to say the least, be doubtful, whether among the duties owing to God we were to place refusing to comply with the Established Religion, against our inward sentiments, at the expense of our lives, or what we held dearest in them; or such degrees of devotion, and so strict a regard to truth as truth, where the laws of justice were not violated; or to the workings of our minds, as we are now obliged to maintain. And as to our neighbour, whether all the same instances of benevolence, e.g. hazard ing our own lives to save those of other persons; and as to ourselves, that exact temperance in the enjoyment of bodily pleasures, that industry and improvement of our time, which are duties now,

*Te maris et terræ, numeroque carentis arenæ*
*Menforem cohíbent, Archyta,*
*Pulveris exigui prope littus parva Matinunt*
*Munera: nec quidquàm tibi prodeít*
*Aemis tentáfle domos, animoqüe rotundum*
*Percurríst polum, moríturo.*

*Hor. L. 1. Od. 28.*

Whether this would be right or no, yet thus would they reason, and of consequence ran into all kinds of sensual indulgence, having no principle left strong enough to restrain them.
now, would be the same then? Or though Reason should determine for all the same duties and obligations upon both suppositions, yet as upon supposition of no happiness beyond this life, we could not so easily and effectually silence those who abandoned themselves to their vices, who would laugh at any that should talk to them of the reasonableness of curbing their inclinations; it is upon this account also very necessary, that the happiness which men have in view should be first fixed, because upon the other supposition of a happiness remaining for the virtuous in a future state, of which the perfection of Virtue and Piety, and the most exalted exercises of it, will constitute a principal part; all disputes about the obligation to the several instances of Virtue and Piety, even the most expensive and self-denying, are cut off at once. A stream will rise as high, and no higher, as it is forced to ascend by the weight of the fountain. It would also be very hard to show in many cases the crime of self-murther if there were no future state.

Sect. III. Grotius having quoted a passage from Aristotle, de Moribus, L. 9. C. 8, wherein he saith, "that whereas the vulgar call those lovers of themselves, who are "for ingrossing the things of this world, E 4 " he

Comment. in Matt. xvi. 24.
"he for his part reckoning that to be the
"man, which was most excellent in him,
"could not but esteem him to be the lover
"of himself, who loved and gratified his
"most excellent part, though he was to die
"for it;" adds, "which opinion whether
"it can be defended by a Philosopher, who
"acknowledges no rewards or punishments
"after this life, may justly be questioned.
"St. Austin was of the mind, that setting
"aside those rewards and punishments, the
"truth would lie on the side of Epicurus."
Puffendorf having said "that the Law of
"Nature considered in itself is shut up
"within the bounds of this life, tending
"only to render man sociable; while the
"end of Moral Theology is to form the
"Christian, that is, a man who ought in-
"deed to live here below honestly and
"peaceably, but who nevertheless expects
"the principal rewards of his Piety after
"this life:" Leibnitz in his Judgment upon
Puffendorf had too much reason to object,
"that to neglect the consideration of ano-
"ther life, was to deprive this Science of
"the finest things belonging to it, and at
"the same time to destroy many duties
"of life."

Sect. IV. As all Morality has its founda-
dtion in Religion, or the belief of a Su-
preme

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preme Being, and the hopes and fears of mankind relating to him, if there be no other life of man but what is animal and dying, Religion vanishes of course, and with that Morality, as far as it flows from conscience, regulates the habit and temper of the mind, and is supported by the awe or love of a Divine Being. For what is Providence in the moral world, but the regard which the Supreme Ruler of it has to human actions, between the doers of which he will make a distinction in his treatment of them, suitable to their respective actions, whether good or evil, and the degrees of goodness or viciousness in each; now no such distinction being ordinarily made in this world, if there be no future state where it shall be done, can men think there is such a thing in God as approbation or dislike of the actions of men, and consequently any regard to them, or any Moral Providence? And if there be no Moral Providence, to what purpose is Religion, or what room is there for Morality, as far as that depends upon Religion, and has it interwoven with it?

Religion and Morality were divided amongst the Heathen, the Priesthood had the care of Religion, the Philosophers of Morality. Religion among them consisted only in the knowledge and practice of certain rites and ceremonies, so that it is no wonder
der Morality was not deduced from their Religion, such a Religion was not a proper foundation for it. As on the other hand, it is no wonder that a Morality not founded in Religion was imperfect, it was impossible it should be otherwise. Christianity has reconciled these two, the Christian Minister is instead of the Pagan Priest and the Pagan Philosopher; he takes care of both provinces, and with more success by means of their union. This argument may be improved to show, that both our Religion and Morality are the only true and genuine. Laërtius ⁸ has much the same observation. Herein Aristotle's Ethicks and Cicero's Offices appear to be defective, the duties we owe to God being omitted, and the duties we owe our fellow-creatures not being founded upon right principles.

Sect. V. 2. The knowledge of the end puts life into the execution of the means. When men run in a race they run with greater speed, having the prize in view; and the more glorious that is, the more vigorous and unfainting is their motion. After the lovely scene is once displayed, and it has been clearly shown what happiness means, a man will find his passions stirred, his hopes and desires will be in motion, and very inquisitive he will be how to secure him-

himself of so invaluable a treasure; and when he is thus prepared, the Moralist has a stronger handle by which to turn and guide him. The precepts of Virtue which make up the second part will then have a more favourable hearing, and he will then be held attentive to instruction, being already convinced that his greatest interest is concerned. Divines indeed in their discourses to the people generally go a contrary way, they first state the duty and then enforce it by motives, taken from the rewards that attend it. But in proceeding after this manner they take it for granted, that their hearers are before possessed of the knowledge of the reward from Revelation, and so carry the idea of it all along with them, and need only to have it a little more opened and illustrated in the close; whereas we are now upon the inquiry after happiness, by the light of natural Reason.

Sect. VI. A man never acts upon previous thought, but he is under a necessity of acting for some end; if for no other, to employ the activity of his Being, and to avoid that satiety and weariness which is the natural punishment of sloth. Should a person to disprove this attempt to lay aside all views and designs in any particular action, and then think he has hereby confuted this assertion, he deceives himself egregiously; for
for he directly confirms it, his end being plainly this, to contradict the abovementioned axiom, that man never acts but for some end. And as man acts for some end, so this end is a good, really such, or imagined so to be\textsuperscript{h}. He may indeed will evil, but not under the notion of evil; this is a contradiction and impossibility, the same as placing our happiness in being miserable. If the Poet\textsuperscript{i} makes the apostate angel say,

————All Good to me is lost.
Evil be thou my Good! ———

by evil he means not his own misery, but the revenge which this would provoke him to take, in gratifying which he should enjoy a criminal and monstrous delight. The Devil himself would be glad to separate between his punishment and his guilt.

Sect. VII. Good is either moral or natural. *Moral* good is the goodness of actions as conformable to right Reason, and deserving of approbation. An action done because it is reasonable and fit, is in that view of it morally good, of which more hereafter. *Natural* good is either happiness itself, or

\textsuperscript{h} \textit{ευτυχίας, κ.τ.λ.} All action is for the sake of some good, either real or appearing to be such; for even flight from evil is for the sake of good, and because it is thought to be useful.

\textsuperscript{i} Milton’s Paradise Lost. B. 4.
or what has a relation to happiness, considered purely in that view. The meeting of these two in the same action does not make them ever the less distinct; for the aptitude of an action to produce happiness, which is its natural goodness, is one thing; and doing such an action, because it is fit and reasonable you should do it, (which is the moral goodness of such actions when so done) is another. Virtue in one view of it is natural good, as it gives satisfactions of the best kind in the action, and in the reflection, and as it improves and enlarges the faculties of enjoyment; but this idea of it is evidently distinct from its moral goodness, or its being practised by us because conformable to right Reason, and deserving of approbation. It is only of natural good that we are here discoursing. And not only happiness itself, but what has a relation to happiness is good in that relation. Hence is the goodness of the natural powers and faculties of an agent, by which he is able to contribute to the producing of happiness, either his own or others; and the more extensive these faculties the better and more excellent they are.

Sect. VIII. Good in this acceptation of it may be thus defined. It is that which either makes or denominates a Being happy, or prepares him for happiness; or at least prevents.
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vents or removes his misery. The full meaning of which definition you may take in the following Propositions.

1. Happiness consists in Pleasure. My chief reason for saying so is this. The contrary to what bespeaks a man miserable must be his happiness; that which bespeaks a man miserable is pain, and the contrary of pain is pleasure. But then the notion of pain is by no means to be confined to the complaints of the body, but takes in all uneasinesses of the mind, whether arising immediately from its own imperfections and disorders, which as unavoidably produce mental uneasiness; as a distortion of the limbs, a dislocation of the bones, or the discontinuity of the parts, is attended with pain in the frame of the body; or from reflections on its irregularities; or be caused by something without apprehended as an evil, whether it be present or future, whether it be real or only supposed. He that boasts of being happy in Phalaris's Bull, talks more like a mad than a wise man. k Seneca quotes a saying of Epicurus to this purpose, and gives him the honour of it: but what can be plainer, than that if the words were Epicurus, yet none but a Stoic could ever speak them seriously? In the mouth of Epicurus they were nothing else but a severe banter upon the Stoics. What other air have

k Epist. 66.
have these words, *Quam suave est, quam nihil curo?* How pleafant I find it, how unconcerned I am! which *Epicurus* fays a wise man would utter in the extremity of pain. And thus *Cicero* \(^1\) understood them. They are excellent words, and worth all the romantic strains of the *Stoics*, which *Xenophon* \(^m\) puts into the mouth of *Cyrus*, in an oration to his soldiers tending to prove, that *pleasure* is the aim of all human actions, even of the fevereft *Virtue*. "It is my judgment, that men would not strive to excel in any *Virtue*, if when masters of their wish, they should enjoy nothing more than the wicked. And as for them who despife present pleasures, they do it not as if they were indifferent whether ever they knew any thing of delight, but from the prospect they have, that this continence of theirs will be the occasion of their tast­ing much greater pleasures afterward." "When men lose their pleasure (faith the *Chorus* in a play of *Sophocles* \(^n\)) I reckon not that fuch do live, but count them breathing carcafes. Be rich if thou wilt at home and possess a government; but if joy be absent from all this, all other things the world can afford are vain as clouds of fmoke, in

\(^1\) *De Finibus*. L. 5. et Tufc. Qu. L. 2. §. 7.
\(^m\) *Kyris παιδεια*. Lib. 1.
\(^n\) *Antigone*. Aft 5. Sc. 1.
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"comparison of real felicity." That happiness differs not but in name from pleasure, is likewise evident from this, that the highest pleasure is nothing else but the result of the regular frame and disposition of nature, and the due exercise of its faculties; so that pleasure is somewhat springing out of nature, which crowns its operations. It is the reward of the wise Author of things, by which he intimates his approbation, and gives us to understand, that nature is in that temperament, and exerts itself after the manner, which he would have it. And what can this reward be but happiness?

Sect. IX. 2. Good is either objective or formal. This distinction is implied in the definition, for objective good, or objective happiness, (as others somewhat improperly call it) is that which makes us happy; formal good, or the pleasure resulting from the application of the faculty to the object, is that which denominates us happy. And it may be of some use to these two to add a third, and to call it intermediate, this is no other than fruition. I term it a good, because it is the next and immediate foundation of pleasure. I call it intermediate, because it comes between the pleasure and the object which gives being to it. Some there are with whom this passes under the name of formal happiness; so say the Schoolmen, but
but certainly without reason, for as I showed just now, happiness is the same with pleasure; but bare injoyment, or the exercife of the Understanding and the Will in the contemplation or love of any object, is not pleasure, but the medium of it. Besides which I might observe, that \textit{formal} happiness is for the sake of no other, but \textit{operation} of what kind soever it be is subservient to pleasure. \textit{Pleasure} therefore is the \textit{formal} happiness of man, the thing injoyed is objective happiness, or good rather, and fruition is the intermediate good.

\textbf{Sect. X. 3.} The nature and excellency of any good is to be estimated by the nature of the Being to which it is adapted. As there is an order of Beings one rising above another, so without all doubt of happiness too. And as one Being is specifically different from another, as far as it is so, its happiness cannot be the same. The more excellent the Being, the more excellent the pleasure proper to that Being; for according to the excellency of the Being is that of the faculties of injoyment; and in proportion as these are more perfect, the pleasure they convey will be answerable in value. Together with the Being the pleasure of a \textit{beast} must be superior to that of an \textit{oyster}, of a \textit{man} to a \textit{beast}, of an \textit{angel} to a \textit{man}. Agreeable to this is the observation of \textit{Aristotle}. 


There is a difference in pleasures suitable to the difference of functions. Every animal aims to have his peculiar pleasure, as well as his particular operations. The pleasures of a horse, a dog, a man, are not the same. The difference in some Beings is such, as to require different objects of enjoyment; and here the advantage one has above the other may be estimated by the object, the noblest object yielding the noblest pleasure. Such is the difference between rational creatures and creatures endowed only with sense. And where the object enjoyed is the same, yet a diversity in the manner, or degree of fruition, will make way for a variety of happiness; which is probably the case of angels, and the spirits of just men made perfect. This observation, if we governed ourselves by it, might be of great use. For having first considered what kind of Beings we are, and the distinction between the soul and the body, we shall not be ignorant of the happiness which we ought to prefer and pursue.

Sect. XI. 4. A thing may make us happy by a proper and immediate causality of its own, or by procuring what will make us happy. By this means it is that Virtue comes to be so great a good. Virtue it is granted

* Eth. ad Nicom. L. 10. C. 5. See also C. 4. where he proves at large, that pleasures are specifically different.
granted is in itself good, as abstracting from all other considerations it causes pleasure; but the pleasure it now affords from its own fund is small, in comparison of the pleasure for which it qualifies and prepares the soul. And on this account its greatest goodness lies, not in making us happy at present by its own efficiency, but in giving us a title to that from which we shall receive all the happiness we can desire. Nay, in this view, things in themselves wholly indifferent put on the nature of good. For instance, Money separate from its use, as in a state of perfect solitude, is of no more value than common earth; only remove the scene into society, and there a competency of it is not to be despised, helping to furnish us with the advantages of life. It is easy to transfer this to actions. An action in itself indifferent, I mean as to its moral nature, and as to any pleasure or pain it gives us in the performance, if commanded by God, and we do it because commanded, passes into the quality of good, by commending us to the divine favour. Yea further, that which in itself and abstractly taken is evil, in the relation it bear to a succeeding pleasure that is more than equal to it, and of which it is the occasion or condition, ought to be numbered among the things that are good. An incision in the flesh is painful, and therefore ordinarily to
be avoided as evil; but when it tends to the recovery of health, and preservation of life, which are the foundation of all pleasure, it puts on another name. And thus all the afflictions and disappointments which the good man suffers in this world, Religion will inform him are favours for which he is bound to give thanks, in regard of their connection with the perfect happiness of a better state.

Sect. XII. 5. He that feels more pain than he enjoys pleasure is upon the whole a miserable man. For things are always to be denominated a majori from their prevailing quality; consequently whatever it be that gives me pleasure, though in a very high degree, and must conclude in a greater degree of pain, is not to be accounted good, because in the result it does not make me happy but miserable. That the pleasure is present, and the pain future, alters not the case; a thinking Being ought to consider what is future as present, for as much as it will once be so. For to what purpose had I Reason given to me, by the help of which I might penetrate into futurity, and bring the most distant prospect home to my view, if I leave things future out of the account? In this light sinful pleasures appear not to be good, and sinners therefore not to be the happy men they proclaim themselves,
6. Happinesse confiding in pleazure, the absence of pleasure is not so great an evil, as the presence of pain; for this reason, that one is only a negation of happinesse, the other as something positive stands in direct opposition to it, and must needs be further removed from happinesse, than that which lies between.

"That pleasure is an evil, that is bought with pain. This shows the wisdom of denying one's self the pleasure that must be paid for with after pains and remorse; a person suffering much less in such a voluntary denial, than he would have done in the painful perceptions subsequent to the gratification of his appetites. Yea, this abstinance from one sort of pleasure is rewarded with pleasure of another kind, whereas the pain is aggravated by the reflection on the foregoing pleasure."

Nec est admita dolore voluptas.

 Sect. XIII. 7. A lesser good, that cannot be enjoyed but with the loss or hazard of one vastly greater, is a comparative evil. And when the difference is exceeding great, both in F 3. Hor. Ep. L. 1. Ep. 2.
in respect of degree and duration, though the greater be only probably future, yet is it preferable to a lesser which is present, how much more when it is certainly future. The same, *vice versa*, holds of a lesser evil.

8. The desire after good or happiness being *inextinguishable*, they must be unavoidably miserable who fall short of it. Desires disappointed cause torment, especially if they are natural and urgent; as the desire of happiness is universally acknowledged to be. A man excluded from happiness cannot forbear panting after it still, and so is in the condition of a person, that should be supposed to suffer the extremity of hunger and thirst, and have nothing to gratify them; or which is worse, should behold at a great distance from him a sumptuous banquet which he must never touch. This consideration should make every one solicitous that he does not mistake in the nature of true happiness, or as to the means of obtaining it.

**Sect. XIV.** 9. A state of indolence, in a thinking Being, is a state of pleasure. Not that indolence and pleasure are the same, as say the Epicureans, they are plainly distinct, unless a thing may be the cause and effect of itself. *Doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas*, the absence of all pain is justly
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justly called pleasure, faith a Philosopher of this tribe in Cicero. Others will tell you, that pain is a privation of pleasure; but good sense will not admit of our saying, that either of them is the privation of the other, all sensations being equally positive. A privation indeed may be the cause of either. The privation or absence of pleasure may be the cause of uneasiness or mental pain; and the removal of pain, for instance of hunger and thirst, may be attended with a corporeal pleasure. Though that it is not properly the removal of this painful sensation, that is the cause of the consequent pleasure, is plain from hence, that when the pain is entirely removed, the pleasure is at an end; whereas then it ought to be greatest, since if the removal of pain in a less degree be pleasure, the greatest pleasure must consist in the removal of all the pain. The true cause of pleasure therefore in eating and drinking must be something positive. This by the by. But though indolence be not the same as pleasure, nor in strictness of speaking always the cause of it, yet to a reasonable man it should administer pleasure to reflect, that he is not in pain. He considers that it is possible for him to be miserable, he sees others who are so, and from hence he takes occasion to rejoice in that goodness which has placed him in better
circumstances. And if this be true, then the absence of evil is a good, it is the occasion of our happiness; or at least it is our own fault if it be not, for it has a tendency to beget pleasure in a grateful considerate mind; and whatever makes us happy or pleased is a good.

Sect. XV. 10. Whatever prepares a man for happiness, by purifying, strengthening, exalting, and perfecting the faculties of enjoyment, is deservedly called good, being the object of a rational desire; which nothing that is not truly good can be. The excellent Dr. Cumberland's definition of good is taken wholly from hence. "Good, faith he, is what preserves the faculties of any Being, or which is more improves and perfects them." Against which definition I have these two exceptions to make. 1. That it is far from expressing the whole idea of good, and so is too narrow, as may appear from what has been before offered for explaining the nature of good. 2. That as it contains but part of the idea of good, so not the principal part neither. Happiness or pleasure constitutes the prime and most distinguishing character of good. What perfects the faculties is good not immediately, but with relation to that happiness which we are hereby rendered more capable of Enjoying.

5 De Legibus Naturae. C. 3.
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joying. It is certain, that nothing which any way injures the faculties can be good, because in so doing, it lessens our capacity for the fruition of the proper happiness of our Being. Nor is this observation of small importance, since it will direct us in judging of a great many things, which though grateful in the present perception, yet being injurious to the noblest powers of our nature are not good but evil. But if these things are evil, the reason must be drawn from the happiness of which they disappoint us, and not directly from the hurt they do our faculties; for faculties raised to the highest perfection, without adequate objects of enjoyment, would be of no value.

11. That may be called good which removes or prevents misery, though it does not bring with it any happiness. To one who feels, or justly fears, the most dreadful torments, and such as he is never to survive, an utter privation of Being, or of all sensibility, would be a favour. In such circumstances annihilation is desirable, and consequently good; because though it makes not the subject happy, it makes him not to be miserable. I do not say that bare non-existence in misery is good; a meer possibility that never was nor will be is not miserable, notwithstanding which, its non-misery is not to be reckoned a good: but what I assert to be good is, the taking a way that Being that
that was, or otherwise would have been, miserable.

Sect. XVI. These are the Propositions by which I chuse to express the intire sense of the definition. And the nature of good being thus intelligibly opened and explained, you will the better apprehend the truth of what I asserted in the beginning, that in all their deliberate actions men propose some end, and that this end is good either real or imaginary; real, when the definition of good before laid down will agree to it; imaginary, when it is only fancied to agree. I shall only further observe, that the common distinction of good is into bonum utile, jucundum, et honestum, or useful, pleasant, and virtuous, all of which are comprehended in the foregoing Propositions. This distinction had I think been never the worse if it had been only into useful and pleasant, omitting the third member, which is no way necessary to the compleatness of the distinction. For Virtue is a good either considered as ministering pleasure of itself, and then it falls under pleasant or bonum jucundum; or as it procures other advantages, improves the faculties of the mind, and intitles to the future reward, and then it is bonum utile, or useful. Cicero distinguishes good into useful and virtuous, including plea-
Chap. I. of Happiness.

pleasure under the former; elsewhere he says, there is no real distinction between what is useful and virtuous, though Philosophers have separated them in their thoughts.

Books proper to be read on this Chapter, besides those cited, are

Mori. Encheir. Eth. L. 1. C. 1, 2, 4.
Wollaston's Religion of Nature. § 2.
Bp. Leng's Sermons at Boyle's Lecture, Ser. 3 & 4.
Netleton of Virtue and Happiness. P. I. § 1 & 2.
Lucas's Inquiry after Happiness. § 2. C. 8.
C H A P. II.

Of the necessity of fixing right our chief End --- Man not his own chief Good --- nor any Creature --- but God alone.

Sect. I. T H O U G H every particular action has some end to which it is directed, is it necessary that there be a general and chief end, which shall run through all others, and be a common standard whereby to pronounce of their goodness? After having premised, that I understand the question of actions which proceed from a principle of self-interest, or as far forth as they are done with an eye to that, (the reason of which restriction you will know hereafter) and that we are to distinguish between an end that is confused and indeterminate, and one that is distinct and explicit; I answer, that there is no person but has some general aim which he pursues in all that he does, and that this aim is to be happy. It may very well be styled a general end, being common to all men, and to all those actions of every man, which he does out of regard to
to himself. Particular desires are but limitations of this general one; and for this very reason that we incline towards good, c'er we have singled out any object, we find a tendency towards the object when it appears. The object does not create but direct the motion. And as it is necessary that we be influenced by some general end, so likewise that we propose some chief end, that is, some end which is to be the measure of goodness to the rest, though the idea we have of this end be extremely loose and unrestrained. This chief end of man is his chief good or happiness. His immediate end, in this or that action, may perhaps be no more than a present gratification; but besides and beyond this there is one more remote, and of a superior nature, namely the prospect or view of being a happy man; not pleased in a lower degree only, or in a particular instance or two, but that he may enjoy a happy Being, and the greatest pleasure for which his nature is contrived. To this chief end all others must submit, as a proof of which if you can but convince a man, that this or that particular indulgence is inconsistent with his main happiness, he must immediately quit it, or suspend the actual compliance with his inclination, 'till he hath introduced a contrary persuasion; or by inconsideration or forgetfulness hath destroyed the energy of this.

Sect.
Sect. II. And yet notwithstanding all that has been said, that men do govern themselves by a confused aim at some universal and chief end, and are guilty of no mistake in the abstracted notion of it, we see the greater part of the world live to none, or to a bad purpose, for want of fixing a clear and precise idea of this great end, or through their taking up with a wrong one. To neglect the first is much like setting out on a journey, with a design to visit the pleafantefl part of the Kingdom, and there to settle, without either knowing ourselves, or troubling ourselves to inquire of others, which way and in what County it lies; though if we are ignorant of this, our general design must be useless. We are all in the quality of Travellers, our intention is to find out the abode of true happiness, but too often we intend this, without taking the leaft care to inform ourselves in what enjoyments this happiness is lodged. The unavoidable consequence of this is, that we act at random, and every object which offers itself to sense or fancy, and promises a present satisfaction, has power to make us follow it. We are pushed on by appetite, and leave that to carry us, just as that itself is carried by the various temptations that come across our view; much like travellers, who at all adventures gives the reins
reins to the beasts they ride on, and let them chuse the way which they happen to like best.

Sect. III. Hence proceeds that inconsistency which every one can observe, but of which so few are willing to know the true reason. Hence it is that men are not more different from others, than they are from themselves, and their lives which should be throughout of one colour, as Seneca ingeniously expresses himself, are so full of inconsistences. The root of this dissimilitude is, that men do not well know what they would have, or if they erect a scheme, they quickly change it for some other. Nor do they barely change, but return again upon their own steps, and are brought back to the very place which they left. This one of the Satirists b calls living ex tempore, and the Greeks c stiled this kind of life καὶ ἐμπρον βίον, living by the day, and the men who gave themselves up to it καὶ εὖρισκομαι; whereas true wisdom consists in always choosing and rejecting the same things, which cannot be without some immutable rule of judging; as neither can such a rule be settled, unless we first fix our eye upon some general and uniform purpose of life. There is

a Epift. 20.
b Periši. Sat. 3.
Hor. Epift. 1. quid, mea cum pugnat sententia secum?
is no need says Seneca⁴, of adding that restriction, ut rectum sit quod velit, that what you will be right, because it is not possible the same thing should always please, if it be not right. This is a most judicious reflection. The same Author exposeth this changeable humour in a very agreeable manner. "They who leap from one design to another, or, to speak more properly, are carried by mere chance, being themselves fickle and fluctuating, can never possess any thing that is certain. Some there are, but the number is exceeding small, who manage themselves and their actions by mature council; but for others, like those things that float upon a river, they do not go, but are carried. Some are borne along upon a gentle stream, others by one that is more rapid. The stream fails, and leaves one on the next bank, while another by the violence of the torrent is hurried into the sea." Would we establish some chief end, and often ask ourselves, how our several actions correspond with this end, we should not be liable to so many errors. It is justly observed by Cicero⁵, Sumnum bonum si ignoraretur, vivendi rationem ignoraris necesset est, &c. "If we know not our chief good, we must necessarily

⁴ Epist. 20.
⁵ Epist. 23.
⁶ De Finibus. L. 5.
Chap. II. **our Chief End.**

"cefarly be ignorant how to direct the "course of our lives. It is as fatal an ign- "norance, as for a mariner to put to sea "without knowing what port he is to "make. But when we know the great "end of life, what is the chief good, "and what the greatest evil, we then "know the right way of living, and how "to go through all the duties of life, so as "to arrive at happiness."

**Sect. IV.** Setting up a false notion of our principal end is just as if *Paradise* being planted in the *East*, we should have a de-

**fire to see it, but imagine it to lie *West-ward*; the more haste we make, and the nearer we fancy ourselves to be to this de-

delightful scene, it is certain the farther we are from it in reality. You and I would fain be happy, and perhaps entertain a strong imagination, that happiness is placed in the enjoyments of the world; which in truth are as distant from it, as the *West* is from the *East*. And what must be the consequence? What, but that pursuing false goods, we wander farther and farther from the true. An error here is of the most ex-
tensive influence, and like poisoning a fountain, whose streams spread into all the country around. A false end corrupts all the duties of Morality. For an example of which kind we may instance the *Epicure-

cans,*
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ans, who placing the supreme good in sensual pleasure, deserved the censure past upon them by Cicero. Sunt nonnullae disciplinae, quae propostis bonorum & malorum finibus, officium omne pervertunt. &c. " There are some sects of Philosophers, who by the account they give of what is chiefly to be pursued or avoided by us, pervert all the duties of life. He who describes the chief happiness of man, so as to separate it from Virtue, and estimates the happiness of life by private gratifications, not by virtuous dispositions and actions, if this person pursued his principles, and their influence was not overcome by a good natural disposition, he could neither be a friend, nor a just or generous man. What shall inspire him with fortitude, who looks on pain as the greatest evil; or how can he be temperate, who regards bodily pleasures as the chief happiness of man?"

Sect. V: These considerations duly reflected on are enough to persuade us, that we ought above all things to settle a determinate idea of happiness, and to be sure of its being true, or exactly conformable to right Reason. If we thus specify our end, and steadily pursue it, we cannot miss of being happy. And this leads me directly to that
that celebrated Inquiry, What is the *Summum Bonum*, or chief good of man? St. Au-

stii from Varro reckons up no less than two hundred and eighty eight different opinions of Philosophers upon this head. *Non quæ jam essent, sed quæ esse possent*. Not that there actually were so many, but so many might be made to arise from the various combi-
nations of their opinions, and be supported by as good reasons as those which flourished. I confess it looks at first very strange, that there should be so great a diversity; and this possibly may tempt some to flight an endeavour to fix the notion of happiness, as a fruitlefs and chimerical attempt. Is it not as so many to one odds, that we shall be mistaken, as there have been sentiments of mankind about it? This objection would admit of an easy dispatch, by saying, that the advantage of Revelation is ours; and that whatever loss the Pagan was at in this search after happiness, the Christian, to whom there is a plain discovery of it made, is to blame if he be not more sure. But waving this answer, I fancy the variety of opinions in relation to the chief good, may be shown to proceed from another cause, than the necessary obscurity of the subject; and if this be done, the ground of the objec-
tion will be removed. But to advance to the question, I shall for the greater
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distinctness branch the Inquiry into these three heads.

1. What is the greatest happiness, that it is possible for man to enjoy?

II. What is the greatest happiness, which Reason can demonstrate to be actually designed for man?

III. What is the Summum Bonum, or highest happiness attainable in the present life?

Sect. VI. 1. What is the highest happiness which it is possible for man to enjoy? Whatever it be, it must have these two characteristicks.

1. It is to be refered to no other, but all others must be embraced for the sake of this. "Querimusigitur, quid sit extremum, quid ultimum bonorum: quod omnium Philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat; ipsum autem nusquam. "We are inquiring what is the ultimate "good of man, what in the judgment of "Philosophers ought to be chosen as such; "so that every thing else should be refered "to this, but this to nothing higher." For if it be the highest and noblest good, it is on account of the pleasure which it gives forth from itself; and not because I consider it as a step to some further good, which will afford more pleasure; that I covet it when absent, and rejoice in the fruition.

And

De Finibus. L. 1. §. 9.
And this alone is sufficient to vindicate its claim to the name of the chief good, and less than this will not serve. Whatever object I pursue, as believing it will conduct me to another, and this consideration is the main spring of my motion; it is plain I do not look upon it as my chief good; for this very obvious reason, that I make it subordinate to another, which consequently I esteem to be better; unless you are disposed to affirm, that the means are more excellent than the end, when nevertheless the measure of their excellency is taken from their fitness to promote that end.

2. It must be sufficient to furnish out an happiness adequate to the capacities of human nature, and of equal duration; that is, not only perfect while it lasts, but everlasting. The whole of man must be happy, there must be no intervals of pain or weariness, which would be so many breaches in our felicity, and hinder its being one intire flow and tenor of delight. And it must be known, or thought to be without end, were it for no other reason, than that it may be satisfying while it continues. And therefore says Velleius in Cicero, speaking of the nature and blessedness of the gods, *Habet exploratum fore se semper cum in maximis, tum in aeternis voluptatibus.* "They have " the utmost assurance, that their pleasures

\[ G 3 \]

\[ k \text{ De Nat. Deorum. L. i. §. 19.} \]
"will never fail them." And where this is the case a Being may indulge its repose, and give up itself whole to the enjoyment.

Sect. VII. By these two criteria then let us examine the pretensions of all things, that may claim to be man's chief good.

1. Can man be his own happiness? *Quid opus est votis?* What need of Prayers? faith the haughty Stoic. *Fac te ipse felicem, vel bonum, "make yourself happy or good;"* for to the Stoic there was no difference between Virtue and happiness. Hear how he goes on, *Hoc est Summum Bonum; quod si occupas, incipis Deorum esse socius, non supplex.* "This is the chief good, of which when "you have once possessed yourself, you are "no longer a suppliant, but a companion of "the gods." Very fine! In the conceit of these Philosophers, we need not go out of ourselves in quest of the supreme good. But I fear this will be found to be only the ravings of pride; for if I mistake not, neither of the characters beforementioned will at all agree to man.

1. He is not, I am sure ought not to be, his own end. This were to set himself up in the room of God; and it looks as if the Stoics thought the place well enough became him. None of the embellishments of his Being, not his Virtues themselves, may be

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1 Seneca, Epist. 31.
be delighted in purely for their own fake. The principal pleasure he derives from
them ought to arise from the reflection, that they came from God, bear some im-
pression of his beauty, qualify us for his fa-
vour, and conduct us to him. It has been
reckoned heroic to chuse Virtue for Virtue's
fake; and so perhaps it is, if meant only in
contradiction to worldly views; but if un-
derstood strictly, and without any limitation,
it is arrogant and sinful, and discovers our
Virtue to be a spurious production; for as-
much as no Virtue can be genuine, that has
its foundation in pride. Nor

Sect. VIII. 2. Will the other character
fit this indigent creature. Man wants a fund
to supply his own wants. He a self-suffici-
ent Being! The many restless desires he car-
rries about him, effectually confute any such
vain imagination. Man his own happiness!
What then makes his desires to stray abroad?
These are so many symptoms of our po-
verty. Ay, but says the Stoic, these desires
are not necessary appendages of our nature,
they are introduced by custom and example,
and the wise man will rid his hands of them
with the first opportunity. A foolish eva-
sion truly. How could desires be brought
into the soul, and grow there, if the foil
did not agree with them, and there was no
stock upon which to graft them? Was
there ever a man without his desires? If foreign, why is it not an easy task to root them out, at least a possible one? Were man a self-sufficient Being, how comes it to pass, that he cannot subsist without contributions from the creation around him? Not to speak of the necessities of the body, which in the account of some men is no essential part in the composition, but rather the prison, in which the soul is shut up for a little while; let us suppose a separate state to be the natural state of the soul, and that the soul being disengaged from its clog, hath nothing else to do, but to contemplate its own furniture, and to fold itself up in itself. Are there no errors in the Understanding? No clouds of ignorance, no irregular tendencies in the Will? Are its virtues all complete? It is well if they are; and so they must be, e'er the soul can be an entertainment to itself. Yet with this concession, I fancy a man would not endure to be long tied up to his own company. Consider the prospect is but narrow; and to be always confined to the same little scene, what can be more tedious? "Neither were it a happiness worth the having, for a mind, like an Hermit, sequestered from all things else, by a recession into itself, to spend an eternity in self-converse, and the enjoyment of such a diminutive superficial no-

m Smith's Select Discourses. Disc. 9. C. 6.
"thing as itself is, and must needs be to it-
self." No finite enjoyment can bear endless repetitions; without some diversions every now and then intermixed, the pleasure will languish, and after a while the whole entertainment become insipid and heavy.

Sect. IX. Man naturally seeks society and friendship; and this is so manifest, that in answer to Epicurus, who presseth Stilpo with this objection against the saying of the Stoics, "that their wise man was contented with himself, se ipso contentus," Seneca * fairly acknowledges, that "though self-contented, their wise man was yet de-
sirous of a friend, a neighbour, a com-
panion. He loses not his tranquility with the loss of his friend, because he has it in his power quickly to repair his loss, by substituting another in his room." Wherein he compares him to Phidias a famous artist, who if he had the misfortune to lose a statue, could with his chisel soon make another. Now this is not to defend, but give up the cause. It is confessing, that man is not fit for a state of solitude; as this aversion in man to solitude, which he startles at as a kind of annihilation, is a full confutation of their flattery, who compliment him with a self-sufficiency and independence. Cicero * represents, in a very strong

* Epift. 9.    Cic. de Offic. L. 1, §, 43, 44. ad fin.
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strong and beautiful manner, this unconquerable tendency in human nature to friendship and society. Placet igitur, aptiora esse naturae ea officia, quae ex communitate, &c. "We think therefore those exercises more suitable to nature, which are of the social, than those which are wholly of the speculative kind. This is evident from the following argument: that if you suppose a wise man placed amidst the affluence of all things, and in a capacity of studying and contemplating all truths worthy of his knowledge, yet if his solitude was such that he was never to see or converse with another, he would choose death before such a life." This is not talking like a Stoic. Such is the mighty power of truth, that these men themselves are sometimes forced to do homage to it, and to talk modestly. ¹ Bonus vir sine Deo nemo est. &c. "No man is good without divine influence. Can any man rise above fortune unless aided by God? He inspires great and noble purposes. In every good man some God resides. The strength which renders a man superior to all those things, which the vulgar either hope or dread, descends into him. So lofty a structure cannot stand unsupported by a Deity." There is sense and gratitude in this, without inqui-

¹ Seneca. Epist. 41.
inquiring how it can be reconciled with the common strain of this sort of Philosophers.

Sect. X. 2. No creature, not the whole universe together, can be the chief good of man. We will suppose a virtuous man to have a grant of the whole creation made to him, and confirmed his by the unchangeable word of God; yet that it cannot be his chief good is proved, by showing that neither of the characteristicks before mentioned can be applied to it.

1. We may not acquiesce in a created enjoyment for its own sake. We have not the allowance of our Maker for this, who cannot act so unwisely, as to design one creature for the ultimate end of another. The satisfaction therefore which a reasonable Being takes, in the society or enjoyment of his fellow-creatures, ought to be founded in the footsteps or the image which they exhibit of the divine perfections, and their being the effects of his love, and only a taste of that more consummate happiness, which God designs for him, and which is to be enjoyed in him alone.

2. The whole of created good united cannot render a man compleatly happy, for these reasons.

1. It is impossible that he should avoid this thought, or that the thought should not
not disturb him, that if the *Creature* contain so much of goodness, what must be the fulness of the *infinite Creator*! For as long as he has his eye upon something that is more excellent, than the good of which he is in possession, how is it conceivable he should be perfectly satisfied therewith?

2. The universe is finite, and because finite not proportioned to the Understanding and Will of man, the two principles of fruition; and where there is no proportion, there can be no compleat happiness. As well may perfect music result from sounds disagreeable to the organ of hearing, for which they are either too high, or too low, as perfect happiness from an imperfect harmony between the object and the faculties of enjoyment. There are two desires interwoven in the frame of our Being, the desire of *truth* and the desire of *happiness*, in both which there is a kind of *infinity*, which arises after this manner. By the contemplation of my own soul I gain the ideas of several perfections, with which I perceive it to be adorned. Following therefore the impulse of my own mind, I enlarge the prospect, and widen my ideas more and more, till lost in the conception of a Being, who possesse all these perfections, and very probably many more, with the additional characteristicks of *infinite* and *eternal*. Now it
it is of the nature of the Understanding, and of the Will, to pursue the supreme truth, and the supreme good; and consequently while I have a Being in view, in whose idea is lodged both infinite Truth and infinite Good, which alone are able to answer that something like infinity that is in our desires, I shall never rest satisfied in any allotment among the creatures, though in the finest apartment of the universe, and accommodated with every good, short of a correspondence and intercourse with the Deity.

3. As a person must be virtuous to have a true enjoyment of any thing, so the more virtuous he is, the greater must be his resemblance and love to the Deity; and consequently the more earnest his endeavours to unite with the original and center of his Being, in contemplating and injoying whom he shall be perfectly transformed into his likeness, and be at once an image of his perfection and of his blessedness. No Creature then can be my chief good. It is not in these rivulets to quench my vast and eager thirst of happiness; from whence it follows, that God alone is the Summum Bonum of man, that boundless good after which I am seeking.

Sect. XI. If some Critics are not so sharp-sighted, as to see more in the writings of
of a *Philosopher* than is really there, we are able also to produce a testimony to the same truth from among the Pagans. My opinion of this matter is, that whether by the contemplation of the idea of the universal good, which is Plato's definition of the chief good, he meant the contemplation of God, who contains in himself the ideas or exemplars of all things, and their several perfections in an infinite degree, and unmixed with any allay of imperfection; or understood the term in the absurd sense which Aristotle endeavours to fasten upon him, of an universal good, or abstracted idea existing without all singulars, in the nature of a genus to the rest; or designed no more than the contemplation of necessary and eternal truths; whether I say he intended one or other, or neither of these, he talks too obscurely on the subject, for any great stress to be laid upon his opinion. However, to gratify the curious, I will add in the margin, what a Commentator upon Aristotle says

*See Stanley's Life of Plato.*

*Takeus in Arist. Eth. ad Nicom. L. i. E. 6. Platonis sententia fuit, divinam quandam, & humanam ideam esse; & divinam quidem sapientiam Dei, & exemplar Deo propositum appellant, quo cuncta creata, factaque sunt. Humanam vero ideam vocat speciem & notionem in mente hominis impressam, quae primum confusior & obscurior est, paulatim vero una cum aetate clarior & illuстрior efficitur. Hominis autem felicitatem definit, vera & perfecta sapientia Dei, quam nemo in mortali hac vita consequitur, sed post mortem; cum fruitor præsenti & explicata cognitione, & ut Theologi loquuntur, vifione Dei.*
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says in relation to Plato's sentiments on this subject.

Sect. XII. But whether we have Plato's authority or not for making this conclusion, that God is the chief happiness of man, there is a great deal of reason to justify it. God made all things for himself, and more especially intelligent Beings, and ought therefore to be the terminating object of their view. He is the author of our faculties, and to be sure is able to match the faculties which he has made. As for my body, the most unlikely part to receive its happiness from a spiritual Being, I consider, that the satisfaction and pleasure which come in this way, flow not properly from the objects without, but are the immediate production of God; and therefore think I, he can raise in me the very same pleasure in the absence of the object; and even when it is present ought to be accounted my chief good; for as much as to him I am indebted for all the pleasing sensations which I enjoy. My senses are but the channels, or conditions rather, and external objects no more than occasional causes, at the presence of which God variously impresses my mind. This you will see proved in Pneumatology. So that in truth God is the author of all sensible pleasure; and not only the author but the object too of the nobler pleasures of the mind. Of
Of fixing right &c. Part I.

the mind I say, which when restored to its proper perfection, has a direct analogy to the Eternal Spirit. Besides which I also reason, that God is his own happiness, and if there be in him good sufficient to satisfy an infinite Being, there is undoubtedly enough to fill all created minds, whose capacities are limited. It is a glorious idea of the Supreme Being, to conceive of him as that Universal Sun which inlightens the intellectual world; that Interminable Ocean of good at which they all drink and are satisfied. Here then our wanderings are over, the thoughts find here their ne plus ultra, their utmost bounds, beyond this we cannot form a conception, a wish, and it is a laudable ambition to be contented with nothing below it.

Books proper to be read on this Chapter, besides those cited, are

Duchal's Three Sermons.
Lucas's Inquiry after Happiness. §. 3. C. 1, 2, 3.

C H A P.
Of the Chief Good which Reason can prove to be designed for Man, and the Characteristicks of it.

Sect. I. Our next inquiry is concerning the Summum Bonum, or highest happiness, which Reason can demonstrate to be actually designed for man. It is known by these three properties. It is something which all men, if not wanting to themselves, may be possessed of—It is one and the same to all mankind—And while in itself fitted to make the possessor happy, is not prevented in its operation by some other thing, which keeps him from relishing it.

1. It is something which all men, if not wanting to themselves, may be possessed of. *Nilne esse proprium cuiquam?* Saith the ingenuous Poet, *Summum Bonum esse Hera putabam hunc Pamphilum.* And in another place, *Ego vitam Deorum propterea sempiter- nam esse arbitror, quod voluptates eorum pro- priae sunt.* Two things are intimated by these

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these passages, that it is pleasure which makes life deserve its name, and that this pleasure must be something that we can call our own, quid proprium; for which reason he makes happiness to be the peculiar attribute of the Gods, the most exalted of all Beings. Happiness must certainly be among the τὰ τῆς ἡμῶν, the things in our power, and depending upon our choice; for the Author and Governor of the universe always acting with the most perfect wisdom, and having made man a reasonable and active Being, cannot without a contradiction be supposed to bestow happiness, the best of his gifts, after such a manner, that it should rather seem scattered by Chance or Humour than conferred on man by their common Lord, as the reward of the right use of their intellectual powers. " It would be the "greatest absurdity, says Aristotle, to "attribute happiness, the best thing in the "world, to Fortune." And in this sense the proverbial expression has a great deal of truth in it, Unusquisque sua fortunae fabe. est, every man has the framing of his own lot.

Sect. II. This demonstrates that no advantages or endowments of body can be the proper happiness of man, because these are not things about which the free election of th

the Will is at all conversant: nor the joysments of this world, of whatever kind they are, both because we have no secure property in them, and because, that while they are the portion of the lazy and und- serving, who often stumble upon them without seeking after them, they are withheld from the industrious, and those who have the best claim to them, know best how to enjoy them, and who would improve them most to the common benefit of mankind. The Heathen therefore made Fortune or Chance the disposer of these things, describing her as the patroness of fools, rather than of wise men; for they saw that they were not divided according to mens moral qualities. From whence they ought to have inferred, not that worldly affluence and prosperity came from Chance, but that they cannot be the proper felicity of rational creatures. This, I say, is the inference which they ought to have drawn from hence, as without doubt it is the instruction designed by Providence. " The nature of the universe would never have admitted of such an error, that good and evil things should without any difference fall to good men and bad. But life and

\[\text{H 2}\] death,

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\(\text{Sit proprium cuiquam, punèto quod mobilis horæ,}\
\(\text{Nunc prece, nunc pretio, nunc vi, nunc forte suprema,}\
\(\text{Permutet Dominos, & cedat in altera jura. Hor. L 2. Ep.2.}\
\(\text{Antonin. L 2. § 11.}\)
Of the Chief Good.  Part I.

"death, honour and disgrace, pleasure and
"pain, wealth and poverty, happen alike
"to men of the most opposite characters;
"therefore these things are neither good nor
"evil." This reasoning is fallacious and will not hold; for let the Stoics harangue as long as they please, they will never be able to persuade us, that ease is not a good, and pain an evil. But with a little alteration the argument becomes conclusive. The nature which presides in the universe can never be supposed to dispense happiness and misery, without respect to the moral qualities of the persons to whom they are assigned; yet life and death, riches and poverty, are thus dispensed in the present state, therefore those things as at present dispensed do not constitute the happiness or misery of man.

Sect. III. 2. The true happiness of mankind is one and the same to all e. This I gather from the sameness of their natures; for as Cicero f well observes, Nihil est enim unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nos- metipsos sumus. &c. "There is not any "thing so much alike, and so equal to an- "other, as we all are alike another. "So that if corrupt customs, and false opi-  

f De Legibus. L. 1. §. 10.
Chap. III.  and its Characteristics.  101

nions, did not pervert our tender minds, and turn them every way, no man would be more like himself, than every man to all others: hence whatever is the true definition of one man, includes all men.

This is a good indication of the happiness for which they are designed. The bodies of men are formed alike, the faculties of their souls are the same, they agree in the same general wants and desires. Now if we make observation of inferior creatures we shall find, that those of the same kind have one uniform bent of nature, and pursue the same way of life. Their food, their pleasures, their diversions, in one word, their happiness, are the same. And if there be a greater diversity in the particular inclinations of mankind, besides the use this is of to hold men in society, it was probably intended to signify, that the body, in which this diversity of tempers is founded, is not the man, his principal and nobler part; that this variety was calculated for the present state, in which it serves many excellent ends; and that none of those things about which men so disagree are the real felicity of man. Do what we will we shall 5 differ about

5 Horace expresses this diversity of tastes and inclinations with his usual spirit.
Cur alter fratrum celfare & ludere & ungi,
Præferat Herodis palmatis pingueibus; alter
Dives & importunus, ad umbram lucis ab ortu
Silvestrem flammis, & ferro mitiget agrum. &c.

L. 2. Ep. 2. ad finem.
about these things, one man's inclination leading him to the Camp, another's to the Court, another's to the Bar, another's to the Exchange, and another's into Retirement; one man's palate standing to this dish, another's to that; one man highly pleased with that which is extremely distasteful to another. Whereas if they exercise their Reason, they must all unite in their apprehensions of true happiness, which must be the same to all partaking of the same nature. To which I may add, that these things are of a scanty nature, and cannot be enjoyed without being parted; from whence must proceed endless competitions and animosities, if men have not more understanding than to place their happiness in such narrow enjoyments.

Sect. IV. 3. The chief good of man must be something which while fitted to make the possessor happy, is not prevented in its operation by some other thing, which keeps him from relishing it.

h valeat possessor oportet,
Si comportatis rebus bene cogitet uti.

"Health must smile on a man, or he cannot enjoy the riches which he has gathered." To one in the gout or stone, how little

little would it signify to have those things in his custody, which would very much delight him, if his body were at ease. Not only bodily pain and bodily pleasure, but bodily pain and mental pleasure cannot subsist together, if the former be anything violent. All the advantage which a man can receive from a good conscience in this case, is only to be less miserable. Or let us suppose him to be under a prevailing melancholy, which is the frequent infelicity of the best men; though such a one may have the clearest right of any man living to be cheerful, he is not capable of being so, the cloud upon his mind darkening his prospect, and casting a gloom upon all the objects around him. What can be plainer than the conclusion from all this, that the happiness designed for man, whatever it be, is not to be enjoyed in this world? A man may be virtuous in spite of the world, he may obtain the favour of God, though he be not the favourite of the world; yet while his mind hath its attention ingrossed by pain, or is oppressed by melancholy, or distracted with cares, he may have things of infinite value in his custody, but will not be able to enjoy them.

There is a great deal of reason for that distinction of the Pythagoreans, between perfection as to nature, and perfection as to life; a like distinction to which you have
in Aristotle, between ἀρετὴ τελεία, and ὑπατία τελεία, both which he makes to conspire in the idea of happiness. And this may answer what the Emperor Antoninus\(^k\) allidges to prove, that nothing which befals a man can make him unhappy, viz. that it cannot hinder him from being just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, &c. with which qualities being endowed, human nature, ἀπεχανε τὰ ἱσιά, has all that belongs to it. Nothing is wanting to the perfection of the man, but a great deal to his happiness. Virtue rightly understood is the perfection of human nature, but this alone will not make a man happy, in order to this it is further necessary, that he be perfect as to life, or happy in the circumstances of his Being. There must therefore be another world, where the virtuous man shall have an untroubled fruition of his proper good, and not be liable to such frequent separations from it as he now is. Upon the whole, natural Reason demonstrates this, that the enjoyment of God in a future state is the highest happiness designed for man. This all may injoy, who aspire to the enjoyment. Though he contains all, and his fulness is adapted to all, yet he is but one object, and so corresponds to that excellent character of the supreme good given by Cicero.\(^1\) Finis bonorum, qui

\(^{1}\) Eth. ad Nicom. I. i. §. 9.  
\(^{k}\) Lib. 4. §. 49.  
\(^{1}\) De Offic. L 3. §. 33.
simplex esse debet, ex dissimilibus rebus misceri, & temperari non potest. "The supreme "good is one simple thing, and cannot be "made up of objects various and unlike." Finally—in a future state God will be injoyed by good men to greater advantage, than this world will admit, where there are so many things to disturb and break in upon the injoyment.

Books proper to be read on this Chapter, besides those cited, are

Cicero De Finibus.
C. 4, 6, 7, 8.
Prior's Solomon.

C H A P.
Of the highest Happiness attainable in the present life. The opinions of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics examined; and the favour of God, and an intercourse with him, proved to constitute the highest Happiness of this life.

Sect. I. Of three inquiries concerning the Summum Bonum, or highest happiness of man, the last only remains to be pursued, viz. What is the greatest happiness attainable in the present life? The good things which fall within the compass of this question are usually divided into the following classes, the good things of the Mind, such as knowledge and virtue; of the Body, as health, strength or beauty; and of Fortune, as honours, riches, pleasures, &c. Cicero's distinction (he does not say bonorum of goods, because according to the Stoics, whose opinion he espouses, there is but one good all, but rerum expectendarum)

a De Oratore. L. 3. §. 29.
tendarum) of things desirable is, of those that are seated in the Body or the Mind, or are without us, or things external, which last I reckon a much better name for them, than that which they commonly pass under, of the goods of Fortune. Epicurus, if we follow the Stoics in their account of him, or Cicero or Horace, or almost all the Fathers, advanced sensual pleasures into the seat of the Summum Bonum, supporting his opinion with this reason, “that every animal by a natural instinct seeks pleasure, and rejoices in it, as its chief good.” But this reason if intended to prove, not pleasure in general, but the pleasures of sense, to be the principal happiness of mankind, is most unluckily chosen, serving to demonstrate the direct contrary. For man, because he is of a nobler species than brute creatures, must be made for a nobler kind of happiness; and his mind or intellectual part being his distinctive character, the pleasure of the mind must be his proper, and therefore his best pleasure, not the pleasures of sense. If in these man were to look for his

b De Nat. Deorum. L. 1. § 40.
c Cir. De Finibus. L. 1. § 9.
d The subordination of the Senfes to Reafon is happily ex- pressed by Cicero. De Leg. L. 1. § 9. Ipsum autem hominem eadem natura non solum celeritate mentis ornuit, sed etiam sen- fus, tanquam satellites, attribuit ac nuntios. The senfes are but attendants and minifters to the mind, which ought accordingly to ufe them as Servants, not be governed by them as Mafters,
his happiness, it is certain that brutes would have the pre-eminence, who can indulge to the gratification of their senses without any such troublesome check, as men receive from their Reason: which brings to my mind an observation of the great Roman Moralist, "A person addicted to a life of pleasure, if he be not quite sunk into the beast (for it must be confessed that some have nothing of men but the name) if he be but a degree more erect than his brethren of the field, though he be captivated by pleasure, yet out of a natural modesty or shame he conceals or dissembleth his inclination to it; a plain intimation that bodily pleasure is unbecoming the dignity of human nature."

Sect. II. As a further objection to sensual pleasures I might take notice that they are too few and transient, and the intervals between them too long, to deserve the name of happiness. "Pleasure, says Seneca excel-

\[\text{De Offic. L. i.}\]
\[\text{Epist. 23.}\]
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rowness of the senses is another argument that the pleasures of sense are not those for which man was designed. The author of nature would have better matched these with the capacities of the soul, if happiness had been to be conveyed by them. How wide and deep are the one, how stinted and shallow the other! He that thinks to fill his soul by the application of his senses to external objects, does more absurdly than a man, who should attempt to quench his thirst by sucking through a tube, whose hollow was imperceptible. In a word, there cannot be happiness were there is not satisfaction; but now between satisfaction, and what men commonly call pleasure, there is a wide difference. Pleasure has its abode in the senses, or in the fancy, satisfaction in the mind. Pleasure is like a flash of lightning, momentary and pernicious, satisfaction is like the light of the day, which though not so dazzling is more steady and reviving. Pleasure excites a tumult in the passions, satisfaction governs and regulates them. To add no more. Pleasure softens and enervates the soul, and disables it for conflicting with adversity, satisfaction strengthens and establishes it.

Sect. III. Epicurus has not been without his advocates, who explain the pleasure he recommends after such a manner, as to make
make it no way prejudicial to the interests of Virtue. Yea, they will tell you, that he carried on the same design with the strictest of the Philosophers, though in a method at first sight very different from theirs, as it was more accommodate to nature. Gassendus is the most remarkable of his champions among the moderns, and in Cicero a vindicator of his has these words. "Clamat Epicurus is, quem vos nimirum voluntatibus esse deditum dicitis, non possis iucundus de vivi, nisi sapienter, honeste, justaque vivatur." "Epicurus, whom you decry so much, as one abandoned to his pleasures, even he loudly declares, that there is no way of living pleasantly, but to live wisely, honestly, and justly." In answer to this Cicero observes, "Multa praecipue sepe dicit. &c. Epicurus often says a great many good things, and which have more reason and truth in them, than consistency with his avowed sentiments. He praises an abstemious diet; this would be like a Philosopher if spoken by Socrates or Antisthenes, but ill becomes his mouth, who pronounces sensual pleasure the chief good. By such declarations the injudicious are drawn in, and his sect grows so numerous." If I might be allowed to take the part of a moderator in this

5 De Finibus. L. 1. §. 18.
this dispute I would say, that as on the one hand I hardly believe Epicurus to have been a Debauchee, so on the other I cannot persuade myself, that he who believed not a Providence, nor the immateriality and immortality of the soul, could be a great admirer of Virtue. Epicurus was a friend to bodily pleasures, but to those only which were consistent with health; and accordingly it was a maxim in his School, Sic præsentibus voluptatibus fruaris, ut futuris non noceas. “So to regulate our indulgence to present pleasures, as not to prejudice future enjoyments.” A most excellent saying if understood in the best sense that the words will bear; but in the meaning of Epicurus no more than a dictate of sensual prudence. As according to his principles, all those fine sayings of his can be no better, with which Seneca embellishes his writings. Pleasure may be often consistent with health, when it is not with strict Virtue. Epicurus would talk frequently of tranquility of mind, but mistake him not, the tranquility he so much extols is not the peace of a good conscience, but of a mind undisturbed with the cares of the world; of which indolent state he was so fond, as to describe the happiness of his Gods, by a retirement from

1 Nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate, & in omnium vacacione munerum ponimus. Velleius in Cic. de Nat. Deorum.
Of the highest Happiness

from the affairs of the universe; and the Gardens of Epicurus are become proverbial. In short, a Gentleman of an elegant taste in these things, but of little Religion, in giving us his own character, hath fortunately hit that of Epicurus, "a Voluptuary whose aversion to Debauchery was not less than his inclination for Pleasure." To proceed.

Sect. IV. If Epicurus, as some have represented him, was in one extreme, the Stoics, in supposing Virtue of itself, and unendowed with any other good things, sufficient to make a man happy were in another. Both forgot they were men, the notions of whose happiness they were settlying; one levelling them with beasts, the other raising them to an equality with the Gods.  

1 Summum Bonum Stoicis dicitur convenienter nature vivere. "Man's chief happiness, "according to the Stoics, was to live ac-"cording to nature," which phrase with them was but a periphrasis for Virtue. To the same purpose the philosophical Emperor. "You have tried several experi-"ments, and could never yet light upon "an happy life. You have not met with "it in argumentation, nor in riches, nor in "glory, nor in pleasure. Where then is it "to

k St. Evremont.
1 Cic. de Offic. L 3.
m Antoninus Pius. 1. 8. § 1.
"to be found? In doing those things which "human nature demands from you." By
human nature he means right and unbiased Reason, for so he explains what nature re-
quires, by temperance, fortitude, liberality,
and the like. Thus high do these men
carry their commendations of Virtue, and
even higher, to a extravagance. But with-
out any reflection upon Virtue, which if
genuine is too humble to accept such idola-
trous incense, I must be bold to say, that
Virtue itself is not the chief happiness of
man in this life. Let it be content with
the honour of being the instrument of ob-
taining it. For what men call Virtue is
either a shoot from Religion, being directed
by the Will of the Supreme Cause as its
rule and measure, and animated by his favour
as its ultimate reward, or grows upon other
principles, and is nourished by other views.
If this latter be understood, it is the shadow
of Virtue, not the vital substance, it is va-
nity, or interest, or at best a natural gene-
rocity of temper. And such as the Virtue
is itself, such is the pleasure it bestows up-
on its votaries, false and counterfeit, or of
too low a kind to be worth much. If it be
true Virtue, its pleasures are then like itself
divine, both in their original, and in their

issus;

n See Cic. Tuscul. Quæst. L. 5. The main of which is—Vir-
tutem ad beatè vivendum se ipse esse contentam. That Vir-
tue is self-sufficient for happiness.
issue; they begin and end in God. Infomuch that Virtue itself and its delights too are derivative and dependent, and resembling the light, which loses its lustre and its very being; when separated from the glorious fountain that feeds it.

Sect. V. This error of the Stoics was founded on a mistaken truth, that of the several things reducible to the two heads of τὰ ὑπὸ κυρίων and τὰ ἐκ κυρίων, of things in our power, and things not in our power, happiness must be among the former. Thus far they were in the right, as likewise for discarding for this reason external advantages from the notion of the chief good. Non est tuum, fortuna quod facit tuum. Seneca. "That is not your own, for which you are "obliged to Fortune." They were further justified in placing Virtue among the things in our own power, provided their meaning was not hereby to exclude the divine assistance. And if Virtue had been the only thing in our power they would justly have given it the title of the supreme good. But are not the favour and approbation of God, the certain consequences of a course of real Virtue, and therefore to be numbered among the things in our own power, as well as Virtue? And how then come these to be forgotten? I doubt from the same gigantick pride, which made Mezentius in
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the Poet say, Dextra mihi Deus, "This right hand is my God."

Sect. VI. As for the Peripatetics, they were not so widely distant in their notions from the Stoics as some have imagined. They both agreed in this that Virtue is the Summum Bonum; the difference between them lay here, that the Stoics not contented with saying that Virtue is the chief good, proceeded further to assert, that it was the only good. This was the ποιεῖν ἥνιδα, their first and leading error, into which they fell for want of distinguishing between physical and moral good and evil. That Virtue is the only moral good, and Vice the only moral evil is very true, but not so simply speaking; because there are other things physically good besides Virtue, and physically evil besides Sin. But as I observed before, this however absurd was the doctrine of the Stoics; and accordingly we find Cicero, after having divided good into useful and virtuous, utile & bonum, in the first Book of his Offices, in the progress of the work, and especially in the third Book, he drops the first and contracts the whole idea of good to the good of Virtue. His chief rea-

I 2

*Virgil's Æneid. B. 10.

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for which seems to be, that he knew not any other way but upon this principle, to evince the obligation mankind are under to sacrifice their own private ease or pleasure, or advantage, or life itself, to the good of the society. Ignorant I say of the true principles upon which this is founded, viz. a regard to the Author of human nature and human society, and the consistency at least of sacrificing this mortal life with the hope of a more glorious felicity in an after state, he endeavoured to make this false principle serve instead of the true. The *Peripatetics on the contrary denied with reason Οτι η Αριστερα ωτερικ προς Ενδαιμοναν, that Virtue was self-sufficient, and therefore required several other things as auxiliaries, such as health, prosperity, friends, and the like, which are to the virtuous man in the nature of instruments or ornaments to his felicity. But then all these things put into the scale against Virtue, *vix minimi momenti, were scarce of any weight or consideration at all.

Sect. VII. Having thus given you a view of the sentiments of the three principal sects among the Philosophers concerning human happiness, I should now, did I think it necessary, examine the preten-

a *Arist. Eth. ad Nicom. L. i. C. 9,

Cic. de Office. L. 3.
Chap. IV. attainable in this Life.

pretensions of riches, honours, learning, friendship, and the other blessings of life, to this title. But as every man’s reflections or experience will enable him to disprove their several claims, I shall without entering into them take a shorter way, and show what is the chief happiness of this life, in doing which I shall at the same time make it evident what is not so. An interest in God then, and a constant intercourse with him, maintained by contemplation, faith, love and hope, are what every wise man, when he is forming a scheme for a happy life, will fix both as the foundation and supreme point of it too. A few considerations briefly hinted at will put this beyond dispute. From hence results the divinest pleasure and satisfaction. For what more god-like pleasure than to survey infinite fulness and perfection? What more satisfying than to be able to add, all this is mine, for my benefit? What so pleasing as the exercise of a warm and rational devotion, towards the Author of my Being? Or so delightful as to feel his preference inlightening and actuating whole intellectual nature? If this imperfect state will not admit the good man to be in transports, he

See Juvenal’s Tenth Satire, where he proves at large, that neither riches, honours, power, eloquence, fame, long-life, beauty or learning, can make men happy; and therefore gives men this good advice, to leave it to the gods to grant these or not, as they saw best.

Permittet iphis expendere numinis ——
he yet enjoys a repose, a peace, a sweet and gentle delectation, which far exceed all other pleasures.

Sect. VIII. Again, he that makes sure his title to the divine favour, takes the most compendious method of securing all other good things; having infinite love engaged to employ unbounded power, and the most perfect wisdom for his supply. And then further, this good is of such a nature, as, wherever it is enjoyed, to communicate a virtue to other things, and to fill them with pleasure which they have not of their own. It refines friendship and exalts learning, and at the same time that it regulates, improves the most common entertainments of life. Is a man devoted to a contemplative life? This furnishes him with new scenes, and sheds a more lovely and beautiful light upon every object; while in the man himself it produces a no less remarkable change, invigorating his faculties, and preparing them for the most divine employments. Is he engaged in a life of action? This raises his views, and spurs him on to generous designs and enterprizes for the good of mankind, whom he would rejoice to further in their way to immortality. The love of God is the best seasoning to all human delights, and that which most of all heightens their relish. Shall I likewise de-
mand what one good thing can satisfy for the want of all the rest, as this can? That person surely hath no great reason to be concerned at the drying up of the stream, who has the fountain nigh at hand. What is there, finally, that can support the mind in the prospect or suffering of the various evils of this mortal life, excepting a sense of the divine favour? He that has this, is clad in armour of a celestial temper, through which no arrow can penetrate, and may meet death itself not only undaunted, but with an air of triumph. Death which for ever banishes the sensualist from his paradise, puts the good man into sure and everlasting possession of his.

Sect. IX. But it may be now asked, if upon the whole it be so evident, that the favour of God is the chief happiness of man, as I have shown in this and the former Chapters, whence proceeds it, that so few agree in thinking him their chief good? That there is so great a variance among mankind in the choice of objects? Or, lastly, so general a consent in pursuing the pleasures of sense of one kind or another? To each of these Questions I shall answer distinctly and briefly.

1. Whence can it proceed, that so few agree in seeking after God as their chief good. The corruption of the heart is the main
main reason of this. The mind hath its taste as well as the body, this is extremely vitiated, and set quite wrong for those things which are the proper objects of its felicity, by the early influence of sense, and sensual appetites and passions, by bad education, and bad example. Besides which there is an error also in the judgment, arising principally from these two causes.

1. That men are not so apprehensive, and so well persuaded as they should be, of the distinction between the soul and the body. Either they think not at all of it, that they have a soul, or are ready to fancy, that the soul is only a finer part of the body, which serves to move and actuate the rest, and which when taken from the outward case, will be scattered and lost in the air; not as a spiritual substance, distinct in its being and operations, capable of subsisting out of the body, and of being happy or miserable when the body is no more. Beings of a separate nature must have their separate wants, their separate happiness, and their separate state. But once men come to believe, that soul and body are of the same substance and nature, the next step is to conclude, that their happiness is the same too.

2. From

See this ill influence of Sense, &c. finely illustrated in Cebes's Table.
2. From the *infelicity* which attends the soul in its present union with the body, which though quick to perceive the necessities of its *companion*, is insensible of its own. The body cannot be destitute of things needful, but the soul is immediately advertised of it by some painful sensation, and in haste to have it supplied; whereas it can want what is essential to its own happiness and hardly know it. Certainly God has thus framed us for wise ends, and probably one chief reason of it is, that we could not otherwise be informed of the wants of the body, than by the pain which they give us; and if we were not excited to it by the pressing appetite of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of gratifying them, we should not take the care necessary for the preservation of our bodies. But as by consideration and reflection we may inform ourselves of the wants of our better part, God expects that the care we take of that should be the effect of such thought and consideration. If we were pushed on to provide for our souls, as we are for our bodies, by certain irrefistible appetites, where would be the virtue, where the praise, of being concerned for their welfare? God has therefore so framed our Beings, that we must exercise our Reason and Understanding, in order fully to apprehend the necessity of injoying God to make us happy. But, alas, how few
few will be at the trouble of this! And their neglect of this is the root of all their errors.

Sect. X. 2. How shall we account for that great diversity among mankind in their choice and pursuit of particular objects? I answer, that if we consider them as having lost the idea of the true good, this is no way wonderful. Truth is one, but error infinite. There is a consciousness that they are not right, and so every man beats out a path for himself as his fancy leads him. I had occasion to take notice before, that there is a discernable variety in the genius and tempers of men, from whence it unavoidably follows, that in case they take not Reason for their guide, they will differ in their notions of happiness, as much as they do in their inclinations. There is need of a great number of arts and professions, for the support and defence, and convenience, and embellishment of human life. And that there might not be wanting a sufficient number of persons to manage and excel in each; men have different turns given to their minds by their wise Creator; which have a further use, to keep up a good understanding and correspondence amongst men, by being mutually assisting to each other. Not to mention that by this means they are all employed, and even they who have no work
work to do with their hands, are not suffered to let their brains lie idle. The consequence of this diversity in mens inclinations, as I just observed, if Reason be not consulted, will be, that every man will be apt to think, that happiness is to be found in the way of life to which the bent of his genius most strongly carries him,

SECT. XI. 3. How comes there to be so general a consent of mankind, in pursuing the pleasure of sense of one kind or other, as their chief good? It is in short because they judge of them by wrong measures, such as the violence of their inclination. They are powerfully inclined to such pleasures, therefore they are good for them. Their inclination this way is much more forcible than to any thing else, therefore they are the best mark they can propose, and contain their chief good or felicity. Every creature naturally tends to that which is its proper happiness——But why must the body have the reins given to it, any more than the beast a man rides upon? They are both alike senseless and furious. Does the horse need a bridle? So does the appetite. Would it be dangerous to give a loose to the one? The danger is more than equal as to the other. And Reason too is as capable of managing appetite, as a skilful rider is to guide the motions of the creature under
under him. The beasts were made to be governed by man; why? but because he hath Reason and they have none. And this argument is as strong for the subjection of the body of man to his Reason, as of other things to man. Another thing that makes men propose to meet with happiness in the gratification of the senses is, that they judge of it by the flattering representations of fancy. We may compare fancy to an ingenious Painter, whose pencil produces more lively pictures of things than are to be found in nature; and being nearly related to sense it is prejudiced in its favour, and shews its delights as far more sweet and inviting than really they are. But shall a creature that hath the privilege of a diviner faculty, yield himself up to the delusions of imagination? This is much such another absurdity, as it would be to govern ourselves in our waking moments by our dreams.

Sect. XII. To conclude. We are too apt to judge of things by sensible impressions. Nothing but what strikes the senses, and excites a lively emotion in them, is supposed to have any reality in it. The pleasures of sense stir the passions most, and agitate the soul, and put the spirits in motion. But let us hear what "Cicero says on this head. Difficile dicitur est, &c. "It is "hard

" De Oratore: L. 3.
"hard to assign the cause of it, but so it is, "that those things which most strongly "impel the senses, and at first trial pro-"duce the quickest sensations of plea-"sure, are soonest followed with loath-"ing and satiety." And a little after, "the pleasures which move the senses af-"ter the gentlest manner are least liable "to breed satiety; so that it seems, distaste "of them is always closely connected with "the most violent pleasures." The reason of this, for which Cicero was at a loss, is as evident as the thing itself. It is the voice of nature telling us, as often as we are sur-"feitd of any delight, that our happiness lies not in these things. The pleasures of Reli-"gion though less violent than those of sense are more durable. It is as much as can be looked for in this world, if we injoy a calm and serenity of soul; transports are re-"served for the other life, where every good man will feel such, as if granted to him now would make him despise all other de-"lights as spiritless, and by their vehemence even dissolve the union between soul and body. May we but pass this life in peace and tranquility, we have abundant reason to wait contentedly, till we come where we shall spend eternity in raptures and extasies of joy.
Read on this Chapter.

Cicero De Finibus.
Seneca De Tranquilitate.
Gayendus's Morals.
Stubbs's Dialogue on Pleasure.
Netleton of Virtue and Happiness.
  P. 2 & 3.
Lucas's Inquiry after Happiness.
Duchal's Sermons.

The End of the First Part.
INTRODUCTION.

SECT. I. 

HE great end of Morality, which is happiness, being sufficiently explained, and established, my method leads me to the consideration of Virtue, as the way or means of arriving at this end. Virtue sincerely practised in all its parts, according to the measure of light that is imparted, together with repentance for all known faults, there wants not reason to believe will be accepted in a Heathen, and receive a suitable reward. Not that I would be thought to level revealed with natural Religion, or to affirm, that the Christian is upon no better terms for happiness than the Pagan. I am free to say, that the Heathen being a person of integrity shall probably

*See St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. C. 2. v. 6—16.*
probably be rewarded in another life; but I am far from saying, that his reward will be conferred merely out of regard to his own virtues, without respect had to the obedience and mediation of the only Saviour of mankind. From Revelation we learn that there will be a resurrection of all men, as well Pagans as Christians, and that they will owe their resurrection to Jesus Christ; therefore called the second Adam, as they derive their mortality from the first. And if Christ be the author of a future life to all mankind, it is likewise reasonable to suppose him, under God, the author of whatever degree of happiness any part of mankind shall enjoy in a future state.

SECT. II. I declare myself therefore inclined to believe, that the honest Heathen hath a felicity reserved for him hereafter; but for the opinion of those, if there be any such, who make his happiness the same with that of the Christian, either as to kind, place, or degree, I beg leave to enter my protest against it. As to the kind of their happiness, though the object will be the same, the ever blessed God, yet the manner of enjoyment may be widely different, agreeable to the different ways of God's discovering himself in the present state, by Reason and by Revelation. For as these two differ

b Rom. C. 5. and 1 Cor. C. 15.
differ after the rate of natural from supernatural, so for ought I know may the happiness of Christians and Pagans; one being more the result of the natural faculties of human minds, than the other. As to the place or scene of their happiness, our blessed Master in telling us, that he is gone before to prepare a place, for those who shall be found worthy the name of his disciples, has given us to understand, that they shall have a peculiar abode, and more exalted mansions of bliss. And then as to the degree of happiness, forasmuch as Christians are by their Religion obliged to sublimer Virtues, to higher measures of the same Virtues, and to the practice of Virtue upon nobler principles; and to this end have a greater effusion of light and strength afforded them, there can be little doubt that the degree of their happiness will be answerable. Faith is as much an evangelical Virtue, or branch of Christian Morality, as justice is a duty incumbent upon all mankind; and this by necessary consequence from the Law of Reason, which obliges men to conform themselves to the Will of their Creator, however discovered, and as far forth as he is pleased to discover it.

I shall divide this part of Ethicks into three Sections.

K

I. Of

John xiv. 1–3.
I. Of the Objects of Virtue.
II. Of the Rules and Measures of it.
III. Of Virtue itself, and its several Kinds and Distinctions.

On the subject of the Introduction consult further,

Whiston's Sermon on Philip. iii. 7, 8.
PART II.

SECT. I.

Of the Objects of Virtue.

CHAP. I.

Of the Objects of Virtue, and particularly of Inclination, and of Habit.

SECT. I.

Y the Objects of Virtue are not meant those which are remote and less proper, in which sense the good and evil things of this life, and the Beings to whom our actions have a regard, whether God, our Neighbour or Ourselves, are the Objects of Virtue; (of these I shall have occasion to
Of the Objects of Virtue. Part II.

to discourse under the Third Head) but such as Virtue is immediately employed about. These are two, human actions and passions, upon each of which I shall be obliged to inlarge. The actions which it is the office of Virtue to regulate, are such only as we term human, that is, such as proceed from men as rational and free agents, or in one word considered as Men. These, says &quot;Andronicus Rhodius, are human actions, of which a man is properly master.&quot; The actions of a fool or lunatick are actiones hominis, non humanae, actions of the natural, not of the moral man as Mr. Locke somewhere calls him. To which let me add all those actions that are done by persons having their Reason, but unknowingly, and without observing that they do them. We rank not these among human actions, in regard there is no ut made of Thought and Reason, the distinct characters of mankind.

On this head we have these things before us to be distinctly examined,

1. The Principles.

II. The Ends. And

III. The Species of human actions.

Sect. II. 1. To begin with the Principles; these are either internal or externa. The internal Principles are so named, be...
I. Of the Objects of Virtue.

1. By inclination is intended a kind of bias upon nature, by the force of which it is carried towards certain actions, previously to the exercise of Thought and Reasoning about the nature and consequences of them, whether they are good or evil, beneficial or hurtful; whether they are one or the other, the man finds his inclination drawing him that way. The Stoics reckon three parts belonging to the human composition, Σώμα, Πνεύμα, and Νοήμα, Body, Soul, and Mind. To the Body they ascribed Ἀνάθημα Senses, to the Soul Ὀρέγα Apperites or Inclinations, to the Mind Δογμά the Decrees, by which the man ought to be determined or governed in all his actions. For it is one of the first things to be settled now we are upon this subject, that inclination, though it be a principle, is never to be made the immediate rule of action. The meaning of which moral Axiom is this, that in order to be ascertained of the nature and expedience of actions, it is not enough for a person to consult his inclination, nor from the bent of this can he justly infer the allowableness of taking the course to which his inclination prompts him. This compendious method may indeed be granted to creatures whose

K. 3

b Antonin. L. 3. §. 16.
nature is not corrupted; beasts which cannot sin, and perhaps angels who never did, may have nothing to do, but to follow the impulse of their respective natures; but it is otherwise with Man, whose animal nature is vitiated. Besides that it is not with man, as it is with angels and beasts, who have each of them but a single nature; whereas man hath as it were two natures, an animal and a rational, a corporeal and a spiritual part; in one of which he agrees with the beasts, in the other with the angels. And since man is made up of two parts, can it be reasonable, that the appetites and inclinations of the ignoble part should prescribe to the other, which has vastly the pre-eminence, both in respect of faculties, and of duration? We ought on the contrary to reflect, that these inclinations were designed as the matter of our trial, not as the rule and standard of our actions; to be governed, not to be indulged without control. The Heathen were better acquainted with the dignity of human nature, than to suppose that the body was the man; or that Reason was to lacquey it after inclination. "*Du-flex est enim vis animorum, &c.* "The "human nature is possessed of two different powers, the one is Appetite, by the "Greeks called *prora*, which rashly hurries a "man this way or that; the other is *Rea-

* Cicero De Offic. L. 1. §. 28. 
Chap. I. Of the Objects of Virtue.

"son, which informs and directs what is to " be done and what avoided. So that by " the constitution of our nature, Reason is " formed to rule, Appetite to obey."

Sect. III. When Reason has given sen-
tence concerning a particular action, or course of action, and pronounced it lawful, then I confess inclination deserves to be con-
cidered, and is oftentimes necessary in con-
currence with Reason, to direct after what manner we are to shape our lives; applying to this purpose the excellent words of the great Roman Orator and Moralist. 

"Admo-
dum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique, non vi-
tiosa, &c. which we may render to this sense, "That every man ought to pursue his "proper bent, provided it be not vicious; "the more easily to preserve that decorum, "which is the beauty of human life. Not "that we are ever at liberty to oppose uni-
versal nature, i.e. the Reason we have "in common with all mankind; but this "being preserved inviolable, every one is "to be led by his own proper genius. So "that notwithstanding other methods of "life may in themselves be more eligible, "we are to measure our own conduct by "that which is proper and peculiar to our "nature. It is heartless to attempt things in "spite of nature, and to follow what can-

K 4

"not

not be overtaken. According to the Pro-
verb, Nothing is becoming which is at-
tempted against our genius." By our pro-
per nature Cicero understands, not only
what we express by the word inclinations,
but every thing that enters into a man's di-
stinguishing character. Upon this difference
of nature he lays so much stress as to say,
that one man has not only a right, but is
under a kind of obligation to kill himself,
while the same is forbidden to another.
For an instance of which he mentions Cato,
who having received from nature an invari-
able severity of temper, which he had im-
proved by a tenacious adherence to the reso-
lutions he at any time formed, was con-
cerned as he would be Cato still, to die by
his own hands, rather than owe his life as
a gift to Cæsar, or even to see the face of
that tyrant. This certainly is a wrong ap-
plication of a rule in the general very
good.

Sect. IV. Inclinations are of two kinds,
natural or acquired.

1. That there are natural inclinations
every one must grant, who makes the least
reflection. Thus in children it is easy to
observe, how from their earliest years they
differ in their tempers and dispositions.
In one you see with pleasure the dawns
of a liberal diffusive soul, another gives us
cause
cause to fear he will be altogether as narrow and sordid. Of one we may say he is naturally revengeful, of another that he is patient and forgiving. It is not improbable that this variety of inclinations has its foundation in different temperaments and complections of body; according to that maxim of Galen, Mores animae sequuntur temperamentum corporis. "The dispositions of the "soul follow the temperament of the "body." Of these inclinations I have two or three things to remark.

1. If the inclination lie towards that which is good, as far as it is purely natural, there is nothing of moral goodness in it, nor is commendation due to the possessor of it, any more than to the fire for warming you, by a quality given it by the author of nature. And consequently an action, that is purely the effect of such an inclination, is in a moral account no better than an indifferent action. And so, vice versa, that an inclination to what, in some circumstances, is evil, as far as it is strictly natural cannot be accounted criminal, seems a dictate of Reason. But

2. An action done in pursuance of this inclination, by a person come to the exercise of his Understanding, may undoubtedly be sinful. You will be ready to object, that if an action cannot therefore be good, because it is only the result of natural
Of the Objects of Virtue. Part II.

Inclination, neither can it be evil when owing merely to the same cause, viz. to a natural principle. But there is no parallel in the two cases. To render an action morally good, it is not enough that nakedly considered it be conformable to the law of righteousness, but the motives and ends of the action are to be weighed; so that the principle being no other than mechanical, the action for certain is too low to be placed in the order of actions morally good. But to make an action sinful, which in itself was disconformable to the law of Reason, no more is required, than that the Being have a capacity of knowing it to be so, and a power to forbear it. That is in short, an action materially good may become indifferent, because the sole effect of a natural inclination; and an action proceeding from natural inclination may be vicious, because prohibited by the Law. The whole turns upon this, that a propensity to evil does not lay any man under a necessity of acting it. He may prevent the effect, when unable to extinguish the cause. Nay, I must needs believe it possible for a person to do more than barely suspend the action, even to stifle, or at least tame the inclination itself; as I shall show you in the close of this Chapter.
Sect. V. This deserves to be considered, seeing that it will from hence follow, that a corrupt desire, though natural, and supposed to have no more strength than what it derives from nature, may yet pass under the notion of sinful; because had we taken the care we ought to have done, it might in some measure have been weakened and overcome. Nor does this contradict a former concession, that no inclination as far as it is purely natural can be culpable. For an inclination which in its first years, and during the minority of Reason, was strictly natural, and consequently free from blame, not being severely dealt with as we grow up to Reason, becomes our choice. Its first existence was the effect of nature, but that it is equally strong now, as it was originally, the fault rests wholly upon my own negligence.

Sect. VI. 2. There are inclinations superinduced by custom, which are called habits, and these are either good or evil. An evil habit is an inclination to evil, begotten and nursed up by a repetition of evil actions. It is irrational to think, that the depravity of some mens tempers, which is so great, as to hurry them into the most abominable crimes, is all original. How many may we have observed, whose natural disposition was
was neutral, or lay on the side of some Virtue; by frequenting bad company, and conforming to it, grow to be extremely loose and corrupt, even to those very instances to which at first they had some kind of aversion. Let us not therefore to excuse ourselves be unjust to nature, and lay the fault upon that of all that is vicious in us. Concerning evil habits the following Positions are evident.

1. A man is answerable for his evil habits, so far as that he may be punished on the account of them. The reason is, that they are the product of actions which he ought to have forbore, and the rather because of the tendency which he knew them to have to produce corrupt habits. "A man must be extremely stupid not to know, that a course of action will issue in a habit, either of Vice or Virtue. And in regard men know what they do, it is of choice that they are good men or bad." It is altogether as proper to call an habit sinful, as an action. The outward action, though in itself necessary is esteemed good or evil, because free in its principles; and by parity of reason habits are denominated good or evil; because though the necessary effects of a course of preceding actions, yet are free in the next remove but one, I mean in the Will, which freely determined the being.

being of those actions, which gave existence to the habits. All the difference is, that the act is directly voluntary, the habit indirectly; but neither one or the other is immediately free. Or if you will keep to the exactness of Philosophy, there is no guilt immediately or distinctly inherent in the action or habit; and that a man is reckoned more criminal when he proceeds to the outward act, is only from hence, that the consent of the Will is hereby known to be more intire, and consequently to have more guilt cleaving to it. As because every sinful action is known to contribute to the production of a sinful habit, every such action becomes on that score the more criminal.

Sect. VII. 2. Not only the first existence, and gradual increase of an evil habit will be placed to account, (because arising from acts of sin, from which we might have abstained) but the continuance also of the habit in the same degree of strength. So that every moment an evil habit remains, the guilt of the person is on the growing hand. To conquer a bad habit all at once is, I confess, in no one's power; but as some part of the prevalency which an evil habit has to day, is to be attributed to the neglect of doing all that might have been done for its removal yesterday, so consequently I stand chargeable with the strength of the evil habit to day;
day; as I shall for that to morrow, if I indulge myself in the same negligence to day.

**Sect. VIII. 3.** The actions occasioned by a sinful habit are all imputable. The same reason holding here, but more strongly, as in natural inclinations, that a habit may incline, but cannot irrevocably sway the Will. I confess a very great Mafter in this way of thinking seems to resolve the imputableness of such actions, not into this, that they may be foreborn, but into this, that the habits they flow from might have been prevented. And so says a Commentator upon Epicetus. "If the soul be the cause of its own habits, both good and bad, through a right or wrong use of its liberty, then is likewise the original cause of those actions, which flow from the respective habits, to be ascribed to it." But as the French Annotator upon Puffendorf well observes, "the possibility of conquering an evil habit all at once (he must mean ceasing to act as that prompts us) is manifest. If a drunkard, under the temptation of good company and liquor, can notwithstanding deny himself, when a wager is depending or the like, why can he..."
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"he not do the same from more noble motives? It is even certain, that if a Prince should but make a severe edict against Drunkenness, and see it well executed, it would in a little time put an end to this absurd vice; as the late King of France by his edicts was able to abolish the humour of Dueling, which prevailed before."

Sect. IX. For the cure of an evil inclination, whether natural or acquired, these two rules may be of use. 1. To be as early as we can in our application. Principis obsta. Inclination is like a plant, pliable at first, but more stubborn after it hath fixed its roots, and is become the growth of a great number of years. 2. To cross and mortify the inclination, by a frequent and obstinate practice of the contrary Virtue. The oftner a man exercises himself in that Virtue, the more he will perceive his reluctance to it abate; till at last he will experience a pleasure accompanying the practice of it, which in time will grow up into an inclination; an inclination, which as it gathers strength, will insensibly subdue, or rather counterwork the contrary evil propension. ¹ Aristotle advises to bend nature to the other extreme, as if the effect of this violent distortion would be, its returning

¹ Eth. ad Nicom. L. 2. C. 8.
Of the Objects of Virtue. Part II.

ing part of its way again, and settling in the middle; which he illustrates by the instance of a crooked stick, which we bow the quite contrary way, in order to make it exactly straight. This expedient is not only unwarrantable, but exceeding dangerous. For either we shall rest in this last extreme, a thing, which as odd as it may appear, is more certain and natural, than it is to fix in the middle; or we shall take such a distaste at the new extreme, as to swing back to the old, and ever after to think ourselves justified in it.

Sect. X. Before I leave this head of habits, I would take notice of one thing in relation to good habits, which at first sight may be mistaken for a discouragement against endeavouring to fix them. The main thing that enhances the price of Virtue, being the difficulty in the way to it, and he who has attained to an habitual love of goodness, finding it no manner of violence to his nature to do well, his Virtue seems to be of less value, than while he was yet in a state of imperfection, struggling with his passions. Mr. Norris having owned, that this objection did once mightily embarrass him, tells us afterward what method he took to answer it. But instead of admiring that he surmounted it at last, I wonder that it could ever

k See his Miscellanies.
ever give him any disturbance. For in short, it is not the difficulty of an action simply considered, that exalts it to the degree of heroic Virtue, but the strength of the good principles from which it proceeds; and that these good principles were either acquired, or maintained, and improved by our own care and industry. It is true, when a person forces his way through a great deal of opposition to perform a good action, his Virtue is concluded to be sincere and prevailing; not purely because of the difficulties attending the action, but because the mastering of these difficulties proves him to be possessed of a more than ordinary strength of mind. Consequently whoever he be, that has attained to such a perfect habit of Virtue, that he no longer feels in himself any considerable reluctance to his duty, he demonstrates his Virtue to be above the common size, in that it has not merely conquered, but well nigh rooted out the difficulties which opposed it. The habit renders the practice of Virtue much easier, but then it was not without continued vigilance and repeated efforts, that he possessed himself of the habit; and therefore the more perfect the habit, the more perfect his Virtue.

The result of the whole is, that inclination, though too frequently a governing principle of action, has not that force as to
induce a necessity, unless the Will second it; and as for this concurrent operation of the Will, it is in a man's power to withhold it, as I shall show in its proper place.

You may consult on the subject of this Chapter, besides the Books cited,

_Tillotson_ Vol. i. Ser. 29.
_Hutcheson_ on our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Tr. 1st. §. 1. Tr. 2nd. §. 1 & 2.
_Cockbourn's_ Reflections on Man, & p. 98. &c.
Of Reason, and particularly as it is a Principle of Human Actions.

Sect. I. The second principle of human actions is Understanding or Reason. Reason is that faculty of the soul, whereby a person is enabled to judge of the natures, relations, and uses of things, of the fitnesses of actions, and of the truth or falsehood of Propositions, particularly those of a moral nature. E. G. That in the present occurrence it is best to act after this manner, and that it is not best so to act, are contradictory Propositions; both of which our Reason tells us cannot be true, as upon examination it will discover which of the two is so. Reason is a much nobler principle than inclination, being a rule as well as a principle; and where this is wanting, I do not say where it is not actually and properly exercised, a man's actions cannot be termed human, as I observed before.

Sect. II. There may perhaps be some ground for distinguishing between Reason and
and Reasoning. The knowledge of the truth of Propositions, whether self-evident, or evident to us only by the mediation of others, whether at one view, or at several, may in a larger sense be stiled Reason. As Dr. Cumberland observes, "All men acknowledge the most evident principles to be the dictates of Reason, no less than those which need proof. Reasoning denotes the action of the mind in finding out of truth, and must therefore be imployed about Propositions, which on account of their being at some distance from things already known, we arrive at by one or more steps." Cicero acknowledges Reason to be common to Gods and men; and further faith, that the wisdom universally ascribed to God, is nothing else but "Reason in its highest perfection." We shall not dishonour God by attributing Reason to him in its most exalted notion, as it is manifest we should if we supposed him to have any occasion for Reasoning. He hath the ideas of all things in his own mind, and with one all comprehending view beholds the infinite relations which they bear to one another; so that he at once possesseth all possible knowledge. There is therefore in this case no room for Reasoning, which always argues imperfection; and yet there is what answers to

\[\text{De Legibus Naturae. p. 32.}\]
\[\text{De Legibus. L. 1.}\]
to Reasoning in finite understandings, and differs from it no otherwise, than as one perfect act does from several imperfect ones in the same kind. God sees how one truth follows from another, and how the remotest ideas may be shewn to agree by the intervention of a great number of others; but then he sees at once, what angelical and human minds perceive not but successively; and infinitely more than they will perceive after the longest exercise of their reasoning faculty. Provided then we only remove these two degrading qualities of the knowledge of creatures, that it hath bounds, and that it is progressive, we need not scruple to discourse of the knowledge of God, under the name and character of Eternal Reason.

Sect. III. Reason being the power which the mind has of discerning the fitness or unfitness of actions, may be considered as a principle or a rule of action. As a principle it excites to action. That there is such an exciting power in Reason I should have thought it unnecessary to prove, because of the evidence of the thing, if it had not been denied. An explanation of the manner in which this is done, will contain a very good proof that it may be done. The mind by its faculty of Reason discerning and contemplating the fitness, congruity, or beauty of actions, has a pleasure in that discovery and con-
contemplation—a still greater pleasure in apprehending that it has a power to do such actions—greater still in a supposed resolution to do them—yet greater in the thought of doing or having done them—the result of all which is a lively conviction of its obligation to do them—as the effect of this is a constant uneasiness, as long as this obligation is not complied with. Sometimes the pleasure alone, sometimes the uneasiness, sometimes both together, flowing from and attended with the conviction of the obligation to such actions, produce a resolution to do them; and the pleasure there is in such a resolution actually formed, and the uneasiness while the execution of it is needlessly delayed, strongly prompt to the action itself. In this way I should think all will allow of the efficacy of Reason; nor will this manner of explaining it at all prejudice the notion of acting upon moral fitnesses.

Sect. IV. He that acts only from inclination is like a vessel without a pilot on board, which wanders on the wide ocean, till driven by a tempest on rocks and quicksands, it miserably perishes. While the man who makes a due use of his Reason, resembles a vessel richly freighted, which the skill of the pilot directs through the dangers of the treacherous deep to its intended haven. One exerts the force of nature
ture blindly, the other guides it with his eye, so as to make it serve to its own welfare and the good of the community. The fable of Prometheus, who stole fire from heaven to actuate his man of clay, may be fitly applied here. For Reason is a lamp or torch kindled at the fountain of light, a beam from that unfading sun; and therefore mindful of its original should be perpetually ascending to him, acting worthy of him, and pursuing his interest and glory. To this faculty the Stoics give the honourable title of the supreme and governing power, for such it is in some respects; though the whole commanding and executive power be properly in the Will. With respect to the same the modern Platonists defined a man a rational Being; to which because of his body they add, and mortal a rational to distinguish him from the brutes, mortal because they would not be thought to equal him with the immortal Gods; restraining however this degrading epithet to his gross and corruptible part.

Sect. V. The Propositions that fall under the judgment of Reason being of two sorts, from hence arises a distinction of Reason into speculative and practical; the latter having a regard to Propositions in which the
happiness, and by consequence the behaviour and ends of life are concerned. Here Reason has a double office assigned it, of a guardian to the body, and the directress of moral life. As a guardian to the body, it supplies the place of those weapons, with which nature has furnished other creatures for their defence. These it has diversly armed, giving horns to one, hoofs to another, swiftness to another, fierceness and strength to another, τοῖς Ἀνδρόσι ερωμένοι, (Anacr. Ode 2.) to men she has given wisdom, which is more than equivalent to all the advantages of his fellow-creatures, whether for conquest, resistance, or flight. In the same capacity Reason is to man, what these in\[42x470] Inferbels are to other creatures, by which they are taught the art of self-preservation, both as to the individuals and the species. From whence there is this useful instruction to be drawn, that in every thing, even in the most common instances, and where instinct serves the brute, man is to employ his Reason. For it is with this view, that wise and provident nature hath put him under a necessity of doing this with regard to the body itself, or of being miserable. The other and higher office of Reason is to be the directress of moral life. Ne quid temerè, fortuò, inconsideratè, negligententerque agamus. "That

“That we may not at any time act precipitantly, negligently, and at random.” For as Cicero adds, *Generati sumus a natura, ad quaedam studia graviora atque majora.* “We are formed by nature for greater and more important things.” Had man been designed for no more than the beast, for none but an animal life like them, the author of his Being would accordingly have indowed him with mechanical force and instincts, and withheld Reason; which on supposition it be of no further use, than to answer to instinct in brutes, is clearly thrown away, and not so much a privilege as a burden. A supposition not to be made concerning nature, or rather the God of nature, who never does any thing in vain; but in all other cases, and therefore in this too, hath suited the means to the end.

**Sect. VI.** In discharging this part Reason is principally concerned about two things, fixing right principles, and framing just deductions from principles thus fixed. For the settling of its principles, it either consults its own light, or the light of Revelation; for the truth of the Revelation being once well established, what it manifestly dictates is to be received with the same veneration and regard, as the first principles of nature. The principles discoverable by the light of Reason

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© De Offic. L. 1. §. 29.
Reason are called *archai φυσικα* natural principles, *κοινα* common notions innate to the soul, *προληψεις* anticipations, to signify that they were originally in the mind, not instilled by education, nor gotten by Reasoning, but the immediate gift of the Creator. Be this opinion true or false, it is of no importance to Morality; the principles of which have the very same degree of authority, by whatever way they are derived into the mind, whether by immediate implantation, or the right use of that Reason with which the human soul is indowed. The same Proposition may be both a *principle* and a *deduction*; a *principle* with respect to those moral rules that follow from it, and a *deduction* from some prior principles which are of a greater extent than itself. Those that have none prior to them, at least not in the same science, are styled *general* and *first* principles.

Sect. VII. I shall conclude with observing, that there is greater danger of men taking up with wrong principles, than of arguing wrong from the principles which they have taken up; and many more miscarry by the former way, than by the latter. *Antiquity, Education, Numbers, Authority, Learning,* are not principles to be relied on; and yet what more manifest, than that these are the principles by which whole nations
tions are governed in the weightiest affair of human life? For at the bottom, the greater part of mankind have little more to say for their being of the Religion and Way they profess, rather than any other, than that it was the Religion of their Fathers, and is so still of the Country where they live, and of the Government they live under; they know learned men that are of it, and it hath a great number of followers. It is to no purpose to go about to expose the folly of their proceeding after this manner; they have neither patience to hear you, nor openness of mind to be convinced by anything that you can offer; having laid down this for a first principle, never to dispute what hath long past under that sacred name. Every man's Reason guided and perfected by Revelation, where it is to be had; or Revelation interpreted by right Reason, is after all the ultimate appeal in moral matters. But then he who is sincere, to avoid mistakes, will be careful to guard against precipitancy, will not refuse any helps necessary to correct and improve his Reason, or to assist him in understanding of Scripture; and having furnished himself with time and advantages will endeavour to lay aside all prejudices, and to shake off every bias, that he may determine himself on the side of the greatest evidence; and proportion the degree of his assent to the degree of the evidence.
Reafon a Principle &c. Part II.

evidence respectively attending every subject.

I say no more here, having more largely treated the subject of this Chapter in the Essay on Reafon, and because the fuller consideration of some parts of it will naturally fall in, as we go along, under other parts of this Science, particularly the Chapters about Conscience and Sincerity.

Consult on the subject of this Chapter.

Puffendorf De Officio Hom. & Civ. L. i. C. i.
— De Jure Naturæ & Gent. L. i. C. 3.
— Spectators. Vol. 8. No. 588, 60r.
Wollaston's Religion of Nature. Sect. i.
Hutcheson's Inquiry &c. Tr. 2, Sect. 3, 5, 6.
Letters between Hutcheson and Burnet.
Balguy's Inquiry into the Foundation of Moral Virtue.—His further Inquiry.
CHAP. III.

Of the Will.

P. 1. Of the Nature of the Will, and of voluntary and involuntary Actions.

SECT. I. IT is a happy similitude which Aristotle makes use of, to illustrate the order of the faculties, and the regular progress of every human action, taken from those antient Governments described by Homer in his Poems; wherein the Kings after having held a Council of the wisest heads concerning any enterprize, if they approved the design, ordered the execution of it by the people under their command. Thus the Will ought to consult with Reason, and then to proceed to action; though after all the supreme authority and final resort be in the Will. Nestor may have the reputation of an Oracle for wisdom, but Agamemnon is the fountain of power. Reason can only propose what the Will is at liberty to reject or follow. The Will

Will sometimes is taken more generally, for that faculty of the soul which carries it in pursuit of good. This is much the same with Aristotle's ἐνεργεία Spontaneity, and comprehends under it all the desires, inclinations, and volitions of the soul. Sometimes more strictly, either for that tendency of the soul which regards the end, by the same Moralist termed ἐνέργεια the Will; or for that which terminates on the action, which he calls πρόαρχεια Preference, or Election. Volition has its principal reference to the end, Election to the means. And again Election is wholly conversant about things in our power. It is chiefly in this latter sense the word is understood, when we speak of the Will in Morality, not altogether excluding the former. Thus understood it may be defined, That power in every man which orders the doing or forbearing of actions: and this with such efficacy, as in all actions within our power to render a compliance unavoidable.

Sect. II. This faculty is distinguished by two characters, it is the only necessitating, and the chief denominating principle. It is the only necessitating principle. Though a man's inclinations may strongly dispose and urge him to action, yet still he has a power of stopping short; and though Reason be necessary

b Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. c. i.

Ibid. C. 2.
necessary to direct, whether and how a thing ought to be done, yet whether it shall be done or not rests in the Will; and once this has determined, the action, if supposed in his power, immediately and necessarily follows. A person may be inclined to move, and in his judgment persuaded that it is best for him to move, and yet, if there should be no further act of the mind, must for ever sit still. A mere inclination or judgment has no effect; but let the Will exert its authority, and the executive power cannot but obey. The sovereignty of the Will is the same in all human actions. For what is it makes the man act at any time, but the command of the Will? Now for the same reason that the Will necessitates any one action, it must necessarily produce every action, that is the object of it, and at the same time in the man's power. It is moreover the chief denominating principle. In all inquiries concerning the actions of men, capable of acting rationally, the whole turns upon the intention, not the end intended; but whether the action was intended, or voluntary. "For by these two names "voluntary and involuntary, we judge of all "actions, says d Andronicus Rhodius; and "accordingly pronounce that some are "commendable, others pardonable, others "worthy of blame." And to the same effect

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d L. 3. C. 1.
effect Simplicius. "God and man have always a regard to the Will, and by that determine what is well or ill done." This is the fountain of moral good and evil, that which leads virtue to the acts of the Understanding, Imagination, and Memory, as well as to our outward bodily actions, or infuses a malignity into them. Separate from the Will, nothing done by us can be good or evil, just or unjust; and where the Will is fully bent, and issues not into action, merely for want of power, the person deserves the praise or blame belonging to the actions, as much as if he did them.

Nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit, si est voluntarium. "An action in itself just " is rightly done, if done voluntarily;" faith Cicero. And it is the universal opinion,

Si desint vires, tamen est laudanda Voluntas.

"Though an ability to execute may be " wanting, yet a good intention deserves " praise."

Sect. III. I distinguished the Will above as regarding the end, or the means; but this general distinction does not content Puffendorf.

* In Epist. C. 1.
* Cie. de Offic. L. 1. §. 9.
dorff, who further subdivides these two acts of the Will into six, three relating to the end, and three to the means. The acts of the Will relating to the end are volition, intention, and delight. When the Will is inclined towards an end, without our considering it as present or absent, it is called, volition, or according to others the Will of simple approbation; because in this case the Will stops at the esteem of things, without determining itself efficaciously to produce or acquire them. Intention or design is an efficacious desire to obtain the end. Delight is that tranquility or pleasure which the soul perceives from the acquisition of its end. The acts of the Will referring to the means, are consent, choice, and execution. Consent is a simple approbation of the means, as conducting to the end proposed. Where these means are in our power we single them out by choice, and apply them by use or execution towards obtaining the end. Though perhaps this distinction is not altogether exact, particularly because those which Puffendorf calls volition and consent are more properly acts of the Judgment than of the Will, yet not knowing but it might help you in framing a clearer idea of the steps which the mind takes in advancing to action, I thought it not unuseful to mention it.
Sect. IV. An action or thing is voluntary, directly, or indirectly. Directly when it is the immediate object of the Will. Thus a man’s swallowing a certain quantity of liquor, no one forcing him to it, is directly voluntary. Indirectly these two ways.

1. When its the effect of his voluntarily doing something, which he ought not to have done, either upon its own account, or because of the effects, which he knew, or might have known would follow his doing it. Thus the disorder of Reason occasioned by a person’s drinking to excess, and all the mischief he does during this suspension of his Reason, are indirectly voluntary, because of his being willing to drink that quantity of liquor which brought it on; which he was obliged not to have done, both in regard such intemperate drinking, being the abuse of a pleasure, that ought to be injoyed within the bounds of moderation, is in itself sinful; and much more as he foresaw, that drunkenness would probably be the consequence. "In like manner, he that from his licentious way of living injures his sight, or contracts any other distemper, is not so much pitied as blamed; for what is not reckoned his misfortune, but his fault." To add no more. The scanda...
als occasioned by a Christian's taking some liberties, in themselves innocent, but which without any inconvenience might be born, are indirectly voluntary; because attending an action, which though perhaps in the circumstances warrantable, he should have left undone, in consideration of the ill he which he knew would be made of it.

2. An action or thing is indirectly voluntary, when it is the effect of a person's not willing to do what he might and ought to have done. "This is the case of one, through negligence ignorant of a Law, of which it was easy for him to be informed." A consideration which leaves the ignorance of one enjoying a plain Revelation without excuse, seeing no such person could be under gross ignorance of the things sealed, who was sincerely desirous of knowledge. In short, to be guilty of an action or omission, and then plead that we're sorry for the event, is no more than prolatio contra factum, "protesting against fact," which was never yet admitted for an apology. These are the several respects in which an action or event may be reckoned voluntary, and in these are contained all the grounds of imputation. Whatever flows from the Will as its cause, whether directly or indirectly, being imputable to a person;
and of this he is to be esteemed the author and of nothing else.

Sect. V. To the two ways of an action's becoming indirectly voluntary which have been just explained, some add a third, ex post facto, from an after-approbation of an action done undesignedly. For instance, a man in hunting shoots at a Deer, and by mere chance kills his King; the thing was done accidentally, but being done is reflected on with a secret satisfaction; and this criminal satisfaction it is imagined converts a casual event into a voluntary one. But I would gladly learn, how a thing comes to be voluntary from its relation to an act of the Will, which exists not till that thing is past; or how this can be shown to be better sense than calling a man Son to one of his Posterity, or making the effect to be older than the cause. That which has betrayed any into this impropriety of speaking, I apprehend must be, the guilt arising from the pleasure a person takes in unhappy accident. I readily own it to be a guilty pleasure, but admire that this should make any one think the preceding action therefore voluntary; since nothing can be plainer, than that it is not the action which is chargeable in this case, that having been past, and so for ever immutable, but the approbation of the action which
which approbation proceeds from the Will, and is therefore faulty. Aristotle decides this matter with a great deal of judgment. A person who through ignorance did what he is not displeased at when it comes to be known, cannot be said to have done it voluntarily, because he did it out of ignorance; nor on the other hand, against his Will, because he is no way concerned for it, when he perceives what he has done.

Sect. VI. An action is involuntary when it is the effect of constraint; of which Puffendorf reckons two sorts, external force, and the threatening of some very terrible evil. The first I grant to be a proper instance. A man, whose hand is violently made to serve a wicked purpose, being every whit as guiltless, as the instrument with which the murther is committed. The action as to him is involuntary, and indeed is no action of his at all. The constraint by fear cannot properly be called constraint, nor the action involuntary that is done in compliance with it; it is a mixed action, as I shall show presently. Again, an action is involuntary that owes its being to a faultless ignorance. Oedipus returning into his own country

\footnote{Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. 1.}  \footnote{De Jure Naturæ. L. 1. C. 5. §. 9.}
country in quest of his Parents who were unknown to him, in a fray happened to kill his Father, and afterward married his own Mother. All that can be said is, that he was unfortunate, but properly speaking, neither a Parricide, nor Incestuous. \textsuperscript{m} Aristotle instances in one who divulges the mysteries, not knowing them to be such. The nearest parallel to which, that I can readily think of, is delivering the most trivial things, and even our 
\textit{jests} in scripture language, but inadvertently. This which would be a great fault in one that did it professedly, in the person ignorant of what he does is no more than an accident. But as \textsuperscript{n} Aristotle observes, those actions are not to be numbered among involuntary ones, which are done out of anger or concupiscence. Ignorance may change the whole species of an action, but the passions do not.

\textbf{Sect. VII.} There are some actions compounded of the two former, voluntary in part, and in part involuntary, and these we call \textit{mixed actions}. Of this kind is the action of Achilles's Son in Euripides, who being about to sacrifice Polyxena Queen Hecuba's Daughter at his Father's Tomb, the Poet says, \textit{O, \epsilon, \omega \delta\epsilon\lambda\nu\nu\tau\varepsilon \eta\alpha\iota \delta\epsilon\lambda\nu\omega, \&c.} \textit{"He through pity}

\textsuperscript{m} Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. t.  
\textsuperscript{n} Ibid.
"pity both unwilling, and willing, cut in "sunder the channels of the blood with his "sword." None but a madman would cast his goods into the sea in calm weather; but in a storm, where there is an apparent necessity of lightening the ship to preserve it, the master does this without reflection on his prudence. Urged by fear, a man does that which is against both his conscience and his inclination. Pro hic & nunc, vv. 41. adx. rαvδε. These actions are voluntary, but not wholly so, seeing they are involuntary in their cause; the cause which makes a man so to act being disliked. I say involuntary in their cause; for as to actions immediately voluntary, and involuntary only upon supposition, they are not actually involuntary at all, and for that reason are to be accounted purely voluntary and not mixed. Which makes Aristotle himself acknowledge, that such actions are rather voluntary than involuntary. He says rather, I say wholly voluntary; because, though if offered to my choice attended with their common circumstances, I should reject them; yet in the present situation of the actions, and of my mind, I do them without any reluctance of my Will. One man steals a bag of money, which he would not have

* Ibid.
have done, had the opportunity been less favourable, or the sum not so tempting. Another having a proposal made to him in his unguarded moments, and the heat of his imagination, which he would have withstood at another time, listens and is overcome. A third in his anger speaks very ill things, and is guilty of very ill actions, nor does his Will make any present resistance. Who will say that these actions are actually involuntary in part? Though it must be owned there is not so much of a criminal Will in them, as where the temptation is less pressing.

Sect. VIII. If it be asked whether, and how far, such mixed actions deserve praise or censure? I shall lay down these following rules, by which we may the better judge of them.

1. Where the action is lawful, and the not doing it would probably be of much worse consequence than doing it, though the action in such cases be not strictly commendable, yet the omission would ordinarily carry guilt in it. He who to save the ship disburthens it of its freight, must not be said to do a thing worthy of praise; but would justly incur the name of a miser, one too well affected to the things of the world, if he should choose to hazard life and all, ra-
ther than submit to such an ungrateful expedient. The same may be applied to him, who consents to the amputation of a limb, rather than the whole body should be in manifest danger of perishing. Every one is bound to seek the preservation of his bodily life, by all lawful and warrantable ways; he sins against nature if he does not; but does not therefore merit reward for taking care of himself in a case of imminent danger; because he is carried to this, much after the same manner as brutes are, by a natural instinct.

Sect. IX. 2. When the action is morally evil, no mixture of involuntariness will entirely justify it. A person threatened with death, or some other very dreadful evil, is by fear prevailed on to do an action, to which he has otherwise an aversion. *Pufendorf* thinks this takes away all ground of imputation, as much as downright force; and he gives an example in an Officer, who receives an order, on pain of his life, to execute one whom he knows to be innocent. And in another book he maintains, that the actions done in such a strait, are not to be imputed to the person doing them; more reasonably than to the Sword or Ax.

employed to take away a man's life. But this is a loose and dangerous decision. It is I think a first principle in Morality, that nothing but ignorance, or proper compulsion, will exempt a person from the guilt of an ill action, neither of which can be pretended here. The passions do not deprive men of their Understanding, or of their Liberty. The heathen Moralist delivers founder doctrine than this. "There are some actions, "says he, which call for pity and forgive-
"ness, rather than praise or blame; as when "for fear of evils, such as even exceed the "ordinary strength of human nature to bear, "a man does what he ought not, A un ςαν;" an expression of the softer kind, which is not to be stretched to include the greatest crimes. Which is the reason that he adds, "but some things are so foul, that a man "will rather suffer death, than be compel-"led to them." Andronicus Rhodius in paraphrasing this passage explains it of death, ushered in with the most exquisite torments; and a little after has these excellent words, "That it is the part of a noble mind, brave-
"ly to undergo the most grievous things, "rather than purchase ease and safety by "acting any thing that is base, Τις αυξηπος." Yea, such vile actions are not to be done by a person threatened never so highly, let there

there be the greatest reason to believe they will be done notwithstanding our refusal by some other hand. For at worst, there is a possibility that they may not; and though we were able certainly to foresee that they would, it will not justify us in doing an ill thing, that it will be done though we refuse it.

Sect. X. 3. As to sinful actions, the more there is in them of the involuntary the better title have they to pardon; and so e contra. A mixture of involuntariness, though it does not annihilate, yet extenuates the fault; and this more or less, as there is more or less of this ingredient in the action. This is too plain to need illustration.

4. In good actions the less there is of mixture the better. The greatest excellency of good actions is, when they are wholly voluntary; and when they are not altogether unmixed, they are so much the more valuable, as they approach nearer to it. A rich man relieves a person in great want, not without a secret wish, that this miserable object had not fallen in his way, that he might not have been under any obligation to give. This is a mixed action, and loses much of its virtue by being so.
Consult on this part of the Chapter the Books cited, and particularly,

— De Officio Hominis & Civis. Spa-van’s Translation, or the Latin Edition with Titius’s Observations.
Turnbull’s Principles of Moral Philosophy.
P. 1. C. 1.
Chap. III. Of the Freedom of the Will.

P. 2. Of the Freedom of the Will—Free Agency explained—And Man proved to be a free Agent.

Sect. I. The freedom of the Will or human Liberty has been a controversy in all ages; as well they who have opposed it, as they who have contended most earnestly for it, being sensible, that the morality, or imputableness of actions, wholly depends upon their being free. And it is no breach of charity to believe, that such as have held the negative of the question, have generally been induced to do it from this very consideration, that a man is

*Epistelus,* speaking of Liberty, has this expression. "The Gods, as was fit, have put this which is the most excellent of all things, and most kingly, in our power, *viz.* the right use of appearances; as for a power over other things, this they have not given us," which he reckons is because they could not give it. And a little after, "Discover the secret intrusted with you—I will not, for this is in my power. But I will throw you into chains if you don't—Man! What is that you say? Me will you fetter? My feet you may, but my purpose not Jupiter himself can overcome." Epist. L. i. C. i.
is not accountable for what he cannot help; and on supposition he has no Liberty, will have the more Licence. "Aristotle's πεπαρηνυσ or οὐξείς βαλευκη deliberative appetite, the το Αὐδεθηνον or self-determining power of the Greek Fathers, "Simplicius's το Αὐδωνθὴν or principle of self-motion, the "Stoics το εν ημιν or things in our power, "Cicero's libera voluntas or free Will, and the liberum arbitrium of the Schoolmen, have all of them much the same signification, and denote that self-determining principle which we find in human nature. And here, that I may set this subject in the clearest light I am able, I shall

i. State the notion of Liberty.

ii. Prove man to be a free Agent.

iii. Show that man is free as willing, from this very manifest argument, that if he is not free as willing he is not free at all; and under this head I shall have occasion to examine Mr. Locke's notion of Liberty.

iv. Fairly consider the chief difficulties and objections which cloud this subject.

Sect.
Sec. II. I shall endeavour to state the true notion of Liberty. And omitting those distinctions of it which are nothing to our present purpose, such as gospel Liberty, which stands in opposition to the bondage of the ceremonial Law, religious Liberty to the dominion of sin, and civil Liberty to slavery, with many other such like; I shall only take notice of two famous acceptations of this word, Liberty of Spontaneity, and Liberty of Indifference. Liberty of Spontaneity stands opposed to external compulsion; and accordingly a Being is then said to act spontaneously, when it is not forced upon action, contrary to the bent and inclination of its Will, at the time when the action is done. This is all the Liberty which some will allow to man. Whether they have any reason to be thus illiberal, or whether their's be the right notion of Spontaneity, will be seen presently. Liberty of Indifference is opposed to necessity, and is usually distinguished into Liberty of Contradiction, and Liberty of Contrariety. Liberty of Contradiction, or quo ad exercitium actus, in the School language, is a power to act, or not to act this or that particular way. Liberty of Contrariety, or quo ad specificatiorem actus, is a power to act this way or another. The first takes place where a single action, this latter where two or more actions are proposed.
poséd. Being at the entrance of a room, I am desired to advance to the other end of it, and have it in my power to go or not to go, this is an instance of Liberty of Contradiction. Being in the middle of a room, it is in my choice to go to one end or the other; or when several things are offered to my election, I can pitch on this or that, as I see fit; these two are instances of a Liberty of Contrariety. Though by the way, it is not very proper to explain Contrariety in so large a sense, as to comprehend instances of the same kind with this last; for when two actions are proposed, both of them good, or bad, or indifferent, as there is no specifical difference in the actions, so no Contrariety in a man's choosing one preferably to the other. And therefore I see not how it can be called Liberty of Contrariety, or as to the specification of the act. But to let that pass, it is well observed by Le Clerc that this distinction is perfectly needless, seeing Liberty of Contrariety is no more than repeating the Liberty of Contradiction upon different objects. For instance, when a person who is advised to ride for his health, chuses a journey to London rather than to Exeter; here is first a Liberty of Contradiction with respect to Exeter, the man has a power to go to Exeter or not, and he chuses not to go; then there is the same Liberty in

\[ \text{\textit{Pneumatol. \S. 1. C. 3. \S. 12.}} \]
in regard of London, he has a power to go to London or not, and he chooses to go. Upon the whole, Liberty of Indifference is a power to act or not to act in any given instance. I cannot say that this distinction of Liberty absolutely pleases me, I shall therefore represent the matter a little differently.

Sect. III. Liberty is opposed to Necessity, and varies according to the Necessity to which it is opposed. The common distinction of Necessity is into physical and moral, which I do not so well approve for several reasons, the terms internal and external do I think convey the same ideas with much more advantage. External Necessity is a Necessity imposed by some external cause. Such is the Necessity which a body is under of moving, when impelled by a superior force. In opposition to which Necessity a Being is then free in its motion, when it is moved by itself, not by the impulse of some other Being. This alone deserves the name of Spontaneity; for as Aristotle justly observes, "that is necessitated which comes from a foreign principle; that on


h Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. Ch. 1.
the contrary is spontaneous, the whole principle or efficient cause whereof is in the agent himself. For though we call those machines adaequale self moved, which contain within themselves the immediate springs of their motion, yet it is not properly or philosophically the immediate spring that is internal, but the moving cause is without. Thus the true reason why a Watch moves, is not the frame and structure of its parts, but the hand which winds it up. And it would be exactly the same as to the Will of man, if that like the wheels of the Watch moved not, till it was first pushed or by some external cause, or by some other thing in the man which was so. It might perhaps be said in this case, that the man was not under a compulsion, because the Will was carried along by the stream; but if he acted voluntarily, it is certain his action would be nevertheless necessary, and consequently not spontaneous. The addition of Reason makes no difference, any more than it would in a Clock, all whose motions, after it was endowed with a perceptive power would be the effect of the weights hanging upon it, as much as before. The concomitancy of perception or understanding attended nothing in the physical or efficient cause of action.
Sect. IV. It is the opinion of Dr. Clarke, that the actions not of Children only, but of every living creature, are in this sense all of them essentially free; wherein he follows Aristotle, whose words are, "that Spontaneity is common to Children, and all sorts of animal Beings, but without a power of judging and deliberating." This is the foundation of what he says in another place, "that beasts though they have sense are not capable of action, for as much according to him election is the principle or fountain of proper action."

That there must be such a thing somewhere as Liberty of action, in opposition to external, by others called physical Necessity, by Cicero Necessitas Fati, aut causarum series sempiterna, may be demonstrated ab absurdó, that otherwise there would be no agent or first mover in the universe, but an eternal progression or chain of effects, without any first cause of motion, which is a manifest contradiction. For if there be a first mover, he must have the original of his activity in himself, and consequently be unsubiect to any fatal or proper Necessity; the supposition of which would

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k Remarks on Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty.
2 De Fato.
would place the original or physical cause of its motion or action, not in itself, but in that which laid it under the necessity of moving or acting. That position of "Plato is certainly true, "that the beginning of "motion must be from something that is "self moved, since otherwise all nature "must stand still, without any force or "energy to put it in motion." There is at least therefore one free agent in the universe, or one Being exempt from the laws of external Necessity or Fate. A necessary agent (meaning an agent under an external Necessity) is an expression, which however ornamental some men may reckon it to their stile, is made up of two ideas that mutually destroy each other. I cannot better conclude this than in the words of * Simplicius. "They who deny to man a principle of Liberty, betray their ignorance of the nature of a human soul, by taking away its self moving power, in which consists the principal part of its essence."

Sect. V. Internal Necessity is in the same place not illy defined by Simplicius. "That which obliges all Beings to act according to their nature;" which he adds, "establishe Liberty instead of overthrowing it. θυλατησε τον Αυξανων." Opposite to this Necessity

* Phaedon. See also Cic. Tusc. Quest. I. 1. § 23.
* Comment. in Epist. C. i.
Necessity is a power indifferently of acting or not acting, unforced by the weight of nature. Not a bare possibility, or physical power of acting or not acting, for that is inseparable from the first kind of Liberty, but a moral power, that may be, and often is reduced into act. This is true Liberty of Indifference; the Liberty which I assert as belonging to man. My meaning is, that he who tells a lye is not under the same Necessity of doing it, that God is of observing the laws of truth. A self-murderer is not obliged to that unnatural act by the same Necessity, which makes a man in full possession of his Senses and Reason, and who has no temptation to put an end to his Being, to seek his own preservation. The man who robs on the highway is not necessitated thereto in the same sense, that a savage beast is when hungry to devour the harmless prey. If we compare man with the beasts, which are governed by their appetites, and under an inward impossibility of acting in any one instance otherwise than they do, this Liberty is a privilege and a perfection, as it requires a good measure of Reason. Compare him with the Supreme Being, who by the infinite perfection of his essence is perpetually determined to act conformably to the rules of the most consummate wisdom, holiness, and goodness, it must be confessed an imperfection, and to
Of the Freedom

argue the weakness of human Reason. The proof of this Liberty is the business of the next head, to which I now advance.

Sect. VI. 2. Man is a free agent, so free as to be able to do many of the actions he forbears, and to forbear many of the actions he does; not only physically, but morally able, being privileged from the sway of an internal as well as external Necessity. It is very remarkable that the Epicureans themselves, they who resolved all the actions of men into the laws of local motion, overpowered by the evidence of this truth, had not the confidence to deny human Liberty, though the concession of it be inevitably destructive of their whole scheme.

Unde est hæc, inquam, Fatis avulsa Voluntas?

faith Lucretius. "Whence is this Will, which we experience to be privileged from the empire of Fate?" For this he endeavours to account by a Clinamen Principiorum, a declination of atoms; the most ridiculous and unphilosophical imagination that ever entered into a man's head. Had we not a power over our own actions, it would follow, faith Cicero, "that neither commendations, nor reproaches, nor re-
Chap. III. of the Will.

"wards, nor punishments, would have any " just foundation." But in regard a plausible reply may be made to this argument, and we want not for others which are more unexceptionable, I shall not insist upon it ; for as to the wisdom of human rewards and punishments it may be said that they answer their ends, if they work necessarily as much as they would if men were free agents. Rorarius tells us, he saw two wolves hanging on a gibbet in the Dutchy of Juliers; and observes, that it made a greater impression on the other wolves, than the mark of a red-hot iron, to deter thieves from stealing. He likewise faith, that in Africa it is usual to nail lions to a cross, in order to terrify those of the same species. And what more common than for a dog to leave faults for which he is beaten? So that these methods are made use of as weights in a balance, to turn it this way or that. And what Myfis faith in Terence, is literally true of man in case he be only a piece of corporeal or intellectual mechanism. "While the mind " is in doubt, the most inconsiderable addi-

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Bayle's Dictionary, Article Rorarius. I find the Author of the Philosophical Inquiry applies the same observation to the same purpose; but this I did not know till some years after I noted it, and put it to this use in reading the article Rorarius in Bayle's Dictionary; from whence Accordingly I quote it, and not from Rorarius himself, as the Inquirer does.

tion of weight inclines it to either side." And as to the justice of punishments, on supposition of the Necessity of human actions, it is easily accounted for, by saying, that the same Necessity that is pleaded by the criminal for committing a fault, the magistrate, or any one else, hath a right to plead for punishing it. He that judges, and he that is judged, are alike the servants of Fate. Therefore Zeno, when his slave was caught in a piece of theft, and argued ad hominem, that it was his fate to steal, without going off from his own principles, replies, "Very true, thou wast fated to play the rogue, and I am fated to see thee whipped for it." To prevent all cavils therefore, I shall argue from two considerations which cannot be so easily evaded; one of them taken from the Perfections of God, the other from every man's own Conscience.

Sect. VII. 1. God being infinitely just, cannot punish actions which are not deserving of punishment; as it is certain none of those actions can be which proceed from Necessity. Being infinitely wise and good, if he interwove in the contexture of human nature a Necessity of acting one way, it would be that way which is most agreeable to Reason, most for the benefit of mankind, and

and most consonant to his own Will. That mankind act irregularly in a thousand instances, or so as to violate the laws of Reason, Religion, and the Civil Society, is a matter of fact not to be disputed. The only question is, whether they can avoid acting in this manner? Grant me that they can, and I have gained my point; since they will then do what they have a power to forbear: deny it, and you are obliged to hold, that the first cause is the source of all evil, i.e. that sin and folly are the necessary productions of infinite goodness and wisdom, which is a manifest contradiction. "The whole system of the universe, says a late Writer, "is the care of God, and all other inferior "Beings must be subordinate to the interest "of this great one, and all contribute, in "their several stations and actions, to bring "about at last the grand purposes of his "Providence." But will he pretend to say, that lying, fraud, intemperance, inhumanity, oppression, and the like practices, have in their nature a tendency to promote the good of intelligent Beings; and cannot therefore, in the order of causes, be dispensed with by him who guides the whole design? This were to make these things good, and not evil, in opposition to universal Reason and Experience. Or will any one contend, that

"The Author of the British Journal in 1722, under the Name of Diogenes."
that particular societies, and consequently the general system which comprehends them all, would not enjoy more harmony, peace and happiness, if they who compose them were universally just, temperate, grateful, kind, and beneficent? And why then are they not all these, but too often the direct contrary? The common answer, that man being at present in a state of trial for the happiness of a future life, is therefore left to his Liberty to do good or evil, is a plain and rational solution of the difficulty: whereas the opinion that men are inevitably betrayed into all these mischiefs by a concatenation of causes, overthrows at once the idea of an eternal mind, and of moral perfections, establishing in their stead a blind unintelligent matter, as the original of all things. Did we see an universal regularity and consistency in the actions of rational creatures; were they all uniformly virtuous, conducted by Reason, and levelled at one certain end, the common interest and welfare of the whole; there might be then some little colour for doubt, whether they were not under a Necessity, like that which retains the heavenly bodies in their several courses, which they perform with an amazing order and constancy, one age after another. But, for certain, wisdom cannot be the spring of an unequal, freakish, and contradictory conduct: the origin of all good can never necessitate his creatures
ures to do evil. Nor can the patrons of his opinion escape by saying, that God himself is a necessary agent; that he could not but create man with an invincible bias to transgress his laws, and cannot but punish him for transgressing them, though without any fault of his. For whence should this Necessity arise? Not from any thing without him, because he would not be then the first and independent Being; not from his own nature, which, containing in itself the most perfect wisdom, justice, and goodness, cannot, without the most evident absurdity, be supposed forcing him to act in direct opposition to all these perfections.

Sect. VIII. 2. There is that in every man which we call *Conscience, which approves him for having done an honest, generous, or benevolent action, and which becks him in the commission of an ill action, reproaches him having done it, fills him with secret blame, with bitter reflections, with smarting anguish, and foreboding fears: his Conscience, natural to all, is an incontrovertible argument of the same Liberty; for what does all this signify less than a sense or consciousness not to be suppressed, of his being the free author of his actions, and justly accountable for the good or evil which is in them. This judgment, we pass upon our

our own actions, and the actions of others, is natural and unavoidable; 'tis therefore the voice of the Author of our frame, by which he tells us we are free and accountable, proper subjects of praise or blame, and consequently of reward or punishment. When we have resisted a strong temptation of interest or pleasure, which would have seduced us to fraud or injustice, we naturally approve ourselves, and look upon ourselves as approved of God, and qualified for his favour but were we not free, we could no more reasonably thus approve ourselves, or esteem ourselves as approved of God, for being in this good temper, and acting with integrity and benevolence, than for being, without any care of our own, in a good state of health, and endowed with a happy vigour of mind and body. We should be delighted with it as a happiness, and are hereby qualified to do more good; but do not approve ourselves for it, or think ourselves ever the more qualified for the approbation or reward of the Deity. Do not mankind agree in distinguishing between natural endowments, and acquired moral excellencies? But what room for this distinction, and the different regards paid to these, if both were alike the necessary result of our constitution, and the circumstances wherein God hath placed us; and justice, mercy, or piety were as entirely the gifts of God, as strength of body, or pene-
penetration of mind? On the other hand, when we have been guilty of actions of known falsehood, ingratitude, treachery, inhumanity, profaneness, and the like, and coolly reflect upon them, we naturally and necessarily reproach and condemn ourselves, and apprehend a wise and righteous God will condemn us; we wish we had not done these actions, and resolve for the future to forbear them. These are the natural sentiments of every mind not abandoned to vice, coolly reflecting on actions of this kind; but were we conscious to ourselves, and were this the real truth, that in such circumstances we could not avoid thinking and acting as we did, and could not before avoid these circumstances, any more than a mad man in the height of distraction, who would condemn himself for any thing he had thought or done; and who reasonably fear the displeasure and condemnation of a wise and just God, who knew our frame, and who knew himself to be the real author of all the dispositions and actions necessarily arising out of the constitution he had formed us with, and the circumstances wherein he had placed us? Repentance and self-condemnation evidently and necessarily suppose we could have acted otherwise. Since therefore these are the natural sentiments and judgments of our minds upon our own actions, and we thus naturally judge of the actions and
and characters of others; since these sentiments and these judgments are in a greater or less degree natural to mankind, and unavoidably formed and entertained by them, either the author of the human frame, by our make, necessarily determines us to judge falsely of actions and characters, and then farewell to all certainty in speculative truths as well as moral; or we are free, capable of omitting the good actions we practice, or doing the ill actions we forbear, or abstaining from the vices we indulge. We as naturally approve and condemn ourselves as the proper authors of our good or ill actions, as we assent to the proportions of numbers, or of lines and figures. Could mankind be universally deceived in this natural, universal, moral judgment of themselves and their actions, they might be deceived in the clearest determinations of their Reason in all other cases. It is no more unworthy our Maker or inconsistent with his perfections, to determine us to judge falsely in speculative, than in moral Propositions; and all truth and certainty must then be given up for a gloomy restless scepticism.

If it should be said, that there is no need of granting more than a freedom of the first kind, or a self-motive power, to take away the force of these arguments; I answer this is evidently a mistake; since, upon this supposition, the continued aversion of the mind
mind from God and goodness, in the worst of mankind, would be as innocent as the desire of happiness, because equally necessary. Yea, this notion would throw the blame of all the evil which is done in the world on God, who in the constitution of men has made it morally impossible, and could therefore never design they should act otherwise than they do. Let ten thousand Beings be framed exactly alike, and be put into the same circumstances, both inward and outward, if they have no more than a Liberty of Spontaneity, it is certain they will all act after the same manner. Blame not therefore a thief for taking away your money, accuse him not of injustice; for he may say, that he has done no more than you yourself, than any man, than any Being in the universe, if framed as he was by God, by nature, and education, and situated like him, would have done.

SECT. IX. This being so, I know not how to subscribe to what Dr. Clarke says. "That the difference between men and beasts is only this, that in man physical Liberty is joined with a sense, or consciousness of moral good and evil, and is therefore eminently called Liberty. In beasts the same physical Liberty, or self-moving power, is wholly separate from a sense, or"
or consciousness, or capacity of judging of moral good or evil, and is vulgarly called Spontaneity. In Children the same physical Liberty always is from the very beginning; and in proportion as they increase in age, and in capacity of judging, they grow continually in degree not more free, but moral agents.” On the contrary, I beg leave to say, that the whole difference between men and beasts is not a mere consciousness of moral good and evil, which these latter want, and the other have; but that the chief difference lies herein, that the Will being joined in men with a reasoning faculty, is capable hereby of determining itself different ways in every circumstance of life, which it is morally impossible for the soul of a brute (if brutes have souls) to do. The only difference between Children, and those come to years of Understanding, is not, that these last have a better capacity of judging than the former, but they are likewise more free; I mean in opposition to internal Necessity. This Liberty increases in proportion to the capacity of judging for some time; but as this capacity approaches to perfection, supposing the virtuous disposition of the mind to improve with its knowledge, this Liberty lessens again; the degree of it being mostly regulated by the proportion there is between the Reason and the Inclinations of the soul.
Books proper to be consulted on this part of the third Chapter are, besides the Books cited,


of his Works.


Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. Prop. 9 & 10.

—His Remarks on Collins of Liberty and Necessity.

Jackson on Liberty.

Dr. Watts of Freedom of Will in God, and in Creatures.

CHAP. III.

P. 3. That the Will is free---And an examination of Mr. Locke's notion of Liberty.

SECT. I. III. HAVING proved man to be a free agent, I now proceed to prove, that the Will is free; because this expression is scrupled by some (and I have no inclination to contend about words) that man is free, as willing which I prove by this very manifest reason: that if a man be not free as willing, he is not free at all. Liberty is radical in the Will, and not in the Understanding, according to the opinion and language of the Schools. That I reckon to be the root of Liberty, in which it has its firm and immediate residence. Now it is certain, that all the operations of the Understanding are necessary, by means either of the object, or of the Will. The object idea being presented, perception, the act of the Understanding, is as inevitable as vision is when the eye is open, and nothing requisite to sight wanting. A man may will
his eyes, or turn them off to some other object; and so the soul has a power of refusing or diverting its attention; but then this power is not in the Understanding itself, but in that faculty which commands its attention to this or another idea; with which command the Understanding cannot but comply, unless where the object is too hard for the Will, and by raising the passions to a great height, chains down the attention of the mind to itself. Too hard, I say, for the Will; for what is it but the Will that commands the doing or forbearing of actions, both mental and bodily?

**Sect. II.** The Will, as has been shown before, is the necessitating, and denominating principle of action; that which makes an action to exist that is in our power, and that which gives to every action its moral tincture and quality. Reason indeed is necessary to the imputableness of an action, *Causa fines nua non*, but no more. The bare perception or knowledge of good and evil has nothing in it either laudable or criminal; but where Reason is not, no action in a proper or moral sense may be said to be voluntary. A Fool in his anger kills a man, the natural action in this case he wills, but not the moral, which alone is forbidden by the Law. For what the Law forbids and will punish, a man's killing another without a sufficient
ent cause, who knows, or might have known, the Law forbidding such actions. To which I might add, that without Reason the Will has not its moral Liberty, but is under a kind of necessity of determining itself by the sensations, passions, and inclinations of the soul. So that after all, the Will is the prime principle of moral actions.

Sect. III. Upon which I proceed to argue thus, that if the Will be the principle of moral actions, it is free; or the man is free as willing. For 1. It is undeniable that Liberty alone makes an action imputable, or worthy of reward or punishment. The consequence of this is, that if the Will be not free, it is quite absurd to denominate actions from the Will. It differs little from a contradiction to say, that an action is therefore good or bad because free, and it is good or bad because voluntary, and yet a voluntary it is not free. And again, if Liberty be what qualifies an action, and man is not free in the acts of his Will, meer act of the Will must always be indifferent; and it would be the greatest nonsense to commend a person because he would have done well, or to censure him because had he been able, he would have proved himself a villain. 2. If the principle be not free, neither are the actions that flow from that principle; and so no thing
thing of Liberty will be left to human actions. For if they are free, it must be absolutely, or relatively, in themselves, or with relation to their principle. Absolutely or in themselves considered they cannot, because necessarily determined to exist by the Will. Inquiry being made, why a person does not effect this or that, it is always answered, either because he could not, or because he would not; between these two there is no medium. If he could and did it not, all mankind agree that he did not will it. If he would have done it but did not, that it was because he could not. So that all our actions, excepting those of the Will itself, are not free absolutely and in themselves; and if the opinion of certain Gentlemen be admitted, they are not more free in the Will than their principle; and when neither free in themselves nor in their principle, it is utterly impossible they should be free at all. This, I say, is the consequence if man be not free as willing; but that he is free has been demonstrated, therefore as willing he is free.

Sect. IV. a Mr. Locke treats the Liberty of the Will as a solecism and absurdity; but let us try whether his notion of freedom be more consistent and rational. “Liberty, “ says this great man, is a power to act or O 3 “ not

not to act, according to the preference of the mind or Will. Thus also b Hobbs. The question is not, whether man be a free agent, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, acc- cording to his Will." c Tully's reflection upon Epicurus's Philosophy concerning the Gods, is justly applicable to this account of Liberty; Verbis ponit, re tollit; "it allows " it in words, but really takes it away." Liberty is a power to act or not to act." Had Mr. Locke stopped here, the definition would have been tolerable; but it follows, " according to the preference of the mind " or Will. In respect of which preference he says more than once or twice, " that a man " is not free." Of this notion of Liberty I have the following things to remark.

Sect. V. I. He that affirms the Will not to be free, but only the actions flowing from it, must confine rewards and punish- ments to these; infomuch that though a man hath a Will to be charitable, and is not of ability; or to commit a murther, for which he wants opportunity, he is neither to be praised or blamed, because here is nothing of Liberty. A preference of the Will there is, but that signifies nothing at all, as long as Liberty lies not in that, but  

c De Fato.
a power to act or not to act according to that preference. " Suppose a man to be carried while fast asleep into a room, where is a person he longs to see and speak with, and be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable company, in which he stays willingly, i.e. prefers his stay to going away." This stay is voluntary, says Mr. Locke, and yet it is not free. Yes, I answer, it may be free in its principle, by which I mean, that a man may be free to will or not to will his stay. For a little to change the instance, et us suppose a man locked into a room in company with a tempting Harlot, who employs all her charms and cunning to draw him into sin; and that he prefers to stay here. I ask, whether he be free in this preference or not? If not, he is guilty of no fault therein, since no action can be culpable that is not free. If he be free, then it follows, that he has a power to will or not to will his stay; in other words, that he is free as willing.

Sect. VI. 2. There is a notorious fallacy in the words. " A power to act or not to act, according to the preference of the mind" or Will, seems to imply a Liberty of Indifference; but supposing withal that

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the Will is not free, there is nothing less. Whatever is the necessary effect of a necessary principle must itself be necessary. This to me is self-evident. There may it is true be a kind of conditional Indifference, but the condition on which it is suspended being an impossible one, it ought not to be accounted a proper Indifference. I take up Mr. Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding, and read therein, with a power at the same time not to have read him; supposing I had willed not to have read him. You see here a conditional Indifference, a power not to have done the action I did, on condition I had willed not to have done it; which in the conclusion is no better than trifling with words, since if I am not free to will the no reading him, I am not free not to read him but must necessarily read him, as the unavoidable effect of my necessarily willing or preferring to read him.

Sect. VII. 3. Allowing this conditional Indifference the name of a Liberty of Indifference, it belongs to a man as willing, no less than as considering or moving. That which determines the Will in its choice Mr. Locke thinks, is the greatest uneasiness it lies under. Be it so; I have then a power to will or not to will an action, according as the uneasiness I am under determines my Will one way or the other. Ay—but the
uneasiness irresistibly carries the Will one way—Let it be granted; yet still I had a power not to have willed this, or to have willed the contrary, in case the uneasiness had lain on that side. So that if a conditional Indifference must pass for a proper Indifference, the actions of the Will must have their share of it, as well as other actions. Upon the whole, you may judge whither Mr. Locke's definition of Liberty leads, it evidently concludes all mankind under an inflexible Fate. This, I say, is the natural consequence of Mr. Locke's notion of Freedom, though I will not say that Mr. Locke himself was a Fatalist. At first sight one would take him to be altogether orthodox; for in one place he says, "A " man has a power to consider, or not to " consider;" and in another, that " he has " a power to suspend his judgment;" and herein he makes the true Liberty of man to consist. These are fair concessions, but will not stand with his denial of Liberty to the Will. " Rational Liberty is a power " to consider or not to consider;" this definition being imperfect, I shall fill it up out of his general definition of Liberty; a power to consider or not to consider, according to the preference of the Will; as indeed that which orders that a thing shall be considered or not, is nothing else but the Will. And would Mr. Locke allow this preference of
of the Will to be free, we should ask no more; but what he says is, that the Will is not free, that is, a man is not free to will, or prefer to consider, or not to consider. Upon the whole it appears, from a Letter of Mr. Locke to his Friend Mr. Molyneux, some passages of which I shall subjoin, that Mr. Locke believed the free-agency of man, but being mistaken as to the principle of Liberty in man, he was unable to satisfy himself when he endeavoured to explain or account for it. His words are. "But if you will argue for or against Liberty from consequences, I will not undertake to answer you, for I own freely to you, the weakness of my understanding; that though it be unquestionable that there is Omnipotence and Omniscience in God our Maker, and I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing, than that I am free, yet I cannot make Freedom in men consistent with Omnipotence and Omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both, as of any truths I most firmly assent to. And therefore I have long since given off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion—That if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it."

CHAP. III.

P. 4. The principal Objections against the Liberty of the Will represented and answered.

Sect. I. HAVING finished three of the Inquiries relating to the Will, according to my method, I am

iv. To consider the principal objections and difficulties attending this subject; and the

1st. Is taken from Hobbs and Spinoza, and affects the possibility of Liberty. "Every effect is produced by some cause, which for this very reason, that it is sufficient to produce the effect, produces it necessarily; inasmuch as supposing it not actually to have produced it, it would not have been sufficient. Now the Will is determined by some external cause, which cause is sufficient, and does therefore necessarily and inevitably determine it." But

a See also a good answer to this objection in an Essay towards demonstrating the immateriality and free agency, &c. C. 11. §. 12, 13, 14.
if this be not begging the question, it is impossible there should be any such thing; for who among the asserters of the Freedom of the Will, was ever so unadvised as to acknowledge, that the Will is perpetually determined by external causes? On the contrary, ask any of them, and they will tell you, that this faculty determines itself by a power originally inherent in it. With regard to the voluntary motions of the mind, we are not to look for an external cause, it being the nature of these to be in our own power. Nor must it be therefore said that they are without a cause; for the cause is no other than the nature of the agent. These are the words of b Cicero, who has likewise something relating to the notion of a cause which is well worth quoting. "That is the true cause of a thing, which efficaciously produces it, as a wound of death or indigestion of a disease; and therefore this term is not to be so explained, as if whatever was antecedent to any thing was its cause; sed quod efficienter antecedat, but what efficaciously precedes it." It may be previously requisite, that there be some circumstances accompanying the action to engage the consent of the Will; notwithstanding which it continues true, that the Will is not physically moved by them, but freely moves

b Cic. De Fato. § 12, & 15.
Chap. III. Liberty of the Will.

moves itself in view of them. Or in case, for argument's sake, we should grant them what they will never be able to prove, that the Will is determined by something from without, will it from hence follow, that it is irresistibly determined? Not at all. For though in regard of Beings who have not a self-motive power, every cause which is sufficient to impel them, must necessarily impel them as often as it is exerted; (as if I had strength to lift any given weight, and made trial of my strength for that very end, the weight will unavoidably be removed out of its place) yet from instances of this nature to infer the necessity of the Will's following the impulse of every cause, which is sufficient to put it in action, is not less absurd, than if we should say, that because a weaker man is able to lift or throw a stronger than himself, provided the stronger man will make no resistance, he can therefore do the same, though the stronger made all the opposition in his power. The Will has this resisting power, by which it can prevent the efficacy of those causes which (I at present deny not) would determine it, on condition the Will would suffer itself to be determined by them.

Sect. II. 2. It is objected, the Will must yield itself to the greatest appearing good; because otherwise it would embrace evil as evil,
evil, which is utterly impossible: and how an object shall appear, whether good or bad, better or worse, is not at the pleasure of the Will, which must take things just as they are offered by the Understanding: and though the Poet makes Medea say,

—video meliora, proboque;
Deteriora sequor—
others will tell you, Omnis peccans est ignorans, the sinner is always ignorant of the evil of what he does. The more common way of expressing the objection is this, that the Will in all its determinations necessarily follows the ultimate dictate of the practical Understanding. To this I shall not answer, by assuming Mr. Locke's opinion, that the Will is always determined by the most pressing uneasiness, and not by the appearance of the greatest good; for did this always hold true, there could be no such thing as voluntary martyrdom. The desire of ease, and the uneasiness created by its absence, or rather by the presence of pain, would not fail to determine the Will to whatever expedients would deliver the sufferers from their torments, even though the only method should be

c See also a good answer to this objection in the Essay just quoted. C. 11. §. 15. and fol.
d Ovid. Met. L. 7.
be the abjuration of their Religion. Whereas this is opposed by matter of fact; many having cheerfully given their bodies to be burned, and sealed their faith with their blood; in which glorious conflict, that which gave them this courage was not uneasiness of any kind, but the joy they felt arising in themselves from the assured hope and expectation of a blessed immortality. Neither shall I reply, as some do, that what is usually called the last dictate of the Understanding, is in truth no other than an act of the Will, wherein I cannot at present agree with them. There are three acts of the mind as conversant about human actions; the first when it pronounces concerning an action that it is a proper means for the attainment of such or such an end; the next, that upon the whole it is an action which ought to be done; or lastly, it faith, let this action be done. The two former are acts of the Understanding, the last of the Will. What is usually called the last dictate of the Understanding, to me appears to be nothing else but perception, either distinct or confused, brighter or more obscure, and therefore plainly an operation of the Understanding; though that it is final and directory, or that the mind rests satisfied in it, is generally chargeable on the Will, which has a power to put the Understanding on a closer view of things than men commonly content them-
themselves with. And this indeed seems to be the original cause of mens confounding these two faculties, attributing to one what belongs to the other.

I as little like Bishop King's hypothesis; Potentiae activae ea natura est quae objectum actu suo sibi conveniens, i.e. bonum efficiat, &c. that the nature of an active power is such, as by singling out any thing for its object, by the very act to make it convenient for it, or good; for in this case the goodness of the object does not precede the act of election, but the election is the efficient or original of the goodness which is in the object; that is, a thing pleases, because it is chosen; not chosen, because it pleases. Not to strike at the foundation of this notion, by shewing, that things are good or evil independently of the Will, its absurdity is from hence apparent, that admitting the truth of the assertion, there can be no such thing as a wrong choice; forasmuch as the choice of any thing whatsoever, creates a goodness where it was not before. That Author indeed faith, "Whoever knowingly chooses what he cannot enjoy, or what will occasion unnecessary trouble to himself or another, "may be reckoned to have made an unwise election." This is very true in itself, because that which cannot be injoyed, is not good to be chosen; and that which has evil conse-

* De Origine Mali. pag. 118, 145, 147.
consequences, which more than balance the foregoing pleasure, is really evil, and this antecedently to the election of the Will. But though this be true in itself, it is not so upon our Author's supposition, which makes things to be good, not in themselves, but because they are willed; and when he comes afterwards to assign the causes of improper elections, he manifestly abandons his first position, and brings the matter back to the common way of solution.

Sect. III. Not approving these answers, I shall offer some other considerations to remove the difficulty. I say therefore,

1. It is not true, that in every action a man performs, he has two goods in view; the greatest of which, according to the present appearance, he chooses, and rejects the least. But oftentimes appetite and inclination lean towards a certain particular, and this the man makes choice of without further deliberation; whereas he ought to have compared it with other goods which are greater, and with which it might have been found inconsistent. This it was possible for him to have done, and by this means to have avoided the action. The inclination of the sensualist is to his bottle, and his bottle-companions; and these, without any further thought of the matter, he takes the first opportunity to enjoy, and comes off

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Objections against the Part II.

with the loss of his senses; when, had he duly considered the hazard he ran of depriving himself of far better and more lasting pleasures, he might have prevented this excess. You will be apt to interpose here, that he could not make a comparison of the pleasures of a debauch, with the advantages of sobriety, without thinking of both. He could not think of them but one of these two ways, either by their presenting themselves to his mind, without seeking for them, or by his willing to think of them; the former was not in his power, as every body must own; nor the latter, because he could not will to think of them, but he must have actually thought of them before. I answer, there may be a general reluctance of conscience not grounded in particular thoughts; and were this reluctance more heeded, it would quickly conduct a man into a more close and serious consideration of the matter. And even when a person makes not the least reflection upon the nature of the action, it may be his own fault that he does not. Sometimes, perhaps often in his life, he has had thoughts of God, and of another world pressing into his mind; which thoughts he entertained and pursued them as he might have done, would have raised his passions in respect of moral good and evil and the passions once raised, are a mighty help to the memory. Did a man carry about
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with him an awful habitual sense of God and Eternity, the thought would return upon every occasion, and be a restraint from many actions, upon which, for want of this thought, he is not afraid to venture.

2. In actions where a comparison is made between two goods, the Will is not necessarily determined to the choice of that which appears to be the greater. Either,

1. Because though it has the appearance of the greater good at present, yet my mind tells me, that a further examination of it might possibly discover the contrary; so that the Will is not forced upon it. Or,

2. Because the greater good is absent, and so does not kindle the desire to the same degree as the lesser, which is present, and which the man flatters himself will not interfere with the acquisition of the greater. In short, the inclination to a lesser good because present, and a presumptuous hope that it will not disappoint him of the greater; and at the same time the idea of the greater good, and a consciousness that if the matter were thoroughly searched into, the lesser might prove irreconcilable with the greater; do upon the whole leave the Will a power of declaring on either side; so that, in such instances, there is not what we can properly call an ultimate dictate of the Understanding, but rather two cotemporary views, which leave the Will in suspense.

P 2

3. Man
3. Man is made up of two parts, an animal and a rational, each of which has its desires and propensions apart to itself. Those belonging to the former are generally the most vehement and importunate, and frequently prevail with the Will to act in defiance of Reason, which, at the very instant we close with an object, enters its protest against it, and warns us of the ill consequences that will probably attend the choice. I say probably; because a certain knowledge or persuasion, that misery will unavoidably follow that particular choice, seems to put it out of our power to make it. Nor do we thus will evil as evil; for though the Will be on the side of the lesser good, yet it is not considered as the lesser good, or for its own sake, but because of the strong and furious inclination which we experience in ourselves towards that good. This inclination is what, pro hic & nunc, we are not able to hinder, though it be in our power to refuse the gratification of it. This is much the same with Mr. Locke's uneasiness. A man finds himself uneasy in the absence of those sensual objects, to which by nature or habit he is passionately inclined; as there is likewise a great deal of uneasiness in crossing his desires; which is the reason that men are too often governed by lust and appetite, in opposition to the plain dictates of the mind. Yet though uneasiness does often influence the Will in its choice,
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choice, it has not always the same effect; since if this were so, there would be no examples of actions done counter to inclination; which on the contrary, is the case of every good man; that which puts the emphasis on his virtue, being the opposition it meets with from his inclinations. And that this uneasiness does not always determine the Will, is a good argument, that when it does, it is not necessarily. Upon the whole, we are capable of two sorts of pleasures, the pleasures of right acting, and the pleasures of indulging to the appetites and passions of the animal life: either of these pleasures are a sufficient motive to action, since the Will can determine itself in favour of either; that when they come in competition, the Will prefers the pleasures of indulged appetite and passion, to the pleasures of right acting, and the reward and happiness consequent upon it, is entirely owing to itself, because it will. To ask a good justifying reason for this wrong choice, is to ask what is impossible to be given. The physical cause of the wrong choice and action is the Will, the motive to it is the sensual pleasure or indulgence. It is our fault when we thus determine and choose wrong; since it is a matter of daily experience and observation, that we can, and often do, determine otherwise; and see it done by others in great numbers, by all the wise and good.

P 3  Sect.
Objections against the Part II.

Sect. IV. 3. We are called upon to reconcile the divine Prescience with human Liberty; to get clear of which difficulty, some have disowned one of these, some the other. Some have contended for God's foreknowledge of human actions; but at once to obviate all objections, have said, that there is nothing of contingency in them. Others aver, that the contingency of human actions is essential to the morality of them; but at the same time judging it a contradiction, that any action should be free which God certainly foreknows, have therefore denied a certain foreknowledge of future contingencies. These, to me, seem both of them extremes, and do not untie but cut the knot. The truth lying in the middle between them, involves us in these two difficulties.

1. How the actions of mankind can be free, on supposition God foreknows them?

2. How it is possible God should foreknow them, supposing they are free?

1. How actions certainly foreknown by God can be free? Does not divine Prescience necessitate the existence of its object? My answer is, that the knowledge of things future differs not in this respect from the knowledge of things past, or present. For, as things must be past, in order to their being known to be past, and present e're they can be known to be present, so they must be
be future before they can be foreknown as such. Things are not future because they are foreknown, but foreknown because future. Knowledge, which is an immanent act, can have no proper direct influence upon things external and future. And if we narrowly examine the nature of this objection against Liberty, we shall find it to be no way lessened in its force, by laying aside the supposition of any such thing as Prescience; as thus, the action I did the last minute, or that I shall do the next, was future from all eternity; and what was from eternity future, seems to be fixed and immutable in the train of events, and is really as much so as if foreknown. The same answer will serve both, that an action being in its nature contingent, the futurity and foreknowledge of it must be conformable to its nature. Knowledge must regard the real nature of things known; it has been proved, that human actions are free; they must therefore if foreknown, be foreknown as free; for to know an action to be what it is not, is a contradiction, it is not knowledge but mistake; because it is future and foreknown, it will be certainly, but not necessarily, because, being contingent, it might not have been future, and consequently not foreknown. It is the free determination of the Will in time, that is the ground of its being future from eternity. The same answer
may be applied to a like way of reasoning quoted from Chryssipus by h Cicero, "that every axiom or proposition relating to the "future is true or false; and that whatever is "true must be certain; and that whatever is "certain must be necessary, which will intro- "duce necessity and fate." This, I say, is but a different representation of the same objection, and is to be answered after the same manner as that before. Let me, however, add, that if foreknowledge and certainty, in relation to future actions, really proved necessity, we must give up certainty and foreknowledge; and if a free action be really impossible to be foreknown, it is no more a diminution of the divine Omniscience not to know what is impossible to be known, than of his Omnipotence not to work contradictions, which are in truth nothing, no objects of power.

2. Supposing the freedom of human actions, how can God certainly foreknow them? A satisfactory account of this is, I doubt, a thing to be despailed of. The theory seems to exceed the reach of human Understanding, "i and therefore Carneades "would say, that Apollo himself could not "foretel things future, unless they were such "whose causes were so contained in the nature "of things, that it was necessary they should "be."
“be;” and he, upon the same account, “denied that things past, of which there were no signs or footsteps left, were known to this fortune-telling god.” Now, though I can easily consent that Apollo should be excluded from this super-eminent perfection of knowing and predicting future contingencies, I must needs assert it as the glory of the true God, whose Understanding being infinite, is infinitely above our comprehension, and may have ways of knowing things wholly inconceivable by us.

Sect. V. I shall close this dissertaiton of human Freedom with an observation, that the doctrine of Fate is commonly the refuge of the slothful and the vicious.—To be virtuous and wise requires no little pains; to save which, men have thought of a shorter way, and thrown all upon Fate; proceeding either from a concatenation of causes, or an unconditional decree of God; and while they swim down the lazy stream of ease and pleasure, would fain persuade themselves that they are carried along by the resistless torrent of Necessity. The ancient philosophers were therefore wont to call this asyνος λογος the idle reason; because, if pursued, it would numb all the faculties, and introduce an absolute torpor and indolence into human life. But people are wiser than to have any regard

* Cicer. De Fato. §. 12.
regard to this reason in their common affairs, and when the safety or interest of the body are visibly concerned; and have we not upon this sufficient ground to question them, why they do not plead Fate here as well as in other cases, and starve themselves, &c. out of Necessity, as well as suffer themselves to be the fools or knaves of Fate? Chrysip pus's distinction will not save them, of things simple and copulate, or consfatalia. They make use of a Physician for their health, because one is as fatal as the other; and so they would have used the means leading to Virtue and Wisdom, if they had been fated to be wise and virtuous. This excuse of theirs is abundantly exposed, by only taking notice of the lucky concurrence of their Fate and their Inclination. Are they threatened with a mortal distemper? The Physician is immediately sent for, and all his prescriptions are submitted to, however nauseous and unacceptable. The health and peace of their minds are in equal danger; and the instruction of good Books, a habit of thinking and meditation, and the exercises of Virtue and Religion, much more infallible cures than any Recipes of the Doctor, and yet are neglected. Their liquor is poisoned, and they refrain drinking; the pleasures of sin kill as effectually, and more terribly, and yet they will not deny themselves. Their Reason is of

\[1\] Cicer. De Fato. §. 13.
chap. III.  *Liberty of the Will.*

If considerable service to them in the concerns of a corruptible body, and a perishing life, but of none at all to make them find a more important interest, and to direct them in the management of it. All this shows that their *Fate* is nothing else but their *sloth* and *sensuality*, their love of the body and the world; and that these men might, if they would, what *Tatian* says concerning the *Christians*, 

\[\varepsilon \nu \mu \alpha \rho \mu \rho \nu \mu \nu \nu \varsigma \alpha \nu \tau \eta \rho \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \iota \lambda \iota \omicron \eta \varsigma \omicron \varsigma \nu \varsigma\] 

superior to their *Fate*.

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*m* Orat. ad Græcos. § 4.

consult on this Part of the Chapter, besides the Authors referred to under the second Part,

*Cartesi Meditat.* 4.

*King De Origine Mali.*


Papers between *Clarke* and *Leibnitz*; and the Treatise subjoined to them.
Chap. IV.

Of the external Principles of human Actions, God, Angels, and Men.

Sect. I. The external principles of human actions, are God, Angels, and Men.

1. God, as the supreme and universal cause, has some interest and concern in the actions of mankind; though wherein it consists, and how far it reaches, be not well agreed. The causality of God is either common or special. The common or universal causality of God extends to all actions alike; the special is restrained to some certain kinds of actions.

2. The common causality of God is either remote or proximate. The remote causality of God consists in his creating, and continually preserving a substance, and its power of acting. Durandus and his followers assert, that this is the only causality universally necessary. Perhaps there is no absolute need of supposing all this. For if the preservation of a substance be meant, kind of continued and successive creation,
of human Actions.

effe<ive volition that it remain in being, in the absence whereof it would presently all back into nothing, it is hard to conceive in what the necessity of this should be founded. If there be such a necessity, it must proceed from a supposed tendency of all created Beings to become nothing; which inclination in something to become nothing, is to me, I confess, equally difficult to apprehend, as an inclination in nothing to become something. And then if y preserving the power of action be intended an express volition to that purpose, without which this power would immediately cease, my Reason does not instruct me in ny absolute necessity there is of this neither in all human actions. For instance, in the licit acts of the Will, a power once communicated to a simple uncompounded substance, as the soul of man is thought to be, must continue in that substance, any created thing notwithstanding, that may threaten destruction. Nor can it be imagined here should be a natural tendency in it to cease; for whence should such a tendency arise? That there may be need of invigo- rating and regulating the intellectual powers of human nature, especially as according to the present laws of union, they are made dependent on a compounded animal body, I readily acknowledge; but withal add, that this

* See Baxter of the Soul. Sect. II.
Of the external Principles Part II
this is requisite to the soul merely as in union with a body, or to vivid and good action only, not simply to all actions.

Sect. II. Besides this remote causality of God regulating all actions, he may be said to be the remote cause of human actions in another sense, as the external motives to action are all from him. Thus he is said to harden Pharaoh's heart, because the hardness of his heart was the effect of those circumstances in which God had placed him his sending the plagues upon him, and so after removing them again. Not that it was the necessary effect, for then Pharaoh has been no way culpable; nor that God put him into those circumstances with a design that they should corrupt him. He knew they would be abused by him, but he did not will that abuse.

Sect. III. The proximate causality of God is his contributing to the action by an immediate efficiency, distinct from a bare conservation of the power. This is the causality generally espoused; but, if I may venture to speak my mind freely, is so far from necessary, as to intangle the asserters of it in very manifest blunder. For if the power be preserved in its vigour, what can be imagined further needful to action? If a further

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additional influence be necessary, it will not be an active power, much less a natural power of action, which is the name given to it. A power to act, and clogged with no manner of impediments, yet not able to exert itself, is really a power and no power, which is a plain contradiction. In behalf of this proximate causality an argument is squeezed from that well known maxim, *Modus operandi sequitur modum essendi*, “the manner of acting must be conformable to the manner of existing;” which if true, because the substance is immediately from God, must infer the actions to be so too. To this I need only say, that the maxim is in the general very true, that the substance being dependent upon God, all its actions must of consequence be dependent. But if any one will take this maxim to conclude, that the manner of dependence is altogether the same, I make no scruple to deny it. The Being has God for its immediate cause, for this very good reason, that there is no middle cause to produce it; whereas no such reason will hold for the actions being the immediate effect of the first cause, but the direct contrary; another cause being here pre-existent and presupposed, namely a power of action planted in the substance by God himself.

Sect.
Sect. IV. The title whereby this \textit{proximate} causality, nay and the \textit{remote} too, is known in the Schools, is God's \textit{concurrence} or \textit{co-operation} with his creatures; but you may be easily made sensible, that it is not properly so called, being distinguished into \textit{simultaneous} and \textit{antecedent}, the latter of which can by no means submit to be so termed. God's \textit{simultaneous} causality is his influencing the action in company with the creature, without influencing the creature itself. This influence, as commonly explained, is in itself loose and indifferent, and determined to particular actions by the \textit{second cause}. That God concurs after this manner to the actions of his creatures, was once a pretty general opinion, the patrons of which were not inconsiderable. Of this party I could never make one, were it for nothing else, but that I find it impossible so far to abstact the action from the agent, as to conceive, that the one may be influenced without affecting the other. As well may I contribute to the motion of a body, without any way operating upon that body. There can be no action supposed, where there is not some agent; and for the same reason, no one can be the cause of the action, but either by being the agent himself, or by influencing the Being who is so. An action supposed to proceed from a cause that pro-
duces it not, either immediately by effecting the action, or mediately by operating on the agent, may with every jot as good sense be supposed to exist without any cause at all. This reasoning seems to be much the same with that of Durandus, and if so, I cannot forbear thinking that Durandus is wrongly criticized by Mr. Howe, whose words are, "Durandus flatly in several places denies God's immediate concurrence to the actions of his creatures, and this universally, and upon such a ground, as where upon the denial must equally extend to good as bad, viz. that it is impossible the same numerical action should be from two, or more agents, immediately and perfectly, excepting the same numerical virtue should be in each. But he faith, the same numerical virtue cannot be in God, and in the creature."

Sect. V. God's antecedent or previous antecility in reference to human actions is his determining the Will to action, by a positive, immediate, and irresistible influx. It is called physical premotion or predetermination, a distinction from that which is moral, and influences the Will by an address or application to the Understanding. This notion is thought to have been first started by Thomas

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mas Aquinas a Schoolman, but says Mr. Howe, he and Scotus held immediate concourse not determinate; for which he appeals to a quotation out of each. But leaving that matter, as of no great importance to be decided, it is certain, that whoever was the author of this ill-favoured opinion, he has had too many followers, as well among the Protestants as among the Romanists. For having been entertained by certain Dominicans, who were apprehended in some things to approach nearer to us, than others of the Roman Church, it came to receive countenance from some Divines of our own, of considerable note for piety and learning; whose name and authority cannot but be expected to have much influence on the minds of men. This remark comes from the ingenious Author mentioned above, and is worthy of him. Physical promotion labours under the following difficulties.

1. It is perfectly opposite to the nature of man as a rational agent. For observe, this determination is, in the words of those who defend it, physical and immediate; whereas should we allow of an uncontrolable determination, it ought to be by the mediation of Reason, or by such an overpowering evidence in the mind, that the Will should not

not be able to resist it. But here the Will is immediately over-ruled; and though a dictate of the Understanding is pretended to go before every volition; yet in truth that is not the real inducement to the volition which follows. The best account that can be given of the matter is this, we will a thing because we cannot but will it; and we cannot but will it, not because it is the greater appearing good, but because we are made to will it by an almighty power, which to us is the same as a blind Necessity. If the views of our mind are a reason of any thing, they are only the reason why God determines the Will, not the immediate reason of our willing.

Sect. VI. 2. Physical predetermination is needless, contrary to what is affirmed, of its being absolutely necessary to action. That it is needless can be no longer a doubt, after it is made appear, that a person not only may act, but cannot forbear acting, though under no predetermining influx. This I prove after the following manner. Whatever Being thinks and reasons cannot but have a power of willing, and this power in certain cases cannot but exert itself. As supposing a thinking Being to have a prospect of the greatest pleasures imaginable, and these pleasures within its reach, if it will but desire and pursue them; can it
otherwise than desire them? Conceive we the same Being to lie under the most violent and excessive pains; is it possible it should not desire ease? Is a particular and irresistible influx from God necessary to raise such a desire? Can a thinking Being remain indifferent to its own happiness or misery? So it seems it may, if predetermination be necessary; but the thing is in its own nature impossible, therefore predetermination is needless.

3. Physical predetermination will not consist with human Liberty. E'er such an alliance can be brought about, Liberty and Necessity must be compatible; since it is plain, that an irresistible premotion infers the strongest Necessity. In consequence of this particular.

Sect. VII. 4. It makes God the Author of sin. For taking away human freedom, a man ceases to be accountable for any thing he does; and his actions ought not to be imputed to him, but to the Being that lays him under a necessity of so acting. An inspired Writer hath told us, that God is not tempted with evil, neither tempteth be any man. But if this hypothesis was true, he would more than tempt men, he would compel them to sin. One would think this to be demonstration; but the predeterminants do

* James i. 13.
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do not want an evasid. They tell us we ought to distinguish between an action and the form of it, its physical goodness and its moral evil. The matter or physical goodness of the action is from God; the form or moral evil, which is its disconformity to the divine Law, being a mere privation, is the creature's. I might answer, that upon the principle of predetermination, there can be no disconformity of an action to the Law, for as much as the Law is a measure of action to none, but those who are capable of observing it. But only mentioning this, I say, that whatever disconformity there be in the action to the rule, the proper efficient cause of that action is likewise the cause of the disconformity; for this very obvious reason, that the disconformity has an inseparable connection with the action; and no one can be the author of any relation, unless by giving being to that on which the relation is founded; which foundation supposed, there is nothing further necessary to produce the relation. He who paints two objects black or white, or one of them black and the other white, is the true, the only author of the agreement or disagreement in colour, which is found between them. If therefore the creature be the cause of the disconformity, it must be the cause of the action; but it is not the cause of the action, either immediately or remotely. Not immediately so, because
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because God is affirmed to be the total cause of it, which certainly must exclude all causality of the creature. We are told indeed that God and the creature are both total causes; the meaning of which is, either that they are both total efficient causes, or that God only is the total efficient cause, and the creature the total instrumental cause. If this latter be the meaning, it will do the hypothesis no service, for an instrumental cause is properly no cause at all; to be sure is not in the least answerable for the action. If two total efficient causes be intended, nothing can be more absurd; for that there should be two total efficient causes to one and the same action is a downright impossibility. If you entirely produce an effect, and I entirely produce an effect also, the same moment, who does not perceive that they must unavoidably be two different effects? This to me is as self-evident, as that one and one make two. Or were it possible that there should be two such causes, yet one of them must be needless, either of them alone if total must be sufficient; and consequently, the creature being a total cause of its acting, would be able to act though not predetermined, which must not be allowed of neither.

Sect. VIII. To proceed, the creature is not the remote cause of its action, before it can
can be so accounted it must be the cause of something, that is the condition or motive on which God predetermines the action. Now this condition is either the Will's disposing itself to the action, as Bellarmine supposes, or the corruption of nature. The Will's determining itself, as the Cardinal explains it, is no other than suffering itself to be moved and wrought upon by an object, proposed to it by the Understanding. By which I cannot conceive what he should mean, but an inclination to that object short of an express volition. But if this inclination begin the first moment of the object's appearance, a person cannot prevent it, and therefore is not the cause of it, and therefore not the cause neither of the predetermination to the subsequent volition. If it be occasioned by the continued contemplation of the object, then indeed a man is in some sense the cause of it, in regard this contemplation is the effect of volition. But then it is natural to demand, what was the cause of this volition? It must be said a predetermining influx. Well—But what was the motive to that influx? It ought not to be answered, the Will's disposing itself to it, because at this rate there will be a necessity of running up the account in infinitum. A corruption of nature, or a depraved inclination to wicked actions, is therefore the only thing remaining, that can be supposed to be the motive
motive to God's predetermining a bad action; but no man is the cause of this neither. All corruption is contracted or natural. Contracted corruption is the result of repeated actions; and consequently a person is no otherwise the author of this corruption, than as he is the author of the actions from which it flows. But he is not the immediate author of these actions, because not in truth the immediate author, according to this scheme, of any action at all, as has been already shown. If therefore he be at all the author of them, it can be only in a remote sense, by being the cause of some vicious inclinations, which were prior to them, and therefore natural; with which natural inclinations a man cannot be chargeable, unless guilty of that first sin, whereof they are the sad consequences. Now granting the action of eating the forbidden fruit to have been as much his, as it was Adam's, it will not therefore follow that it was his, because rightly considered it will appear not to have been Adam's. Adam could not act without being predetermined, any more than his posterity; their Will, at least to that which is bad, must have as much power as his. And why was Adam predetermined? No recourse can be had here to an antecedent corruption; Adam therefore was not guilty of the first sin; and if Adam was not, much less are we; and not being guilty of the first sin,
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fin, we are not accountable for the corruption which is brought into human nature, nor the cause of God's predetermining us to action on the account of this corruption. The issue this drives us upon is, that God is the only cause of all the disconformity between human actions and his own Law. The Law is from God as its Author, so likewise is the action, and both the terms proceeding from him, the contrariety between them must be his too. Predetermination therefore, in spite of this pitiful evasion, makes God the Author of sin; a worse thing than which I defy any man to say of the Devil himself. I might further observe, that predetermination opposes the moral perfections of God, his Sincerity, his Holiness, his Justice, and Goodness; but these things are too plain to need insisting on. So much then for the common or universal causality of God, it does not imply a physical predetermination, nor any such general influence as is directed to particular actions by the creature; it signifies no more than God's creating and maintaining a Being, and its powers of action, and ordaining the objects and circumstances, which are the occasional causes of action.

Sect. IX. 2. God's special causality is restrained to some certain actions; as for instance, to all good and virtuous actions, and
and to all such other actions as are requisite in the nature of means, for the accomplishing some design of Providence; which actions nevertheless would be neglected, did not God interpose with a more than common causality. As for actions morally good, the light of nature will inform us, that we are to ascribe them to God, as their prime original. It was a chief principle of the Socratic Morality, as we learn from 'Plato, “that Virtue is the gift of God,” Se μο TOUR. Nay Seneca, who according to the manner of his See was used to talk so extravagantly, does in some places, which I have before cited, deliver sentiments not unworthy the humility of a Christian. His saying, Nulla fine Deo mens bona, “No mind is good without the help of God,” is an instance of this, and is much the same with that of Cicero, Nunquam vir magnus sine afflatu divino, “There was never a man became truly great without divine aid.” The Heathens understood this maxim not only of actions morally good, but of all other actions and performances of an extraordinary character, as the inventions and works of Poets, Lawgivers, Musicians, and the like; as you may see particularly in Plutarch's Life of Numa. Perhaps the notion taken in this latitude is not without its foundation in Rea-

5 See Maxim. Tyril Dissert. 32. Εί γενότα τίς μενα μοιρο θαλήο.
Reason; without all question it is not when limited to good actions. To these a more particular influence is required; nor is it improbable, arguing only from the reason of the thing, that God is always ready to communicate this assistance upon the humble application of his creatures to him; though in what measure it shall be vouchsafed, and whether it be ever irrevocable, is a controversy that falls not within my province to determine.

Sect. X. II. For what relates to the agency of Angels whether good or bad, I shall not anticipate myself in what I have to say concerning this head in Pneumatology, where it falls in more naturally. I shall only in general take notice, that their agency is of a moral nature by the consent of all sides. They can offer no violence to the Will; nay, they cannot so much as approach the Will, but by the Understanding; nor the Understanding but by the mechanism of the Body.

Sect. XI. III. Men are either deficient or efficient causes of each others actions.

1. Deficient causes. The propriety of this term I am not solicitous about, so it convey my meaning intelligibly. This happens as often the faulty negligence of one man,
man, or his omitting to do what he ought to have done, is either really, or imputative-ly, the occasion of some good omitted, or some evil done by another. In debitis causa deficiens efficit moraliter. Thus we are never wanting to instruct, admonish, reprove, dissuade, or encourage others, according to the duty of the relation wherein we stand to them; but we may be reckoned to have contributed by way of defect to that corruption of manners which it was our concern to have prevented. Qui non veta peccare, cum possit, jubet, says Seneca "He who does not restrain another from "offending, who is under his authority, if "effect commands him to offend." To the same purpose the Civil Law. Qua prohibere potuit, teneatur, si non fecerit.

2. Men are efficient causes, when by some act of theirs they influence the actions of other men; and that either by disposing, or impelling them. The first by Education Institution, Discipline and Example; the second by Suasion or Diffuasion, by Command or Prohibition, by Advice or Reproof, and the like. For the explanation of these terms I remit you to Curcellæus's Compend. Eth. p. 16 & 17. Here the following Maxims will not perhaps be without use.

Sect.

\[5\] Troad. I. 289.

\[h\] Digest. L. 9. Tit. 2. ad Leg. Aquil. leg. 45.
Sect. XII. 1. Strictly speaking every man is the sole efficient cause of his own actions. The cause of an action, and the agent or doer of it, are synonymous terms. Others may supply the motives or grounds of the action, they may promise, or threaten, or ensnare, &c. but this is all they can do; for the proper and immediate cause of the action rests with the agent, and with no one else.

2. According to the exactness of language, the same individual action cannot belong to more than one man; or if you will, to every single action there can be but one agent. This is as evident, as that the motion of several distinct bodies cannot be numerically the same. Their conspiring to produce one common effect does not confound their distinctness, so as to make the motion of one the motion of the rest. In like manner, when a number of assassins join in the murder of a person, that person's death is but one effect; but the respective shares of the assassins in compassing it, make so many distinct actions, compleat in themselves, though not as to the effect produced by them in conjunction.

3. The virtue or guilt of the same numerical action is incommunicable. This is built upon the former Proposition; for the virtue or guilt, the good or evil, is but an adjunct.
Of the external Principles Part II.

adjunct of the action, and accidentia non pos-
sunt migrare a subjecto, "the individual qua-
"lity of one action or substance cannot be "the individual quality of another," is an axiom that needs not the stamp of the Schools to make it pass unquestioned. The same crookedness cannot be transferred from one flick to another; the same individual velocity or obliquity cannot be attached successively to motions numerically different.

Sect. XIII. 4. When therefore one man's action, whether good or bad, is imputed to another, it is only in a less proper sense; for in the eye of the Law no man is answerable for any more than his own actions; for these it is he is rewarded or punished. His actions indeed may have some communion with, or influence upon those of another, and the good or evil of them may be heightened by this relation, which is all that is meant in Morality by the imputation of another's actions. They are imputed to me so as to enhance the good or evil, the reward or punishment, of my own, which concurred to the being of his. In this sense we are accountable for other mens actions, not only when we are the efficient cause of them, but deficient also. As to our own actions, we are accountable for all those, and only those, whose existence or non-existence has been in our power. And on the contra-
contrary, that which depends not upon a person, either immediately, or in its cause, cannot, as Puffendorf truly observes, be imputed to him in virtue of any obligation. But as to another's evil actions they shall be imputed to us, or we shall be reckoned the deficient causes of them, in case we omit what it is our duty to do to prevent them; even supposing all that we can do would in the event prove ineffectual.

5. In all inquiries concerning the principal in an action, or the person to whom the chief part of the praise or blame of it belongs, the question is not really about a single action, but two or more; between which a comparison is made, in order to know the moral quantity of each. For instance, a Servant robs or kills by the command of his Master; to be able to determine who is the principal in the crime; we compare the action of the Master and of the Servant together. The Master commanded, the Servant executed that command; and if upon a comparison of these two, it appears more criminal in a superior to command an ill action, than in the inferior to obey such an illegal command, we have nothing remaining but to decide against the Master. In cases where several are involved in the guilt, and their fault is equal, all are principals, and none accessaries.

Consult

\[\text{De Jure N. \\& G. L. i. C. 5. § 5.}\]
Consult further on this Chapter.

Le Blanc's Theses.
Howe of the Reconcileableness of God's Prescience with his Wisdom and Sincerity.
Sherlock on Providence. C. 2.
CHAP. V.

Of the Ends of human Actions.

SECT. I. Proceed now to consider the ends of human actions. These in a larger sense may be called principles; nor indeed is it usual for them to pass by that name, as in the question so often asked, What the principles are upon which a man acts? But since they are known by another name, which is more proper and distinguishing, I choose to assign them a separate place. This term is variously distinguished.

1. There is the end of the action, and the end of the agent. The end of the action is the event and consequence of that action, whatever it be. The end of the agent is what he proposed to himself in acting. Common to both these is the distinction into proper and accidental. The proper end is that to which the action has a natural tendency, or which was expressly in the intention of the agent. An accidental end is an event happening contrary to the nature of the action, or the design of the agent.
2. An end is **principal** or **subordinate**. The principal end is that by which the agent is chiefly swayed; the subordinate that which is governed or over ruled by the other. The order of each end is to be fixed according to its *dignity*, It is contrary to Reason that a less noble end should give laws to one of greater importance. Reason is nothing but order, and as often as we neglect that method which Reason has established, we invert nature, and quit judgement to follow fancy and inclination.

3. There is a *necessary* and an *arbitrary* end. The first relates to good or happiness in the general, which we cannot avoid intending; the other to particular goods, in the choice of which we are more at liberty. Or we may understand this distinction in a *moral* sense, and a necessary end is that which is necessary to render the action conformable to Reason; an arbitrary such an end, concerning the *morality* of which our Reason dictates nothing.

4. There is a *good* and a *bad* end, and an end that is neither one nor the other, but *indifferent*. This distinction is too plain to need any more than mentioning. Dr. Taylor quotes this Proverb from the Arabians, "that a good end is the soul of every "action."

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Sect. II. 5. An end is temporal or spiritual. The first having reference to the welfare of the body, and the enjoyments of the present life; the other to things more immediately adapted to our intellectual nature. I should not have taken notice of this distinction, but upon account of a question which some have, viz. Whether in actions of a moral nature it be lawful to propose temporal ends? I must confess that this is no question with me, who am persuaded, that the end of the action, (I mean it not of an accidental, but proper end) may justifiably become the end of the agent. Nay, I know no better rule for the agent to proceed by in settling his end, than to determine his end by the end of the action. For what are the ends of actions but their genuine fruits and consequences, those which their own nature hath fitted, and the Author of nature designed them to produce. In pursuance of these therefore we only follow the intention of God and nature. It is certain that Virtue, in a well regulated course of things, is the best and only infallible way to promote our temporal welfare; for this reason it can be no crime to have an eye to our temporal welfare in the practice of Religion and Virtue. All that we are to be careful about is, that we make this but our subordinate end, placing it below those which are spiritual.
and as much below them in our esteem, as it is beneath them in real worth and excellency. In doing this we only observe the rule before laid down, of conforming our intentions to the ends for which actions themselves were ordained. The principal end of Virtue and Religion is a good of a higher order, than falls within the compass of sense and time; which, according to the natural subordination of things, leads us to propose this higher good in the first place. Which of these ends is predominant may be often easily known, since every one who abandons Virtue when it lies cross to temporal ends, or puts even Vice in the room of it, if that will better serve a present interest, may be sure he is not influenced by right views. As he likewise may be convinced, the higher end does not weigh with him as much as it ought, who, though he forswears not the cause of Virtue, yet grows cold in it, if he be not kept in heart by temporal prosperity and success.

Sect. III. 6. There is the ultimate and the intermediate end. The ultimate is that which terminates the view of the agent. An intermediate partakes of the nature both of a means and an end. In reference to something which went before, and had a tendency to promote it, it is an end; as it refers to something beyond, to which it is sub-
Chap. V. of human Actions. 245

Subservient, it is in the quality of a means. Under this head it may be expected I should speak something in answer to that grand inquiry, What is the chief and ultimate end of man? The difference between this, and the question concerning the Sumnum Bonum, is apparent. The question there was, What among the variety of objects pursued by mankind, makes their chief felicity? Here that question is supposed to be resolved, and another founded upon it succeeds, What is the chief and ultimate end of man, his own happiness, or the glory of God? Before I return a direct answer to this question, I think it necessary to distinguish between a chief or supreme, and an ultimate end. I know nothing is more common than to confound these two, though there be evidently a distinction between them. The ultimate end is that to which all others are referred; the chief that which, supposing a competition between them, a man would prefer to the rest. It is possible there may be several ends, which are nothing akin to one another, and so have no subserviency one to another, on which account neither of them can be said to be ultimate with regard to the rest; and yet one may be the chief end; namely, that which we pursue with the greatest ardor, and for the sake of which we should relinquish the other, in case they should interfere with it.

R 3 Sect.
Sect. IV. This premised, I must make two questions of one. 1. What is man's chief end, the glory of God, or his own happiness? I answer, both in different respects.

1. Absolutely speaking man's own happiness is his chief end; for should any end overthrow this he would unavoidably reject it, and abide by this. Thus were it supposeable that the divine glory could not be built but upon my eternal ruin, it were naturally impossible I should choose that glory for my chief end; because no Being whatever can prefer its own misery. And notwithstanding the high, not to say extravagant strain, in which some have talked, as if they could gladly submit to be damned for the glory of God; if by damned they mean perpetually miserable, I will be bold to say that this is a perfect contradiction. For how is perfect misery consistent with that mighty satisfaction, which they pretend to take in the divine glory? Or the love of God, which makes them content to be damned for his sake, with that hatred of God, which is a necessary part of damnation?

2. The glory of God is suo genere, in its kind, man's chief end; that is, it is the supreme of those ends, which depend upon his choice. As for happiness, it is what a think-
thinking Being cannot but passionately pursue, never intermitting the degree of his motion; and therefore not to be reckoned in the number of those ends, which it is our duty to propose; since nothing is properly a matter of duty, which is not some way or other in our power. Now when we are speaking of man's chief end, the meaning is not, what is necessarily, and therefore actually his chief end, but what ought to be so. No one faith, that man ought to desire happiness; the reason is, that this desire is natural and uncontrollable, and therefore in general not subject to law. The sense of the whole is, in strictness of speech man does not make happiness his end, but is rather carried towards it by an impetus of nature. In his desire of happiness he is not a free, but a necessary agent; even as necessary, as he is in the appetites of hunger and thirst. Consequently, if next to his own happiness a person may and ought to aim at the glory of God, the glory of God may well be termed his chief end.

Sect. V. 2. If it be inquired, What is man's ultimate or last end? I readily answer, the divine glory; for to this ought we principally to direct all our actions, at the same time that we are obliged, neither by duty, nor by a necessity of nature, chiefly to design our own happiness in them. For instance,
stance, in loving my neighbour as myself, I love him with a love of benevolence, and therefore with an affection as to myself pure and disinterested. I do not, I ought not to wish his happiness, principally as a means to my own. Pleasure, I acknowledge, is the companion of all our volitions, such especially as are rational and generous; but let it be noted, that this pleasure is the concomitant, not the principle or end of our volitions. Consequently, if besides this instantaneous pleasure I have no other in view, and it is very possible I may not, I do not refer the thing desired to my own advantage. Did the satisfaction that goes with a generous inclination make it selfish and mercenary, the most charitable persons would be some of the most selfish, because they feel the most sensible satisfaction in the kind wishes they bestow upon others. Nay, God himself, whose goodness is the spring of infinite delight, would be a narrow, not a diffusive and beneficent Being. It is not impossible then to wish well to another from a principle of unmixed kindness, making his happiness our end, unconnected with our own; to be sure without permitting our own to fill up the larger part of the prospect. But the principal end we look at through all others, ought to be the glory of God. In loving our neighbour as ourselves, we should have a greater regard to the divine glory arising from
from our obedience, and our neighbour's welfare, than we have to him; greater there can be no question than we have to ourselves.

To conclude. In relation to the desire of our own happiness, we ought to cherish it from a view of persuasion, that the glory of God never reflects so brightly, as from the happiness of the creatures whom he hath made so. So that upon the whole, the divine glory appears to be the ultimate end of human actions.

Books proper to be consulted on the subject of the Chapter are,

Curcellaei Comp. Eth. p. 16, 17.
Hutcheson's Inquiry of Beauty and Virtue.
Treat. 2. §. 1, 2.
Tillotson's Sermons on the Glory of God, and on God the First Cause and Last End.
Sharp's Sermon on 1 Cor. 10. 31.
CHAP. VI.

Of the several Kinds of human Actions, and particularly of good, evil, and indifferent Actions.

SECT. I. THE next thing to be treated of are the several species or distinctions of human actions. Some, says a Curcellæus, are spontaneous, others involuntary, a third sort of a mixed nature, participating of the other two. But observe. 1. The contradiction of making involuntary a species of moral actions. A human or moral action is an action done by a person considered as a rational and free agent, i.e. an action properly imputable. Now of these actions that are moral and imputable, some are involuntary, or which is the same, not imputable. 2. Observe the impropriety of placing spontaneous or voluntary among the kinds of human actions; when it is acknowledged, that all human actions are voluntary. Upon this account you must be sensible, that the distinction of actions into voluntary, involuntary,

a Compend. Eth. p. 2O.
tary, and mixed, was not without reason handled in another place, nor without design. To proceed therefore.

SECT. II.Actions are distinguished into deliberate and indeliberate. A deliberate action is an action done by one, who had time and liberty to weigh its nature and consequences, who premeditated it, and came to it with some kind of preparation. The contrary to this makes an action indeliberate. Deliberation turns upon the quality of an action, whether it be good or bad; upon the execution, whether it shall be done or forborn; and the circumstances, relating to the manner, and time, and objects of it. Here it may be useful to observe these rules.

1. If the action need examination, and there be leisure for it, he is guilty of a criminal rashness, who ventures on it without due deliberation and inquiry, even though in itself it should be a good action. The action is right, but not being done with knowledge, is not done rightly. Cicero's advice will here take place, *Ne incognita pro cognitis habeamus*, &c. "That we should " never determine about subjects we do not " well understand, as if we thoroughly un-" derstood them, and thus give our assent " rashly;

De Officiis, L. 1. §. 6. See also §. 21.
Of the several Kinds Part II.

"rashly; which fault he who desires to avoid, (and we ought all to desire to avoid it) will allow proper time and diligence for examining whatever comes before him."

2. Though it does not justify an ill action that it was done indeliberately, as upon a surprize, or through the violence of passion, yet it may be allowed to extenuate it. The Antients therefore made a great difference between a fault committed en passas through passion, and ex πνευμα with deliberation; as well they might, because in the latter the intention is compleat, in the former imperfect. When the evil or hurt of an action is casual it is then άληθινα, no more than an infelicity, or misfortune; when it was done μη παραλογος, ανευ δε καινιασ, not contrary to what the agent might reasonably expect would be the consequence, yet without malice, and proceeded from carelessness and inadvertency, it is άμαθεια an error or fault; when it is done knowingly, but not deliberately, from a sudden emotion of the spirits, not a depraved disposition of the Will, it is άληθινα an unjust action; but when it is deliberate, and out of choice, ex προκειμενων, not only the action is an instance of injustice, but the person himself άνινος an unjust man.

Sect.

Sect. III. 3. In actions apparently good or evil, to deliberate whether we shall do the one, or forbear the other, is a very great fault; and generally the indication of a bad temper of mind. Whether a man shall do his duty or no, maintain or renounce his integrity, ought never to fall under deliberation. Hear the Roman Moralist. Quam-obrem hoc quidem deliberandum genus pellatur e medio, &c. "They are to be entirely rejected, as absolutely impious and wicked, who deliberate whether they shall follow what they know to be honest; or knowingly pollute themselves with wickedness; for the being in suspense in such a case, is being guilty of a crime, though they proceed no further. Those things therefore are not subjects of deliberation, to hesitate about which it is criminal." Herodotus in his sixth Book has a story to this purpose worth relating, of one Glaucus a Lacedæmonian, who consulting the Oracle, whether he might not perjure himself, in order to retain somewhat of considerable value, that had been intrusted with him, was by the Pythia threatened with the destruction of his whole family; and when he begged pardon for this offence was told, that his tempting of Apollo was the same as if he had

had done the crime. *Juvenal* relates the same story with great spirit. To the same effect *Mucianus* tells *Vespasian*, when deliberating whether he should submit to *Vitellius* as Emperor, or set up for himself, *Qui deliberant, desiderunt*, "they who deliberate have begun to rebel."

4. In good actions it may be sometimes necessary to deliberate about the circumstances of doing them; not whether we shall do them at all, but whether this way or that ought to be chosen, this time or that, this object or another. *Cicero* having given instructions for the conduct of our Liberality, concludes, *Hæc igitur, & talia, circumspicienda sunt in omni officio, &c.* "These and the like circumstances are to be taken into the account, in the practice of every Virtue, and we must exercise ourselves in observations of this kind, that we may compute with readiness and exactness in *Morals*; and by making proper allowances and deductions, see what the sum of duty is, upon the whole, owing to every one."

**Sect. IV. II.** Actions are *internal* or *external*; *internal* such as are transacted in the mind, and pass no further, of which kind are the thoughts and desires of the soul;

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* Spartano cuidam respondit Pythias vates, &c. Sat. 13.
* De Offic. L. 1. §. 18.
foul; external such as are performed by the instrumentality of the body, as speaking, writing, and the like. Somewhat akin to this is the distinction of the Schools into immanent and transient, with this difference however, that in a strict sense an internal action is yet transient, if it carry in it an inclination or endeavour to break forth into act; and thus all our volitions, which for want of opportunity cannot display themselves in outward acts, are no other than transient actions of the soul.

III. There are elicite and imperative actions. An elicite action flows from the power immediately, non imperante alia facultate, without the interposition of any other faculty. An imperative on the contrary is the effect of a command from some superior faculty. Note, no human actions are elicite besides those of the Will; the operations of the Understanding itself are imperative, as far forth as they are human actions. In simple apprehension, as likewise in the perception of self-evident Propositions, it is not subject to the Will; neither in these is a man a free agent. The actions under the command of the Will, and those only, are free, and being under command are imperative not elicite.

Sect. V. iv. Actions are good, evil, or indifferent. A good action is an action morally necessary to be done; that is, which a man
man cannot but do, if he will act agreeably to Reason and duty. An evil action is an action morally necessary to be forborne; or which a man cannot do without opposing his Reason, and violating his duty. An indifferent action leaves a person at liberty to do or forbear it. The goodness of an action is either material or formal. An action for the matter of it good is such naturally or adventitiously. An action naturally good obliges the agent antecedently to the consideration of any Law. Of this sort are all natural duties, which, without supposing them enforced by the Will of a supreme Law-giver, every man's own Reason would urge him to perform. The goodness of an action is adventitious, when though in its own nature it is indifferent, yet being commanded it becomes necessary. Actions of this latter sort are good because commanded; of the former are therefore commanded because good. The formal goodness of an action is that which, added to an action materially good, renders it compleat in its kind, or such as the Law requires it should be. This formal goodness results from a right disposition of mind, and right views, from a love of order, an express or virtual regard to the Law as the measure of human actions, and to the glory of their Creator as their end. I say a virtual regard, because it is not absolutely necessary to a good action, that we have
have actual explicit thoughts of the Law enjoining it. It is enough that a person knows the action to be commanded, and that this knowledge is the remote cause of the action, by having been the cause of the prevailing inclination to such sorts of actions, which inclination is their immediate spring or original.

Sect. VI. It is not expected that in every good action the agent have the glory of God directly in his view; all required is, that he be habitually governed by a desire of pleasing and glorifying this most excellent of Beings, and that this desire is the remote cause of those actions, which he judges to have a tendency to promote this great end of life. In the ordinary course of a man's actions this is all that is needful; in actions of a religious nature the glory of God should be more expressly designed. It is also highly proper, that at other times we should contemplate the Author and End of our Beings, in order to revive and increase the influence of our last end, and to prevent our deviation from it. In short then, a morally good action may be defined, an action conformable to the Law, which it cannot be, if not possessed of a formal as well as a material goodness.

It is worth observation, that of some actions the material and formal goodness are
Inseparable. Such are the sincere Love of God, Reverence of his Authority, and Zeal for his Honour; and these are the actions which mingling with others constitute their formal goodness.

Sect. VII. An action morally evil is characterized from its contrariety to the Law, which is broken when either the matter or form of the action is evil. The reason is, that the Law equally forbids both. Hence is that well known maxim, *Bonum ex causa integra, Malum ex quolibet defectu,* " A defect in any part makes an action evil, " but it must be in every part conformable " to the Law to be good." Which we are to understand not of a gradual, but specific defect. A gradual defect is found in actions which have all the parts the Law requires; but not in that perfection which the Law rigorously interpreted demands; and such a defect as this cleaves to the very best actions of the best men. A specific defect is a defect in some essential part, as in the matter or the form; and any such defect gives an action the denomination of evil; not a mere defect neither, but mixing with the action something positively evil. The reason of this restriction you will see towards the close of this Chapter. It is not the matter of an action, though good, that can sanctify it, the form of it being evil; nor
nor can the form of it, though seemingly good, refine and sublimate the action, when the matter of it is evil, and might have been known to be such.

Sect. VIII. 1. An action materially good is yet evil, as often as the form of it is so. The giving alms is in itself a good action, but to give alms for ostentation sake, or to serve some wicked design, is manifestly evil; nay, in one respect to be reckoned worse than open injustice, because it is an endeavour to make Virtue assisting to Vice.

Videre etiam licet plerisque non tam natura liberales, quam quadam gloria ductos, ut benefici videantur facere multa, &c. “We may observe many, who in their disposition are rather ambitious than generous, do a great many things that they may appear beneficent; which evidently proceed more from ostentation, than a desire of doing good. Such an affectation of appearing generous has more of vanity, than either of generosity or honesty.”

Sect. IX. The intention, in which consists part of the form of the action, has not virtue enough to change an action in its nature so apparently evil, that no one can mistake it for any other than it is, but through gross ignorance or criminal prejudices. Be the

† Cic. De Offic. L. i. §. 14.
the intention what it will, such actions retain a great deal of their own bad nature notwithstanding. Persecution on account of Religion is a plain outrage to common Reason and Humanity, and incapable of a transformation into good, even by the strongest persuasion in the world, that the best of ends are answered by it. This was the case of the Jews in crucifying our Saviour, and of the Apostle Paul in his rage against the Christians before his Conversion. They verily thought that herein they did God and Religion good service, and yet were guilty, the Jews of a most abominable crime, as may be gathered from the judgments inflicted on them for it; and Paul of a great sin, as appears from the sentence which he passes on himself. And the reason of this is not so hard to assign, as some may imagine. The action it is granted is materially evil, neither if strictly examined will it appear to be formally good. There is indeed a good end proposed to be served by it, but this good end is not the true cause of the action. It is, I acknowledge, the immediate cause, but the remote or first cause (that is, the occasion of mistaking actions for good which the Law condemns) must needs be some latent evil, a defect of love to God

\[\text{John xv. } 18-21. \quad \text{Acts iii. } 17. \quad \text{xxvi. } 9.\]
\[\text{1 Tim. i. } 13-16. \quad \text{See Grove's Sermons. V. i. Ser. xi.}\]
God or men, or a want of due attention to the divine Law. Were the mind in a right temper it could never give so easily into a belief, that the most inhuman methods were proper to carry on the best of causes, and compelling men to be hypocrites, the way to render them acceptable to a God of knowledge and truth.

The Jesuits, by this single art of directing the intention, have put their disciples in a way of committing the greatest crimes, without the least danger from them. "An action known to be forbidden, but done not as forbidden, which is a diabolical, but with an innocent intention, loses all its malignity. It is unlawful to render evil for evil, notwithstanding which a man may kill another, who hath injured, or but affronted him, provided he does it not out of revenge, but for the reparation of his honour." This notion, if true, will considerably reduce the number of sins, and leave none under the guilt of wicked actions, but those who have not sense enough to direct their intention aright. Before I dismiss this particular I shall likewise animadvert upon a passage of Aristotle's, "That every action takes its form, and denomination, and name, from the end or intention. Thus he who corrupts his

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1 See Pascal's Provincial Letters, L. 7.
2 Andron, Rhod. L. 5. C. 3.
his Neighbour's Wife, if he does it not through intemperance, but to get money, is not an Adulterer, but covetous." For the same reason as the intention cannot transmute a bad action into a good one, it will not change the species of evil actions; because every kind of evil actions must be denominated from the Law which is violated. He who breaks the Law forbidding Adultery is an Adulterer, whatever was the view he went upon. If he did it out of Covetousness or Revenge, he at once broke two commands, and was guilty both of Covetousness and Adultery, or of Adultery and Revenge.

Sect. X. Having explained the general nature of good and evil actions, I descend to consider them in their degrees. It is the opinion of the 1 Stoics, that whatever difference there be between good actions and evil, neither of these differ among themselves. "Οτι ισα τα Αμαθηματα, και τα Καταβαματα, all good actions are of equal goodness, and all evil actions equally evil. It might be observed, that the Stoics in this opinion are not very consistent with themselves; for if there be no degrees in Virtue, how come they to distinguish it into καταφυε or perfect Virtue, and καθαρον or the Virtue of the middle kind. If, as Cicero says, Virtue be a right line, which

1 Cit. Paradoxa.
whoever transgresses is guilty of an error, and all errors or sins are equal, what room is there left for the medium officium or middle kind of Virtue? Or for that question, An officium aliud alió majus fit, whether one duty be greater than another? Or with what propriety could he say? Vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus, pleneque sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus præclarè agitur, si sunt simulachra Virtutis. “We live not among men perfectly wise and good, but with such, among whom it is a great thing if Virtue be reverenced and honoured, or they preserve the appearance of it.” And again —“In ipsa autem communitate, &c. In social life there are degrees of duties, by understanding which we may know what duties are to be preferred, and that the first regard is due to the immortal Gods, the next to our Country, the next to our Parents, and to others in a regular descent.” Antoninus himself allows Theophrastos to have philosophically determined the difference in the degrees of wickedness between two ill actions, proceeding one of them from concupiscence, the other from anger; though at the same time, to save the reputation of his own Sect, he adds this limitation, judging of things according to the common notions of mankind.

Sect.

m Cic. De Offic. L. 1. § 3 & 15.
\[Ibid.\] L. 1. § 45. o L. 2. § 10.
SECT. XI. That there is an inequality between good actions and bad respectively is easily demonstrated,

1. Some are of a higher rank and species than others. Martyrdom appears more illustrious than an act of Temperance, or Justice, which are Leniores Virtutes, as Cicero calls them, "Virtues of a less exalted kind," And among evil actions, some are in their nature more heinous than others, as Murder is more detestable than Lying.

2. In the same kind of good and evil actions there is a variety of degrees. A kind office done with freedom and cheerfulness is as much better as it looks, than one performed not without grudging. A fault committed through inadvertence, or under a strong temptation, is more excusable than one which is deliberate and unprovoked. Nor need we be at a loss as to what makes this inequality, both as to the kinds of actions, and the degrees in the same kind; for some good actions argue a more perfect habit of Virtue, and require a more intense exercise of it than others. As on the contrary, some evil actions discover a greater depravity of nature, a more settled aversion of the heart from goodness, and a higher degree of wilfulness than others do. "In all things not capable of an exact and "mathe-

\[\text{p De Offic. L. 1.}\]
"mathematical measure, we may, faith
" Monsieur Titius, distinguish at least three
degrees, viz. two extremes and a middle,
" which sometimes approaches nearer one
" extreme, sometimes another. The in-
" convenience of admitting a greater num-
" ber would be, that we must determine
" the precise point, where one degree be-
" gins and another ends. But how can this
" be done? Or what mark have we by
" which to assign this difference? This is
" according to the distinction of the Roman
" Law into Culpa lata, levis, & levissima."

Sect. XII. That which led the Stoics
into this mistaken opinion of the equality of
actions, was a conceit that there must be
the same reason of moral good and evil, as
of logical truth and falsity; now all true
Propositions are equally true, and all false
Propositions equally false. ¹ Ἐν Ἀλθῆς Ἀλθῆς
μαλλον ἐστιν, ἢς Ψευδός Ψευδός; ἢς ἢς Ἀστὴρ Ἀστὴ-
ρος, ἢς Ἀπόφασις Ἀπόφασις ἢς ἢς. "As one truth
" is not greater than another, or one false-
" hood than another; so fraud cannot be
" greater than fraud, nor crime than crime.
" He that is a hundred furlongs distant
" from Canopus, is no more in Canopus, than
" he that is but one furlong distant from
" it. So they that offend more or less are
" equally

¹Diog. Laert. in Vita Zenonis.
Of the several Kinds Part II.

"equally transgressors." In answer to this I say.

1. Allowing the parallel between truth and goodness to be exact, it will not prove all bad actions to be equally bad; because indeed all false Propositions are not equally false, that is, equally distant from the truth. We will suppose there are ten persons in a room, one says there is but nine, another there are but six, both are out in their guess, but for certain he who affirms there are but six is further from the truth, than he who says there are nine. All truths are equal, because truth is in the nature of a right line, and all right lines are equally strict; but error being a departure from truth, just as a crooked line deviates from a strict, must be various; for the same reason as one line may be more crooked than another, or more removed from the nature of a right line.

2. I deny that there is any such resemblance as is fancied between truth and goodness. Truth consists in the agreement of ideas or words with the reality of things; but the goodness of an action does not merely consist in its conformity to the Law, but depends very much on the difficulty of performance, and other circumstances. And then every good action is not exactly conformable to Law, or in other words, is not gradually perfect; no more is required, as was
was observed before, than that there be no specifical defect. Gradual defects there may and will be in this state of imperfection, whence arises a vast diversity between good actions themselves.

Sect. XIII. The circumstances which enhance the good or evil of actions are summed up in this verse,

Luis, Quid, Ubi, quibus Auxiliiis, Cur, Quomodo, Quando.

taken from Aristotle's "Tiv. Ti, &c. ad Nicom. L. 3. Instead of adding the explanation of these terms, which you will find in the common Ethicks, I shall transcribe a passage from Puffendorf containing much of their sense. "The relative quantity of actions, or their exceeding one another as to good or evil, is measured. 1. With relation to their object. For the more noble the object, the more does a good action terminating on this object excel another; as the evil action on the contrary is the more criminal. 2. With relation to the estate and condition of the agent. Thus a benefit received from an enemy passes for more considerable, than one received from a friend; on the contrary, an injury received from a friend is more sensible and aggravated,

vated, than that which proceeds from an enemy. 3. With relation to the nature of actions themselves. According as there was more or less trouble and difficulty attending the performance of them. A good action the more difficult the more laudable, other circumstances being equal.

On the contrary, in proportion as an evil action was more easy to be avoided, it is worse than another of the same kind.

4. With regard to the effects and consequences of an action, supposing those consequences might have been foreseen.

5. With relation to the circumstances of time and place. And besides there is this particular in the comparison of good actions, that some are more excellent than others; as the practice of the latter ought to give place to the former, when both cannot be done at the same time.” So far Puffendorf. We may add. 6. With relation to the manner of performance. A good action done with hesitation and reluctance, in so much that the scale but just turns on the right side, loses a great deal of its beauty; as by the same circumstance an evil action does of its guilt. 7. With relation to the strength or weakness, the greater or less influence of the principle. A good action must have a good principle; and the more that principle predominates in it, the better is the action. If the principle or end of
of an evil action be bad too, it exceedingly aggravates it, and so much the more as it operates more powerfully.

Sect. XIV. I hasten now to discourse a little of indifferent actions, that is, actions neither morally good nor evil. And that there are such indifferent actions, not only secundum genus, or as to the kind of them, which the Schools will allow, but in individuo, or as really existing, cloathed with all their individuating circumstances, may, I think, be decisively proved by this one argument. If there be actions, both the matter and form of which are neither good nor evil, then there are indifferent actions; but there are actions whose both matter and form are neither good nor evil. No one, I presume, will quarrel with the first Proposition, and in proof of the second I will assign some actions, which are indifferent both in their matter and form. Paying a debt in silver or gold coin, dining at twelve or one a clock, wearing leather or wooden heeled shoes, with a thousand such more, are actions in themselves both for the form and matter of them indifferent; neither is it necessary that the form of them be morally good. No one is obliged to have an eye to the glory of God in doing them; for when it is seen that there is no connection between such actions and the glory of God,
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God, it would be a foolish superstition to make that the end of them.

Sect. XV. Some of the Heathen Philosophers were of opinion, that no actions are indifferent, but all positively either good or evil. Not that no actions are indifferent in their own nature, but that no actions are indifferent in fact. For they lay down this as a rule of moral wisdom, that every man ought to fix πρός τὴν τάξιν, as they called it, that is, a certain general purpose and scope to all his actions. This general purpose they required should be, συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ to live agreeably to right Reason. And hereupon they further determined, that so long as this purpose was fixed in the mind as a principle, and a man had his eye upon it, so long all his actions, even those that were in themselves indifferent, were made wise and good. But on the contrary, all a man's actions, however indifferent in their own nature, became irrational and evil, where this general right purpose was wanting. This was the doctrine of the Stoics. We may grant this to be true in the main, without giving up what has been offered to prove there are in fact indifferent actions; since there are a thousand instances occur in life, wherein various actions, in their own nature indifferent—

† See Dean Young's Sermons. V. 2. p. 102.
indifferent, may be equally consistent with this general plan, and consequently it is a matter morally indifferent in these cases, which of those actions we choose to perform.

Sect. XVI. If it be objected, that every man is obliged to conform his actions to Reason, which will suffer none of them to be indifferent. To this it is usually answered, that in case an action be negatively conformable to Reason, that is, not condemned by it, nothing more is expected. It frequently happens that Reason is silent, and leaves us to act this way or that, as fancy or temper lead us, or to give a proof of our liberty. To which I further add, every reasonable action is not morally good, because the reason we proceed upon may be something of very little moment, and yet enough to determine such actions; and therefore where no higher reason is to be produced, sufficient to render the action reasonable, though not morally good. Again, it may be said, every one is bound to make the glory of God the ultimate end of all his actions; now the doing this, though it be only by a general dedication, sanctifies those of our actions, which are in their own nature most indifferent. My answer is, that an implicit or general aim at the glory of God can affect none but those actions, which
which are adapted to serve that end. Then is an action done to the glory of God, when either *immediately* or *remotely* the divine glory is the reason or motive of its being done. But there are innumerable actions which can in no degree be produced by a regard to the glory of God, and which therefore can have no such interest in the general pursuit of that end, as thereby to become *formally* good. To know when an action indifferent in its kind ceases to be so, *pro hic & nunc*, in present circumstances, there is this general rule. Suppose any such action or the omission of it to be necessary, as a *means* of performing an acknowledged duty, or of avoiding something evidently sinful, in these circumstances the doing or forbearing of this action is no longer a matter of indifference. Speaking is in itself equally indifferent with silence, but neither speaking nor silence is indifferent in the publick Congregation; the first being necessary to the *Minister* that he may discharge his duty, and the latter to the *Hearers* that they may acquaint themselves with theirs.

**Sect. XVII.** Another question still behind, and perhaps of greater importance than the former, is this, Whether those actions, which practised upon the *best principles*, would be virtuous, as acts of Liberality, Justice, Temperance, Chastity, and the
the like, in a bad man who acts only from a natural generosity of temper, or with a view to his own temporal interest or fame, or to the good of civil society, are to be esteemed good, evil, or indifferent? On the one hand these actions labour under an essential defect, for want of that which should be the governing principle in all our virtuous actions, the reverence of our suprem Lawgiver; so that they cannot be accounted religious actions, nor even morally good, except in one of the cases mentioned, viz. when they proceed from a view to the good of civil society; for this is a morally good principle of action, as appears from its being the principle on which God himself, the most benevolent of Beings, constantly acts. And this case excepted, I cannot pronounce the actions proceeding from the other principles to be merely Splendidida Peccata, Splendid Sins. "Pagan Virtu" "Pagan Virtues, faith Dr. Waterland, are mean and "low things in comparison with Evangelical Virtues, or Christian Graces; and "have indeed, according to the true and "express doctrine of our excellent Church, "Art. 13. the nature of Sin; as being de- "fective in principle, and in direction, and "wanting the grace of God." But I can by no means agree with this learned Doctor in reckoning them such. For though a re- T
gardlesness
gardleness of the Sovereign of the world cannot but be sinful, yet these actions of a Pagan, or any other man, so disregarding his Maker, are not therefore evil, for this evident reason, that this want of respect to a divine Being, and to the divine Law, is not the principle, or cause of the actions before mentioned; but on the contrary, where this respect is found, there is an additional motive to the performance of these actions. The real principle is a natural goodness of disposition, or a prudent consideration of the present expediency of things; both which as they are themselves innocent, cannot infuse a malignity into the actions proceeding from them. It therefore remains, that such actions as these be numbered among actions physically good, but morally indifferent. From whence, by the way, it appears, that the form of an action is evil, not from a mere defect of a good end, but the presence of some evil end, or principle, which either in whole, or in part, is the cause of the action.

I shall conclude with observing what should have been remarked before, that the term action in Morality is not always understood after the vulgar manner, for something done; but is to be extended even to omissions themselves, which pass under the common name of actions, because imputable, either to our praise, as forbearing an
an action forbidden, because forbidden; or to our blame, as the omission of an action commanded, though known to be commanded.

Books proper to be read on the subject of this Chapter are,

Puffendorf De Offic. L. i. C. 2.
— De Jure &c. L. i. C. 7, 8, 9.
Curcellæi Eth. C. 3.
Ciceronis Paradoxa.
Whitbii Eth. L. i. C. 2, 3.
Wollaston's Religion of Nature. Sect. i.
Claggett's Serm. V. i. 1 Cor. 10. 23. Phil. 3. 20.
Taylor's Ductor Dubitant. about indifferent actions.
Of the Passions in general, their Nature, Objects, Innocence, Usefulness, and Seat, and the Regulation of them.

Sect. I. The other objects of Virtue are the Passions, in discoursing of which Dr. More will be my principal guide, as Des Cartes was his. Not but I shall take the liberty to leave him, as often as I apprehend him to mistake the way, or to go too far about. The Passions are divided into two sorts, the proper Passions, which by common use have had that name appropriated to them, and the improper; for in some sense all the impressions made upon the soul by the mediation of the body, which if not heedfully observed, might be prejudicial to the mind in its judgment of things, are so many Passions. I begin with the proper Passions; and here the Nature, the Objects, the Innocence, the Usefulness, the Seat, and the Regulation of the Passions, will comprize all that is necessary to be said concerning them in general.
Sect. II. *A Passion is an affection of the soul, attended with a peculiar and extraordinary emotion of the animal spirits. From which definition you may learn, that Passion is a kind of medium between a simple affection of the mind, and the appetites and sensations of the body. Passion is an affection of the mind, which distinguishes it from the appetites of the body, such as hunger and thirst, and from bodily sensations; both which are indeed perceptions of the mind, but however have a more immediate relation to the body, and seemingly their abode in it. Passion is attended with a peculiar and extraordinary emotion of the animal spirits, which differences it from pure affection, (for there may be love or hatred that is not a Passion,) and from the several forts*

*Andron. Rhod. Περὶ Παθῶν. "Passion is a motion of the soul, that takes not its rise from Reason, and that waits not for its determination." When Cicero, agreeing with the Stoics, declares against the Passions under the name of Perturbations, he thus defines Perturbations, *Adversa ratione, contra naturam animi commotio, & appetitus qui procul ab sit a naturæ constantia. "A commotion opposite to Reason, and to the nature of the mind, and an appetite very inconsistent with the steady regularity of the rational nature." But there was never a man who defended the Passions thus explained. The Κινοῦσις αλογὸς, or motion not excited by Reason of the Peripatetics, *ἐν Ratione, is very different from the Stoics adversus Rationem, in opposition to Reason, contrary to Nature, and to its steady regularity. A thing may be αλογὸς or not excited by Reason, yet very consistent with it.*
sorts of sensation, in all which, though there be some motion of the blood and spirits, yet that motion is natural and regular; whereas in the agitation occasioned by the Passions, the spirits are moved after a more vehement and tumultuous manner. The foundation of the Passions is in the body, its natural completion, or some accidental disorder arising from excess in eating and drinking, from the weather, from diseases, and the like. The indications or symptoms of the Passions are likewise in the body; for whether a man consents to it or no, they many times betray themselves by distorted postures, odd motions, or sudden and various alterations in the countenance, so that the look, the posture, the voice, conforms itself to the state of mind into which a man happens to be thrown.

*Format enim Natura prius nos intus ad omnem Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad iram,*

*Aut ad humum mærore gravi deducit, & angit; Post effert animi motus interprete linguæ.*

*Hor. De Arte Poetica. L. 108.*

For Nature forms and softens us within,
And writes our Fortune's changes in our Face.
Pleasure enchants, impetuous Rage transports,
And Grief dejects, and wrings the tortured soul,
And these are all interpreted by speech.

*Roscommon.

*Cicero*
b Cicero had made, and well expresses the same observation. *Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum, aut eorum, qui aut libidine aliqua, aut metu commoti sunt, aut voluptate nimia gestiunt; quorum omnium vultus, voces, motus, statusque mutantur.* "You may see "the prevailing Passion in the countenances "of the angry, or of those who are disturb- "ed by eager desires, or by fears of any "kind, or who exult in excess of pleasure; "their look, their voice, their motions and "posture are all changed by it." This is wisely ordered by the Author of nature, both to communicate the Passions, when it is necessary, or to raise correspondent ones, and to put others on their guard, when they are threatened with any danger from them.

**Sect. III.** According to the Cartesian the body is likewise the leading cause in all the Passions, the first alarm to which is given by an universal hurry in the animal spirits. But this is certainly a mistake, since a mere thought or imagination may and often does give birth to the most violent Passions. Nay, I am inclined to think, a sensation in the soul generally precedes a change in the spirits; external objects not being able to raise a ferment in the spirits, till they have first struck the mind with an idea

idea of something noble, frightful, amiable, hurtful, or the like. From this account of the nature of the Passions it may be inferred, that Angels and all separate Spirits are not subject to them, because the body must concur as well as the soul; nor perhaps brute creatures, because the soul must contribute to them as well as the body. The Stoics gave the name of 

παθήν to all extraordinary emotions of the soul, as accounting them Diseases, the word according to Cicero having that signification; which therefore he chooses rather to call Perturbations, than παθήν Passions or Diseases. The name of Passions belongs to those mixed perceptions, because the mind in certain circumstances, and within certain degrees, has no dominion over itself or the body, is in a manner passive, can neither help the agitations of the blood and spirits, nor help being itself affected by them. Omnes enim motus, qui non voluntate nostra sunt, inviæti & inevitabiles sunt; ut horror frigida aspersis, ad quosdam ictus asperratio, ad peiores nuntios subruguntur pili, & rubor ad improba verba suffunditur, sequiturque vertigo prærupta cernentes. “All those emotions, which depend not up-

on our Will, are not to be restrained or avoided by us; such as shuddering upon having cold water suddenly thrown upon us, and dislike upon being touched in a

“par-

particular manner; on receiving very bad news the hair stands on end, the countenance is flushed upon hearing immodest words, and the head grows giddy with looking down a precipice." It is Seneca a Stoic who talks thus, which, to omit other quotations that will be inserted in their proper places, may convince us, that the Stoics when they recommend the destruction of the Passions, did not mean the natural impressions of objects, from which they were sensible it would be a vain endeavour of any man intirely to free himself. And therefore the same Author says, Nihil ex his quæ animum fortuito impellunt, affectus vocari debet. Ista, ut ita dicam, patitur magis animus quam facit. "None of these sudden impressions ought to be called affections of ours, because in them the mind is passive not active." This latter part of the sentence is very true, but oddly brought as a reason of the former, when it is a reason of the direct contrary; for because the soul is passive in receiving these impressions, they ought therefore to be called affectus, affections; the word necessarily denoting Passion, and being used by the best Latin Authors to express the Greek word Πάθος.

SECT.

4 De Ira. L. 2. C. 2.
6 Ibid. C. 3.
Sect. IV. The objects of the Passions are mostly things sensible; for these having a nearer alliance to the body, as parts of the same whole, that is, of the corporeal universe, are more fit to operate upon it, and to produce in it consenting motions and affections. This accounts for the observation of an ingenious Author (of which he himself assigns not the reason) "that the "noblest desire in our nature, that of univer-"sal happiness, is generally calm, and "wholly free from any confused uneasy "sensation." The reason is, that the ob-"ject of this desire is so far from being sensi-"ble, as not easily to strike the imagination; which is the reason of its not causing any corporeal emotion; as that is the reason of its being without any sensible pain, and what the Author calls a confused sensation. But though things sensible must be owned to be the chief objects of the Passions, yet they are not the only. The object may be spiri-"tual and invisible though the Passion be sensi-"ble. The love of God, the hope of Hea-"ven, the dread of Eternity, and the joy of Assurance, may become proper Passions, and have the same general nature with our common love, hope, fear, and joy, while the objects are exceeding different. But then it is remarkable, that these Passions are not so easi-
easily raised, are less violent, and must borrow the assistance of the imagination. The Passions which terminate on sensible objects often surprize a man, and take forcible possession of him, they need not be invited or cherished, they intrude into the mind, and grow upon us without our approbation. On the contrary, the more refined Passions are kindled by collecting the thoughts, and centering them for a long while together on the object, they increase by slow degrees, and must be carefully cultivated and improved. Our other Passions are too often impetuous and ungovernable, these are generally remiss and languid; the others need to be cooled, these to be inflamed. Finally—Spiritual objects draw forth the Passions, but it must be by the help of the imagination, a faculty next bordering upon sense. The mind is forced to have recourse to sensible representations, in order to transmit the efficacy of spiritual things to the body, to engage the fancy first, and by that the Passions. And this must be the reason, that spiritual and heavenly things are in Scripture so frequently illustrated by similitudes, taken from the common objects and occurrences of life.

Sect. V. The Passions are in their nature indifferent. Εἰς ἅπαν μὲν ἐκ εὐσω, ἢ ἕκτο Ἀριστοτ., αὐτῷ.  

"The Passions are neither good nor evil," but according to the good or ill use that is made of them, and the degrees to which they are permitted to rise. Of the innocence of the Passions, or that there is no essential vitiosity cleaving to them, we cannot desire a better proof, than that they are ascribed to God himself, who in the sacred Writings is represented as angry, grieved, repenting, jealous, passionately desirous of his people's happiness, and the like. It must be granted, that these expressions are to be understood in a qualified sense, by way of resemblance or accommodation, not rigorously. But what then? If the Scripture in condescension to the weakness of our apprehensions, and the frame of our beings, describes the blessed God by our imperfections, yet still they are our innocent not our sinful ones. Should this not be thought sufficient to establish the point, the history of our Saviour puts it beyond all controversy, whom we find to have been a man of like Passions to ourselves, though better attempered and regulated. From hence it must follow, that Passion is an original appendix of human nature, not a part of its corruption.

Sect. VI. The usefulness of the Passions is in general owing to the union of the soul and body, from hence they have their ori-
Chap. VII. Of the Passions.

Original, and were given us for a kind of spring or elasticity to correct the natural sluggishness of the corporeal part. The Mathematicians *Vis Inertiae* (we owe this term to Kepler) by which every body opposes its removal out of the state it is in, may be applied here. The body is an unactive principle, and by the laws of union would communicate an indolence and heaviness to the mind, did not the Passions help to agitate the dull mass of lumpish matter, and thereby to invigorate the thoughts and affections of the soul.

"Man never exerts himself but when he is roused by his desires; while they lie dormant, and there is nothing to raise them, his excellence and abilities will be for ever undiscovered; and the lumpish machine, without the influence of his Passions, may be justly compared to a huge windmill without a breath of air." This observation has some foundation in truth, tho' like most of the observations of the same Author it is stretched to an extravagance.

There are two powers in the soul, Reason and Desire; Reason is chiefly employed in finding out Truth; Desire impels to Action." I distinguished before between

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h Author of the Fable of the Bees. p. 200.

i *Cic.* De Offic. L. 1. §. 36.
between pure Affection and Passion; pure affection does not seem to have any uneasiness connected with it, but the Passions, at least in the absence of their objects, do. This uneasiness supplies the imperfection of our Reason, and excites us to action, where that alone would fail to do it.

Sect. VII. The Passions gave birth to Poetry, k "As it is natural upon certain occasions to run or to dance, to sing or to cry; though these kinds of voices and motions are not the most simple, or the most easy; so great Passions make men speak in a manner which appears forced to those who are in cold blood, abounding with more exaggerations, comparisons, bold figures, and extraordinary words, than common language. Moreover, the same principle which makes men sing is the cause of their measuring their words, that they may sing them more commodiously, observing a certain quantity and number of syllables, the peculiar sound and harmony, and in fine, a cadence which ought to return from time to time. We ought not therefore to wonder, that we find among all nations, and of all times, some kinds of verse, as well as singing and dancing, especially among the

k Abbè Fleury's Discourse on Poetry in general, inserted in Calmet's Dissertations. V. 1.
"the Orientals, who being naturally more witty and passionate, have been some of the first who cultivated this natural inclination; and reduced it into an art." To this observation of the Abbé Fleury I would add some passages of Father Calmet, in his tract on the Poetry of the Hebrews. "There are two sorts of Poetry, the one natural, the other artificial. Natural Poetry is as antient as men. Reason and cool blood speak in a manner simple and direct, but Passion expresses itself with force and vivacity. A vehement and figurative expression, and an elevation of sentiments suited to the greatness and quality of the subject, constitute what I call natural Poetry; and this gave birth to what I call regular and artificial Poetry. This latter kind paints the sentiments and Passions in a strong and pathetic manner, which is common to it with natural Poetry; but then it represents them in chosen and studied phrases, ranged in a certain measure, and with a proper cadence. This is what distinguishes it from the other."

Sect. VIII. From hence we may observe, that all the polite arts which minister to pleasure, such as Poetry, Painting, Music, and the like, have their original from the Passions. And what is said here in
in general of the influence of the Passions on Poetry, is more particularly true of Admiration. 1 Dr. Jackson hath some observations on this head very well worth transcribing. “Were Arts to begin anew, "Poetry, which was the first and most common among the Antients, in all probability would spring the last, and grow the lowest amongst us. For which he assigns this reason. He is a Poet by nature (faith an excellent Poet and divine Philosopher) who is apt to be ravished with the true and native beauty of such objects as are represented to his senses, and can express his conceptions by such pleasant resemblances, as often as he shall have occasion to utter his mind in writing or set speech. This inclination or disposition is the ground or soil whereon Poetry doth naturally grow, whether in antient or modern breasts; but the antients had this advantage. The fashion of the world in their times was more apt to ravish their thoughts with admiration, wonderful events were then frequent, nor did their frequency abate, but rather increase wonderment, because their variety was great, and the apprehension of invisible or supernatural powers in them usual. So that admiration was then inforced upon men, and the breasts of such as diligently observed these events, “ or

or were any way disposed by nature for the faculty, were inspired with lively and sublimate affections, apt to vent themselves in such poetical phrase and resemblances, as we cannot reach unto, unless we raise our invention by art and imitation, and stir up admiration by meditation and study. And because neither our senses are moved with any extraordinary effects of God's power, nor our minds bent to observe the ways of his wisdom, so as we might be stricken with true admiration of them, we have fewer good sacred Poems than of any other kind."

Sect. IX. I shall be easily excused, if I close this account of the influence of the Passions on Poetry, with some observations relating to the subject borrowed from the learned and ingenious Author of the Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer. Sect. III.

The Geographer Strabo, a wise man, and well acquainted with antiquity, tells us, That Cadmus, Pherecydes, and Hecateus first took the numbers and the measure from speech, and reduced that to Prose, which had always been Poetry before. And the admired judge of the sublime, in the fragment of a treatise we have unhappily lost, has this remarkable sentence. Measure, faith he, belongs properly to Poetry, as it personates the various
"Of the Passions.  PART II.

"ous Passions and their language, uses
"fiction and fables, which naturally pro-
"duce numbers and harmony.  It was for
"this reason that the Antients in their ordi-
"nary discourse delivered themselves rather
"in Verse than Profe—He thought the life
"of the Antients was more exposed to
"accidents and dangers, than when cities
"were builded, and men were protected
"by Society and a Publick; and of conse-
"quence their discourse was more passionate
"and metaphorical—I do not in the least
"question, but that the first things which
"were committed to writing in Greece, as
"Oracles, Laws, Spells, Prophecies, were
"in Verse—The primitive parts of the Lan-
"guages reputed original are many of them
"rough, undeclined, impersonal, mono-
"yllables; expressive commonly of the
"highest Passions, and most striking objects,
"that present themselves in solitary savage
"life."  The Author introduces this ac-
"count of Language with the description

which the antient Heathen Writers give of
the beginnings of the human race, which
he seems to approve, or says nothing in dis-
like of.  So that the "origin of Language
"seem to have been certain rude accident-
"al sounds, which that naked company of
"scrambling mortals emitted by chance
"Upon this supposition it will follow
"that at first they uttered these sounds in a
"much higher note, than we do in our "words now; occasioned, perhaps, by "their falling on them under some Passion, "Fear, Wonder, or Pain; and then using "the same sound, either when the object "or accident recurred, or when they want-"ed to describe it by what they felt from "its presence—Hence came the antient "opinion, that Poetry was before Prose." Though I cannot entirely approve this ac-
count of the original of Language, because not agreeing with the account which Moses gives of the first Language, which the parents of mankind seem to have been taught immediately by God, yet it is a probable account of the rise of the various Languages formed by the rude Colonies dispersed over the earth after the confusion at Babel. To return.

Sect. X. The Passions have a threesfold use, with respect to Knowledge, to Virtue, and to Happiness. As to Knowledge and Truth itself they have their use, in as much as there is ground to question, whether in the present state of human nature, if there were no Passions, mankind would not by degrees sink into the most profound igno-
rance. A person seldom makes a consider-
able progress in any art or science, for which he has not a sort of passionate pre-
possesion. And were it not that men ap-
ply themselves to different studies, one to cultivate this part of learning, another that, how small would the common stock of knowledge be. The learned as well as the trading world subsist by mutual labours, helps, and improvements, and are addicted to different pursuits by the various Passions which God hath placed in them, as the springs of their several motions. "Philosophiae denique ipsius Principes numquam in suis studiis tantos progressus sine flagranti cupiditate facere potuissent. Ultimas terras luistras se Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem acceperimus. Ubi enim quidquid esset, quod disciplet, eo veniendum judicaverunt. Num putamus haec fieri sine summo cupiditatis ardore potuisset? "The prime masters of Philosophy "would never have been able to make so "great a progress in their studies, if they "had not been pushed on by an ardent de- "fire of knowledge. History informs us, "that Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato "visited the most remote countries, think- "ing themselves obliged to go wherever "any knowledge might be gained. And "can we think this could be done, if their "passion for knowledge had not been very "great?" "Cicero indeed, who takes the part of the Stoics, pretends that it was from Reason alone these great men acted, without any

\[\text{\textsuperscript{m}} \text{Cic. Tusc. Quaest. I. 4. \$ 19.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{n}} \text{Ibid. \$ 25.} \]
any thing of passionate desire. *Quid*? *Vos studia, libidinem vocatis? Quae vel optimarum rerum, ut ea sunt, quae profertis, sedata ta-
men & tranquilla esse debent.* "What!
"Would you call the desire of truth a hot
"Passion, libido? When the desires of the
"best things, such as those which you in-
"stance, ought to be sedate and calm."
If by *libido* Cicero means such a desire as
puts a man out of the command of himself,
*vehementior appetitus, qui procul absit a naturae constantia*, §. 21. it is certain the
study of Philosophy does not presuppose
any such perturbation as Philosophy con-
demns. Nor did the *Peripatetics* by their
*ardor animi*, ardor of mind, understand any
such irregular motion, but a *mixed inclina-
tion*, in which *found Reason* concurred with
bodily temper to carry a man towards a par-
ticular object.

**Sect. XI.** If we consider the Passions in
relation to *Virtue*, it will appear they are of
admirable use, for the *acquisition*, for the
*trial* and *exercise*, and for the *evidencing* of
it. The conviction of the mind, and recti-
tude of the judgment are not enough; there
may be these where not one step is made
towards the attainment of Virtue. This
was the first foundation of *Eloquence*, which
in its original intention is nothing else but
the art of ingaging the Passions on the side

U. 3
Of Reason and Virtue. And therefore an Orator deserves not that name, who addresses himself only to the Understanding, and who is a master of style and argument, but not of the Passions. Such a one does but half his work, while he possesses himself of the Reason of his hearers, without captivating their hearts. A people inured to war grow bold and hardy, which is the view upon which some politic princes act in lending out their troops to foreign nations and states, when they have no quarrel of their own upon their hands. So Virtue often exercised in combating the Passions, gains strength and vigour, and improves into a habit and complexion of soul. From the conflict between Passion and Reason, when victory declares for the latter, it is obvious to conclude, that there is an empire in the soul of man, and that it is the indefeasible right of the intellectual part to govern and direct the inferior powers.

Sect. XII. This conflict the Cartesians explain after the following manner. The soul, though united to the whole body, they imagine to be in an especial manner present in the brain. And because all the parts of this are double, the Glandula Pinealis excepted, (which Anatomists call Conarion) and the soul is but one, no better seat could have been

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been chosen for its residence than this gland, which lies in that part of the brain, where there is the greatest concourse of animal spirits. As often as any Passion is raised, the spirits are in a commotion, and smartly strike upon this gland; whereupon the soul exerts its authority to quell the mutiny, and moves the gland according to the advice of its own Reason, not by the impulse of the Passions. I mention this notion for the fancifulness of it, rather than any probability attending it; for indeed it is entirely inconsistent with fact, as we learn from the following anatomical account given of the brain by Monsieur Le Clerc. Ventriculi, sc. Cerebri, qui quasi receptacula spirituum animalium habebantur, plerumque inveniuntur pituitâ pleni; ut Cloacarum potius sint loco, quae superfluam humorum partem excipiunt, & per Infundibulum ejiciant. Conarion nihil est præter Cerebri quamdam excrecentiam, quae pituitâ, non spiritibus animalibus, unde quaque adluitur.

Sect. XIII. The best and most demonstrative evidence a man can have of his being virtuous is drawn from the Passions. A man may be deceived with respect to his Senses, but not as to his Passions. In a dream

p Physica. L. 4. C. 7. §. 1. See also Le Memoire de Mr. De le Peyronie in the History of the Academy of Sciences, for 1741.
Of the Passions.  Part II.

dream he may fancy himself to see what he does not; but can never think himself to be angry, or sorrowful, or glad, when he is not so. From whence flows the satisfaction that Virtue brings with it, to be preferred before the pleasures of speculation, as well as the delights of sin and sense. Pleasures of speculation may be built on a mistake, but Virtue, consisting in the conquest and due government of the Passions which we feel within us, can never be a deception. And it is the same as to the progress which a person makes in Virtue, and the price at which he values it. This is best known by the greater or less degree of the Passions, the moderation of them towards earthly objects, and the intensity of them towards such as are spiritual and divine. The love of Virtue is not wrought up to the degree it should be, if it is not followed with a passionate warmth, which shall impart its influence to the mechanism of the body, and create a generous indignation against Vice, as a thing unworthy the dignity of a human soul, and unsuitable to its expectations. Not but great allowances must be made for difference of temper and constitution. That degree of Passion which mixes with the Virtue of a man, whose disposition is lively and sanguine, cannot be expected from one of a cold and phlegmatick complexion. Yet, as there is no man without his Passions in a lower
lower degree, the observation how they work upon different objects will afford him a great deal of light into his own character. For it is gross hypocrisy to pretend a love to Virtue, and yet from an affected tranquility to continue unmoved, when the publick rights of mankind, and the eternal laws of Reason are violated; though at the same time we can warmly resent the most trifling injuries offered to ourselves.

Sect. XIV. As for Happiness, the Passions by being subservient to Virtue are of course subservient to Happiness. The noblest satisfactions of life arise from a warm love to God and man, from the clear and full testimony of a good conscience attending a Virtue thoroughly tried and greatly advanced, and raising high our hopes from God and for eternity, and from the easy and abundant practice of what is good and excellent, to which our Passions well directed carry us. And as to our other enjoyments, it is to be ascribed to the Passions that life has any briskness in it. These strike a vivacity through all our operations and enjoyments, of which they are destitute without them. Without these a man is scarcely awake, existence is insipid, the scene of the world affects him no more than the fleeting images of a dream. This is the case of a drowsy indolent soul. While the man
man who has lively Passions, under the direction of strong and sedate Reason, has the truest enjoyment of himself and all things around him. As the winds purge the air and preserve it wholesome, so do the Passions put the blood in motion, and by this means promote the health and vigour of the body; upon the vigour of whose organs in a great measure depends the vigour of the mind; as from both together arise all the pleasurableness and entertainment of life. If it be objected, that the Passions often cloud and pervert the judgment, plunge men in Sensuality and Vice, push them on to commit a thousand extravagances, and are accountable for more than half the tragedies, and complaints of human life. I own these to be effects of the Passions, but deny that they are the necessary effects. The best things may be abused, and when they are so, prove more hurtful than others. They who think this the crime of the Passions, should therefore abstain from meat and drink, because they are by many made the occasions of excess; to prevent diseases they should try to clear the body of all its humours, and break all the strings of an instrument, as the best way to avoid discord in the notes. To which I might add, that though the Passions themselves belong to uncorrupted nature, yet the over ballance of some one particular Passion or other which we
we may observe in every constitution, may
be justly reckoned a consequence of the
Fall, and of the gradual degeneracy of man-
kind since.

Sect. XV. The controversy about the
Seat of the Passions may be soon ended; for
as Passion signifies a sensation of the soul,
it must be lodged there, and not in any
part of the body. As this sensation is join-
ed with a tumult or agitation of the spirits,
the Passion must go along with the spirits
moved. Those in *Admiration* (which seems
to be a more speculative Passion, as being
imployed chiefly about the *novelty or gran-
deur* of objects) are in the *Brain*, the
great instrument or condition rather of
thought and contemplation. In other Pas-
fions, which respecting the good or evil of
objects, proceed from a principle of self-
preservation, the spirits agitated are in the
*Heart*, the fountain of life, and fittest resi-
dence of those motions of the animal spirits,
which are intended for the benefit and pre-
servation of life.

Sect. XVI. To know whether and how
far the Passions are under the regulation of
*Reason*, it will be of use to distinguish be-
tween *Δυσθεία* or *φωτισία*, the *first stroke* or
surprise on the sudden appearance of the ob-
ject, and *ταυρής* or *Συνοπλαγμένος*, the *opinion*,
*consent*,

Of the Passions.  Part II.

Consent, or approbation of the mind added to the former. This distinction is made by Antoninus, Seneca, and other Stoics, with this further remark, that the first is out of our power, but the other in which the soul is voluntary and active may and ought to be prevented. "Affectus est, non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permettere se illis; & hunc fortuitum motum perseveri—illa prima agitatio animi, quam species injuriae incussit, non magis ira est, quam ipsa injuriae species; sed ille sequens impetus qui speciem injuriae non tantum acceptit sed approbavit. "Passion is not being moved with the first appearance of things, but giving up ourselves to them; and following this accidental impulse. The first commotion of mind which the appearance of an injury excites, is no more the Passion of Anger, than the appearance itself is; but the following impetus is the Passion, which not only entertains the apprehension that we have been hurt, but owns it to be a right apprehension." It is then an allowed fact, that the first commotion of the spirits cannot be prevented, the physical reason of which seems to be this. All sensation and motion is performed by means of the Nerves. "The Nerves are of two

1 Anton. L. 5. §. 26.
3 Seneca De Ira. L. 2. C. 3.
two kinds, such as are derived to the spinal marrow from the Cerebrum or fore part of the Brain, and those that come from the Cerebellum or hinder part. Of these two sorts the former only are under our command, and the instruments of all our voluntary motions; the latter are not immediately subject to the direction of our Will; and it is on these the Passions of the soul depend, as far as they communicate with the body. For as the motions of the Heart, the Stomach, the Bowels, and the like, are performed by these Nerves, so in violent Passions it is certain that these several parts are liable to be considerably affected. This shows why the first impressions of the Passions are not immediately in our power; as it is likewise not in our choice (the eye being open, and the object presented, and all the other requisites supposed) whether we will see or no. What we do to secure the mind against violent impressions must be by way of prevention, or, after the first surprize, by strongly directing the mind another way.

Sect. XVII. As for the opinion or judgment of things whether present or future, as being good or evil, this according to the "Stoics is a false judgment, and in our power. It is a false judgment, because according to them Virtue is the only good, and Vice

* Vide Salm.
Vice the only evil. This is the ground upon which they condemn the Passions; by which they do not mean those sudden motions which prevent all thought, but those which flow from our opinion of things. Chrysippus places the Passion in this opinion itself; Zeno in the emotion of the mind consequent to it; but the followers of one and the other agree in this, that it is the false opinion of things that makes the Passion blameable. "Cicero argues at length against all Perturbations of mind, as the same with what the Stoics meant by their Passions, who, according to him, allowed of a reasonable desire of what are usually called good things, which they termed voluntas, and delight in them, which they called gaudium; but declare against the Perturbations which they called libido and laetitia. They further allowed of caution against evil, though not of what Cicero calls metus or dread, by which again they meant a Perturbation or disturbance of mind. So far they seem to differ in words only from the Peripatetics, but in condemning all Grief under present evils, agritudo animi, they not only oppose all other Philosophers, but common sense too. Cicero seems liable to the same charge also, when he finds fault with the Peripatetics for saying, that Anger was usefully given us by nature, and declares

" Tusc. Quest. L. 4. §. 16, 17. &c."
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declares his opinion that it ought to be entirely discharged.

Sect. XVIII. But with the leave of Cicero and of the Stoics, I must declare on the side of a Philosophy more agreeable to the necessary feelings of human nature, and to common sense. I cannot think the opinion with regard to things external so much in our power, but that though we allow Virtue to be a principal good, and Vice the evil most to be dreaded, we must judge other things to be good or evil besides these, though not in an equal degree. But then, whether we shall indulge to the Passion we feel is certainly matter of our choice; as it is further certain, that without this indulgence the Passion would expire much sooner; I mean the sensitive part of it, or the disorder into which nature is thrown. For though this be at first involuntary, yet by being countenanced it gets ground, and owes its strength and duration to us. Not that I imagine our authority to be so absolute in this case as Adam's was. It is not improbable that during the state of innocence man had a greater command over the Passions, even in respect of the part which the body hath in them, than we can now pretend to have. As the fluids of his body were better tempered, than to subject him to the incursion of violent Passions on the
the unexpected appearance of things, so we may reasonably suppose it was more in his power to stop the career of a Passion, by laying a restraint upon the impetuous current of the blood and spirits. To this purpose I think it very observable, that the Evangelist (John xi. 33.) describing what passed at the grave of Lazarus, does not say concerning our Saviour, that he was troubled, as we have translated it, but ἀφανὼν καθόηον, he troubled himself. The meaning whereof seems to be this, that finding in himself the same tender emotions of humanity which others feel on like occasions, though he could have re stifled and over ruled them, yet he rather chose to give free way to them, to shew that he was truly a man, and framed with the same Passions as other men, though better able to controul them; wherein it is likely he was resembled by innocent man.

Sect. XIX. The two general rules for the management of the Passions concern the direction, and the moderation of them; the first their object, the latter their degree. The first is called ὀφθεταία, or Passion rightly determined. Grief is in general an innocent Passion, but Grief at the excellent qualities, or noble actions, or happy success of another, which is then known by the name of Envy, offends against this rule of chusing a proper object of our Passions. Joy is a delight-
Of the Passions.

delightful Passion, but to *rejoice in iniquity*, though it may be pleasant, is highly criminal. The latter is called *metoethaskia* or *Passion duly moderated*, proportioned to the value of the object, and to its own intention and end. *Efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus Rationi obediant, eamque neque praecurrant, nec propter pigritiam, aut ignaviam deserant; sintque tranquilli, atque omni perturbatione animi careant. Ex quo elucebit omnis constantia, omnisque moderatio.* "We should " reduce our appetites into subjection to " Reason, never suffering them to run before it, nor yet through sloth or cowardice to desert it; preserving them sedate, and " the mind undisturbed by them. This " will give us the ornament of a steady and " composed temper." So that according to *Cicero* there may be both an excess and a defect; in which sentiment he forswears the *Stoics*, who allow not of the Passions in any degree as far as they are voluntary. "A " wise man will not yield to the impressi-" ons of Anger, Joy, Grief, or Pity, but " strive against them all he can;" wherein they make him wise beyond the intention of nature, which cannot be supposed to have given a man Passions with a design they should be opposed in their whole kind, but only tempered and regulated. *Nimis mag-

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*Cic. De Offic. L. 1. §. 29.*

*Senec. Epist. 116.*
Of the Passions. Part II.

na promittitis, nimis dura praecipitis. Nos humunciones sumus; omnia nobis negare non possumus. Dolebimus, sed parum. Concupiscimus, sed temperate. Iraeemur, sed placabimur. "You Stoics pretend to things too great for human nature, and give precepts too severe. We are weak men, who cannot deny ourselves every thing. We will grieve, but not violently. We will desire, but with moderation. We will be angry, but not implacably." This plea for the Passions Seneca mentions with dislike, and insists on an absolute dispassionateness; and Cicero argues for the same thing; and this is the Stoical Apathy so much talked of. The Epicureans and the Stoics were guilty of an extreme on either hand, one declaring a perpetual war against the Passions, the other suffering themselves to be subdued by them; and perhaps both these extremes had their original from the same project, of putting an end to the contest between Passion and Reason. The Epicureans were for renouncing their Reason, and sinking human nature to a level with the beasts; the Stoics disclaimed all voluntary Passions, and aspired to be Gods.

Sect. XX. The particular Directions proper to be observed for well regulating the Passions are such as these.

1. Let

2 Tusc. Ques. L. 4. §. 17.
1. Let us endeavour to improve our minds in sound knowledge, and particularly to furnish it with right notions of those things which are the common incentives to the Passions. The Understanding was appointed for a guide to the Affections, but before it can perform this part as it ought, it must be furnished with light in itself. According to the doctrine of the Stoics the Passions do either immediately consist in opinion, or depend entirely upon it, so that we should have no Passions if we were not led away by false opinions. Though this be not a true representation of the matter, since opinion and Passion are two things, and where the opinion is right, the Passion may be wrong, for want of serious consideration and firm resolution, yet it is too plain to be denied, that opinion is the usual cause or foundation of excessive Passions. We distinguish things into the good or evil things of the soul and of the body, of this life and the next, of time and eternity. Let us get and settle just notions of these things with respect to their different weight and value, considered absolutely in themselves, and comparatively one with another, and often revolve these in our thoughts, and we shall find this single rule of unspeakable use. Do the objects of sense and time raise frequent commotions in our breasts? And is it not easy to apprehend what is commonly
the reason of it? Did we judge these things to be trifles, should we give them so much power over us? And are they more than trifles in comparison of those things, which affect the well-being of our souls, and our everlasting state? Are we not reasonable and immortal, I speak as to our better part, and what then are those things which we are to esteem of real importance to us, but such in which we are interested, considered as reasonable and immortal? What does not make us better or worse in our moral and religious character, or as to the state of our souls; what does not promote or hinder our preparation for eternity, cannot be good or evil in a high degree, and therefore will not justify a strong Passion. They are fine words of a Heathen Moralist. "Quid enim ei videatur magnum in rebus humanis, cui eternitas omnis, totiusque mundi nota sit magnitude? " What can appear great in human things to that person, to whose view all eternity lies open, and the greatness of the universe?"

Sect. XXI. 2. Be careful to observe a proper medium in respect of bodily gratifications, not using too much indulgence on the one hand, nor too great severity on the other. The former of these extremes is by far the most dangerous and the most com-

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mon, but both of them are to be avoided. A life of sensuality gives birth to number less Passions; for when nothing else is mind-ed but pleasing the senses, and the appetites of the fleshly part, the Passions grow head- strong and mutinous; the reason of which is plainly this, that the Passions being root- ed in the body, are consequently fed and nourished by the same methods, as the body is pampered and rendered less fit to obey the mind. Whoever therefore would not be subject to the impulses of violent Passi- ons, let him be temperate in all things, and live in the practice of frequent instances of self-denial. A few there are who run into the extreme of giving the body too little, some through a fordid parcimony, and others through mistaken principles of Religion. Whatever the principle be, if persons do not keep the golden mean, but deny themselves what is convenient as to meat and drink, society, and other innocent relaxations, there are certain Passions to which they are pecu- liarly liable, and of a very bad kind too, such as spiritual pride, a blind zeal, and un- charitableness, and a savage sourness, and moroseness of temper. The accounts we have of the temper and behaviour of many Monks and Recluses, both of the Roman and Greek Church, and of those who far out-do them, both in superstition and austerity,
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among the Eastern Bramins, are a sufficient demonstration of the evil of running into this extreme.

Sect. XXII. 3. Another good direction for regulating the Passions is, either to make the object familiar to our minds, or to keep out of the way of it, according as we perceive one or other of these tends to abate the Passion. Love, and Anger, and Envy are generally fed by thought, while Fear lessens. Do we find in ourselves the seeds of Ambition, Covetousness, or Sensuality? Are we inclined to doat upon the pomp or riches, or pleasures of the world; do these things dazzle our eyes, and bewitch our hearts? Let us turn away our eyes from beholding vanity. If we suffer our imagination to dwell upon these things, the effect will be near the same as from the sight of them; our Passions will be awakened, and we shall envy the prosperous wicked, and be tempted to learn their ways. We must therefore either not think at all of these things, or view them on the dark side, for they have all a dark side as well as a bright one. Let us think of the dangers that attend those which the world reckons its best things, and the cares and troubles and disappointments which are bred out of them. Such thoughts, if we entered deep into them,
them, would convert our Admiration into Contempt, our Love into Indifference, and our Envy into Pity. Are we inclined to fear where no fear is? Let us bring our minds up close to the object, in order to convince ourselves that there is no ground for such terrible apprehensions. Ignorance is in this respect like darkness, it breeds unreasonable fears and surmises, every shadow becomes a frightful spectre; and we startle at the first appearance of that, which when we come to examine it hath nothing in it dreadful. This method would sometimes be of use to qualify the fear of death itself; I mean to the truly good man, who perhaps is more afraid of death itself, than of the state which follows after death. The pain of dying in all likelihood is nothing so great, as that we suffer in many distempers of the body; and generally speaking it is soon over. This moment we are struggling with the agonies of death, the next we are entered into everlasting rest.

Sect. XXIII. 4. Another very important rule to be observed is, that we watch against the beginnings of Passion. What the wise King remarked of Strife is true of other Passions, the beginning of them is as when one letteth out water; the breach at first may be easily

b Prov. xvii. 14.
Of the Passions.  Part II.

easily stopt, but let alone soon widens, till at length the banks are thrown down, and the flood deluges the neighbouring plain. It is seldom if ever any Passion rises to its height in a moment, it does not take possession of the soul all at once, but by degrees; so that usually we have sufficient warning to think of our danger, and sufficient time to put ourselves in a posture of defence. This is very wisely and kindly ordered by nature, or rather by the God of nature; since we should find it a much harder task to quell and restrain a Passion if we were always to engage it in its full strength. How many, for the sake of venting their Passion, when they have been angry, have given their tongues a liberty to run on, till they have talked themselves into the height of Passion, thus as it were fanning the flame with their own breath; which shows Cicero's advice to his Brother, a man of a passionate temper, was very good, "That as much as possible he should keep silence when he was provoked, that he might not further incense himself by his own words." And there is the same reason why we should watch the beginnings of other Passions, for the Passions not restrained chase themselves, and like the wheels of a chariot take fire by the rapidity of their own motion.
Sect. XXIV. 5. Let us conquer one Passion by the help of another, either of the same kind, as Fear by Fear, and Love by Love; or of a different, as Anger by Love, Fear by Hope, Sorrow by Joy, as we see there is occasion, and prudence shall direct us. To overcome a Passion which grows upon us, we may frequently employ another of the same kind with good success; as the Fear of God to banish the Fear of man, and the Love of God and of our Neighbour, to get free from the Love of the world. Hear what the living Oracle of truth says, Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do. I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear; fear him, who after he has killed, has power to cast into Hell; yea, I say unto you, fear him. Let us fear to offend him, and then we shall have no great cause to be afraid of any thing else; because all things else are under his controll and direction, and compared with his displeasure are as nothing. On the other hand, in combating a Passion we may borrow help from a Passion of a different kind. Are we prone to be angry with our brother without a cause, and beyond measure? Let us cherish brotherly love in ourselves, as a most excellent and amiable affection; let us

\[\text{\textsuperscript{5}}\text{ Luke xii. 4, 5.}\]
us consider the reasons we have to love our Neighbour as ourselves, till we come to be acquainted with this love from our own experience, as well as in the notion of it; and then whenever our Anger begins to grow extravagant, our love and benevolence will be at hand to check and suppress it. Is our temper inclined to sadness, so that sorrow filleth our hearts upon small occasions, and sometimes we hardly know why? Let us dwell more upon the joyous views and prospects which Religion affords us; let us think often of the goodness of God, and how many things we enjoy which are fitted to promote gladness of heart; that the good things of life are abundantly more than the evils of it; that the good things of it flow from the divine benevolence, and even the evil things of it shall, by the same goodness, be made to contribute, some way or other, to our final happiness; always supposing that we ourselves concur with the designs and methods of the divine benignity.

Sect. XXV. 6. Would we succeed in our endeavours to regulate our Passions, our watchfulness over them must be constant, and our care to govern them habitual. Every single victory obtained by our Passions concurs to establish their empire; as on the contrary, a continued vigorous resistance will
will in time destroy it. To be sometimes vigilant, at other times careless, now strict and severe, and then remiss, is but trifling in a matter of the greatest moment. Who that wisely considers his true interest, would be content to spend his life in rolling a stone up hill, and then leaving it to run down again? Let me further take notice, that though we should exercise some rule over our spirits for the greater part of our time, and only now and then let our Reason sleep, yet even this would not be sufficient. For besides the mischiefs our Passions may do in the intervals of licence, they will prove much more untractable at other times. An habitual command of our Passions is sooner obtained, than one which is every now and then interrupted; it being the same here as in other habits, whatever we would have to be easy in the practice, we must make habitual; and that it may become habitual we must be constant in it.

7. We should meditate often on the shame and evil of disordered Passions, and the honour and happiness which attend the reducing them within the bounds of Reason. As we are reasonable creatures, and naturally pursue good and fly from evil, if we clearly see that the government of our Passions is every way for our interest, and their govern-
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governing us in every respect opposite to it; that one brings us to the enjoyment of the best ends we can propose to ourselves, and the other sets us at the greatest distance from them; if we clearly discern this, and often and attentively consider it, we are not such enemies to ourselves, or so indifferent to what concerns our own interest and happiness, as not to be influenced by these motives.

Sect. XXVI. 8. Let us not forget our dependance upon God, and to beg of him, that as his hand hath formed us with this variety of Passions, so by the same hand he would over-rule their motions, and guide the vessel in this perilous voyage of life, until it arrive safe at the haven of eternal rest. Besides, our being qualified by humble and fervent supplications to receive assistance from heaven, the apprehension that our succeeding herein is highly pleasing to God, and the hope of his favourable influences will naturally give a great degree of strength and spirit to our endeavours; for to our prayers we must join our most resolute and constant endeavours. This minds me of the last advice.

9. Be persuaded that we can do a great deal in the government of our Passions; and hereupon resolve that you will rouze the latent strength of your souls, and exert it in this con-
conflict. Remember it is in our power to follow the preceding advices; and let this excite you to follow them. You can watch against the incursions of Passion; you can resist and fight against them, when they invade your quiet; if you do not strive against them, you must not call this weakness, but sloth. The use of this single direction cannot be easily conceived; men fancy they can do nothing, and therefore will not attempt any thing, but tamely deliver themselves up to be bound by the enemy, and used at discretion. Seneca's words are worth remembering, (applying them to the moderation of the Passions, not as he does, to the total denial of them) "Would you know why we cannot do these things? It is because we do not believe that we can. We love our vices, and then defend them; and had rather be at the trouble of excusing them, than shaking them off. Nature has been liberal enough, would men use the strength that she has given them; and collecting their forces imploy them in their own defence, instead of turning them against themselves. The true cause is that we will not, that we cannot is only a pretence."
Read on the subject of this Chapter,

*Ciceronis Tuscul. Quæst. L. 4.*
*Curcellæi Eth. C. 4.*
*Whitbii Eth. L. 1. C. 8.*
*Hutcheson on the Passions. Sect. 4 & 6.*
*Watts of the Passions, and of the Use and Abuse of them in Religion.*
*Cheyne of Health and Long Life. C. 6.*
*Claggett's Sermon on Prov. 25. 8.*
*Clarke's 17 Sermons. Ser. 6.*
C H A P. VIII.

Of the primitive Passions, Admiration, Love, and Hatred.

S E C T. I. A L L the Passions are reducible to these three heads, of 

Admiration, Love, and Hatred, which may therefore be stiled the primitive Passions. 

Admiration is that sudden surprize at the novelty of an object, by which the soul is fastened down to the contemplation of it. 

The inclination for novelty is universal, and so prevalent in its influence, as to be almost necessary to recommend the best and most excellent things; which no sooner cease to be new, than they are looked upon with indifference. Which, by the way, may be one ground of the expediency of 

sleep; (and there is the same reason for the variety of the Seasons) for though the time spent in sleep may seem to be all lost, yet when it is considered that by this retirement from the world every twenty four hours, by this suspense and in action of the senses, the scene appears with a fresh beauty every 
morn-
Of Admiration, Part II.

morning, just as a man's home is more agreeable to him, after he hath been some time absent from it: we shall discern one reason more to admire the wisdom of the Creator, in appointing so great a portion of our time for sleep. But may we not admire things for their antiquity? We may so; and the reason is, that in this case even their age is a novelty, in regard of our not having observed the like before, or not often. That novelty should carry the mind to a more fixed and attentive view of objects is not difficult to be accounted for, since novelty is attended with pleasure.

Sect. II. There are these few things which I would remark concerning this Passion.

1. In Admiration every man, where he can do it, secretly regards himself as the measure of all things round about him, both as to his body and his mind; and I believe, where this unobserved comparison is made between the things admired and ourselves, the Admiration is generally stronger than in other cases. If a man admires the vastness of the Whale, or the almost imperceptible dimensions of the Mite, it is because he himself is but a kind of Mite to the one, as he is a Whale to the other. And yet he admires not other men for this reason, because though compared with the Whale or the Mite,
Mite they are exceeding great or little, compared with himself they are neither. Does he admire one man's courage and another's pusillanimity? The cause is, that he comes short of the one, and surpasses the other.

"What the real Magnitudes of Bodies are, I doubt no one can justly tell, nor were it of any use to us to know, since their Analogical Magnitudes to the Magnitude of our Bodies is all that we have any concern about. Thus taking our own Hand or Foot or Height for our Standard, all things about us are represented in a constant uniform proportion to these; so that we are thereby informed of that Distance and Magnitude of objects that is most natural and familiar to us, and is also most necessary for our security and preservation. And the same is true of every other animal small or great. Thus take an Elephant, a Man, and a Mite, and present the same object to them all three, and it shall appear not of the same Magnitude to them, but in a Magnitude in some sort reciprocally proportional to their own bulks, that is, to the Elephant less than to the Man, and to the Mite much greater than to either. And this of necessity from the different Magnitudes and Fabrick of their Nerves and visual Organs, and from the necessity

*Chyve's Philosophical Principles of Religion. p. 351*
Of Admiration, Part II.

"necessity of their preservation and seeking " their food."

Sect. III. 2. Greatness or excellency is the most general and most proper object of Admiration. Even when littleness is the immediate object, this is commonly the object that terminates the view. The works of nature or art, which are of an unusual smallness, are admired, not so much for their smallness, as for the greatness of the wisdom or skill conspicuous in them. For we can behold a particle of mere undiversified matter, though incomparably smaller, without any such wonder.

3. Novelty is essential to Admiration as a Passion only; for though as the object grows familiar the Passion lessens, and is at length scarcely discernable, yet the intellectual affection may still continue. Upon this account, knowledge, which destroys the Passion of Admiration wholly, if the object of it contain things worthy of our contemplation and acquaintance, does proportionably increase that Admiration, which is founded not in their novelty, but in their real beauty, greatness, or excellence. Were I to advise how the pleasure of the Passion might be best continued, I would say, do not keep the mind too long attentive to what it admires. On the contrary, to one who...
who is desirous of injoying the pleasure of a rational *Admiration* I would recommend the closest and longest attention, and the most familiar acquaintance with great and noble objects. The Passion of *Admiration*; after *Adam* had been used to contemplate the glorious scene above, and around him, cannot be supposed as great as it was the first moment he opened his eyes upon it; but the rational impression must be the same or stronger, and the intellectual delight greater, as he grew better acquainted with the immense wisdom, power, and goodness, discoverable in the frame of things.

**Sect. IV. 4.** The alteration caused by the Passion of *Admiration*, is confined to the spirits lodged in the *Brain*. The *Heart* lies quiet and undisturbed, the reason of which was given before, namely, that the object immediately under contemplation is the *novelty* of the thing, not its good or evil qualities. It is acknowledged that pleasure is joined with *novelty*, and pleasure is the same as good, but then pleasure is not directly the object of *Admiration*, but rather the consequence of it. *Novelty* is the cause why a thing is admired, and the object of *Admiration*; though perhaps did not pleasure go along with the *novelty*, we might admire but should not continue the contemplation of an object, because we should
Of Admiration, Part II.

should be without any motive to do it. In other words, novelty is the cause and the object of Admiration, and the pleasure arising from novelty is the true cause of curiosity, in which Admiration generally issues. And then further, the pleasure of novelty is not a good inherent in the thing itself. The same thing may cause Admiration in one and not in another, because its being new or old is purely accidental, and makes no change in the thing itself.

5. The commotion that follows Admiration is soon over. At the instant that the object first presents itself, the spirits are mightily alarmed, and (as Monfieur Des Cartes observes) forcibly determined to that part of the Brain where the image is newly formed, and to the Muscles which serve to hold the external sense in the same posture; but when this is done they settle in a fixed and quiet suspense.

Sect. V. Admiration was in general disgrace among the Antients, and condemned particularly for these two reasons; that it was the disease only of weak and ignorant minds, and that it laid the foundation of an unhappy life. This is the thing objected to it by Horace.

Nil

Nil admirari, prope res est una, Numici, Solaque quae posset facere & servare beatum.

Not to admire, is all the Art I know, To make men happy; and to keep them so.

In answer to this I say, that the Antients do not seem to have taken Admiration in a strict and philosophical sense, but for an extravagant opinion of things, expressing itself by excessive hopes and fears about them, as it is certain, from the following lines, that Horace understood it.

--- quid censes munera Terrae?
Quid Maris, extremos Arabasditantis & Indos?
Ludicra quid, plausus, & amici dona Quiritis,
Quo spectanda modo, quo sensu credis, & ore?
Quo timet bis adversa, fere miratur eodem
Quo cupiens pacto; Pavor est utrique molestus;
Improvisa simul species exterret utrumque:
Gaudeat, an doleat, cupiat, metuatne, quid ad
rem;
Si, quidquid videt melius, pejusve sua spe,
Defixis oculis, animoque & corpore torpet?

Admire we then what Earth's low entrails hold,
Arabian shores, or Indian seas unfold;
All the mad trade of Fools and Slaves for Gold?

Or
Of Admiration, Part II.

Or Popularity? Or Stars and Strings?
The Mob's applause, or the gifts of Kings?
Say with what eyes we ought at Courts to gaze,
And pay the Great our homage of amaze?
If weak the pleasure that from these can spring,
The fear to want them is as weak a thing:
Whether we dread, or whether we desire,
In either case, believe me, we admire;
Whether we joy or grieve, the fame the curse,
Surpriz'd at better, or surpriz'd at worse.
Thus good or bad, to one extreme betray
Th' unbalance'd mind, and snatch the man away.

Pope.

And if this were their meaning they were much in the right to brand it with a note of infamy; since a man of such a temper forfeits the credit of his understanding, and is infallibly wretched. *Fortis animus* (says *Cicero*) *in rerum externarum despicientia cernitur, cum persuasium fit, nihil hominem nisi quod bonisium decorumque fit admirari oportere.* "A truly great mind discovers itself in a contempt of things external, from a settled persuasion that a man ought to admire nothing but what is virtuous and morally beautiful." But according to the explanation before given of this Passion, no reasonable man will condemn it. *Admiration* *De Offic. L. 1.*
tion, though the daughter of Ignorance, is the mother of Knowledge. It shows ignorance, but it is as nature gives indications of distempers, in order to their cure. Accordingly it is very observable, that this Passion operates most powerfully in Children, making them inquisitive and willing to take pains to stock and improve their minds, which otherwise would be waste and unfurnished. * Si quas res in vita videmus parvas, usitatas, quotidianas, eas memorisse non sollemus; propter quod nullâ nisi novâ aut admirabilior commovetur animus. At si quid videmus, aut audimus egregie, turpe, aut bonum, inusitatum, magnum, incredibile, ridiculum, id diu memorisse conuevimus. " If we see any thing trifling, usual, and of daily occurrence, we do not commonly remember such things, because the mind is not naturally much affected but with what is new or admirable. But if we see or hear any thing in a great degree vicious, or excellent, uncommon, great, incredible, or ridiculous, those things usually make a deep and lasting impression on the memory." This is another great advantage we owe to this Passion, that the memory is considerably aided by it; for whereas the images of things would else pass by unheeded, and scarce leave any print behind; Admiration, by fixing the view of the mind,
impresses ideas, and renders them more clear and lasting; and thus by degrees supplies us with the materials of the intellectual building. From this end of Admiration it is obvious to infer, that whoever admire things purely for amusement, not to increase their knowledge, are justly to be condemned for contradicting the design of nature.

Sect. VI. Curiosity is the effect of Admiration, and to Curiosity we are indebted for all those fine discoveries which have been made in the several Sciences. "Διὰ τὸ θαυμα-
ζεῖν ὁ Ανθρωπὸς καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρὸς θεόν πρέπει Φιλοσοφεῖν," says the Prince of the Peripatetics. "It was from their proneness to admire that men heretofore, as well as now, learned to φιλοσοφίζειν." I shall advance no more than admits of easy proof if I add, that Religion itself is in great measure bred by Admiration. For what is it that imprints on the mind the belief and reverence of a divine Being, but an admiring view of his works? Jovis omnia plena. The creation is nothing else but a heap of wonders, all proclaiming the wisdom of the Deity in forming them, and of man in adoring him upon that account. With how much reason therefore does Milton describe the first man, from the contemplation of the surprising scene around

* Paradise Lost. B. 5. L. 152. &c.
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around him, rising to this noble acknowledgment and veneration of the boundless perfection of the great Creator.

These are thy glorious works, Parent of good, Almighty, thine this universal frame, Thus wondrous fair; thy self how wondrous then!

Unspeakable, who sittest above these heavens To us invisible, or dimly seen,

In these thy lowest works, yet these declare Thy goodness beyond thought, and power divine.

Sect. VII. Admiration, according to the different character of its object, is called Esteem or Contempt. Esteem is the admiration of an object on account of its excellence; Contempt for its insignificance or worthlessnes. Hence it is easily apprehended what is meant by self-esteem and self-abasement, and what by our esteem or contempt of others; whereof the former is styled Veneration, the latter Slight or Scorn. Esteem and contempt are in the nature of things the same, whether they regard ourselves or others; the joy or sorrow that mingles with them in one case or the other, is extraessential to the Passion itself, 9 and proceeds from self-love, joining with either of them. Some

2 See Mor Ench. Eth. L. 1. C. 8, 14.
Of Admiration, Part II.

Some measure of self-esteem is necessary to give a man a modest assurance, as this latter is necessary to preserve a man from being trampled on by the world. *Tu modo enitere, ut tibi ipse sis tanti, quanti videberis alis.* Was good advice of *Pliny* to a friend. "Strive to be as deserving in your own im-
"partial judgment, as you would be thought "by others." The chief thing we are to guard against here is *self-conceit*, especially if we are in prosperity. *Tales enim nos tunc esse putamus, ut jure laudemur: ex quo nascuntur innumerabilia peccata, cum homines inflati opinionibus, turpitur irredentur, & in maximis versan tur erroribus." At such a "time we are apt without reason to think "ourselves deserving of praise. This vanity "betrays us into numberless faults, and ex-"poses us to the most just and severe ridi-"cule." Self-conceit thus defeats its own design, and by discovering an overweaning value of a man's self, renders him contemptible to others, and reduces him to the condition which *Horace* humourously de-
scribes.

Quin sine Rivali teque & tua solus amares.

Left without Rival to admire yourself.

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*b* See *Spectator.* V. 8. n. 538.

*i* Ep. 3. L. 1.

*k* *Cic. De Offic.* L. 1. §. 26.

1 *De Arte Poet.* L. 444.
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Self-esteem, or contempt, seem designed to intimate to us, that it is our duty to be and do what may deserve our own approbation; and to avoid all such things as would justly lessen us in our own opinion. They should also teach us to be more humane and charitable in our judgments of others, it being reasonable, that when we differ so little from others, and yet are so prone to think well of ourselves, we should not be backward to acknowledge the merit of any man.

The only justifiable cause of self-esteem (as Cartes with good reason remarks) is the right use of one’s Liberty; because this is the only thing a man can properly call his own. The conduct of this by the dictates of sound Reason is true generosity, and of great service to fortify the mind against slander and defamation.

\[ bic murus abeneus esto. \\
Nil consciire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa. \]

Be this your brazen wall, your sure defence, Thoughts free from guilt, and conscious innocence.

Sect. VIII. Veneration is an esteem of some free agent, as in a capacity of being beneficial or hurtful to us, joined with a des-\footnote{Horat. L. 1. Ep. 1.}
fire of subjecting ourselves to him. There may be *Admiration* of a Tyrant's grandeur and dominion, which, being without any desire of putting ourselves within the reach of his power, cannot be called *Veneration*. The account which *Cicero* gives of true Glory differs little from *Veneration*. *Summa igitur & perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his; si diliget multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam bonore dignos putat. *“They have attained the highest glory, “who have gained the affection and confidence of a people, and whom with an inward esteem they declare worthy of the chief honours in the commonwealth.”* The usefulness of this Passion is best discovered in civil and religious societies; nor does it obscurely hint to us, that we ought to honour our superiors; and that there is a Providence which hath wisely ordered this Passion, to secure the performance of the duties owing from the inferior part of mankind to those above them. *Dedignation or Scorn* is *Admiration* in conjunction with security; or the contempt of a free agent as unable to benefit or to hurt us. *Deespiciunt autem eos, & contemptunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum putant. Non enim omnes eos contemptunt, de quibus male existimant. Nam quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos*
dulentos putant, & ad faciendam injuriam instruéstos, eos hæd contemnunt quidem, sed de his male existimant. "Men look "down with contempt on those who want "resolution, prudence, and strength of "mind and body, but they do not contemn "all of whom they think ill. Those whom "they look upon as wicked, flanderous, "deceitful, and qualified to do mischief, "though they think ill of and abhor them, "they by no means despise." The use of this Passion is to guard the tranquility of the soul, and to lay that fear of men against which our Saviour cautions (Luke xii. 4.) and which has been so fatal to many in tempting them to abandon a good cause, to which they wanted courage to adhere. Socrates will be for ever quoted as an illustrious example, for his contemning the impotent malice of Anytus and Melitus, who might kill his body, but could do no more. And this is the only case wherein this Passion is to be admitted. A scorn of others, as sunk too low for us to apprehend any thing from them, is founded in a mistake. The contemptuous neglect of any man is not prudent, forasmuch as there is no man of so little consideration, but he may one time or other have it in his power to do us a kindness or the contrary. These are the ends and uses of Admiration, which it never fails of answering, while kept within bounds, If
Of admiration, Part II.

If we suffer it to pass its proper limits, it may be of ill consequence. The excess of this Passion is often followed with a stupor or astonishment; and not seldom with that distemper which the Physicians call Catalepsis, whereby a man is held motionless and stiff like a statue. This should caution us against the excesses of this Passion, but is no argument against the Passion well regulated.

Sect. IX. The next class of Passions are love and hatred, with their dependants. The antient philosophers meant much the same by their ἐρωσία καὶ θυμός, the concupiscible and the irascible part. Nothing is more known than love, and yet nothing almost harder to be defined. You may take this general idea of it; love is the gravitation or weight of the soul towards good. I choose to describe it thus, rather than by a motion of the soul, because there is such a thing as love at rest. But even then, though the motion be over, the gravitation continues, and is the cause of the soul's adherence to the beloved object; much after the same manner as it fares with a heavy body when settled on its center. This affection may be conceived separate from any alteration in the body, and is then what we call intellectual or rational love; or is attended with an agitation of blood and spirits, and then it is called sensitive or passionate love; it is as
as a Passion we are at present concerned with it. Hatred is an endeavour of the soul to disunite from that which it apprehends to be evil. So that the object of these Passions are good and evil; each of which is either negative or positive. Negative good or evil is nothing but the negation of the contrary in a subject capable of it. Positive good or evil are terms equivalent to pleasure or pain.

Sect. X. Before I descend to a more particular view of these Passions, I would make a few general observations concerning them.

1. The pleasures or pains conveyed by the body, and occasioned by sensible objects, are ordinarily much more lively and forcible in the perception, than those which are purely intellectual. The thing is undeniable, and the reason of it, I believe, not hard to be produced, being probably grounded in the different manner of conversing with sensible objects, and the objects of the Understanding. With the former we have a direct correspondence, with the latter only by reflection; the former we know to exist by a kind of immediate perception, the other by reasoning and deduction. It is therefore no more to be wondered at, that the pleasures and pains of sense should be commonly most pungent, than that the fight
fight of any thing should affect more than a mere report about it. However that be, the consequence is plain, that the strongest Passions are produced by sensible objects. The *pure Affection* may be greatest to divine and heavenly things, when the *Passion* exceeds on the side of sense. The good man grieves most for his sins, and yet, perhaps, at the same time, sheds more tears for the loss of a near relation; and while he loves God and delights in him above all things, his joy flows most sensibly after having received some temporal deliverance.

Sect. XI. 2. We have a more lively idea of misery than of happiness. The cause of this lies in the advantage which pain has above pleasure in the present constitution of things. We are not so happy for the time we enjoy pleasure, as we are miserable while we suffer pain. The greater any pleasure is, the shorter is its seeming duration; whereas pain, on the contrary, appears so much the longer. The ways of receiving pleasure are of a stinted number, but pain assails us innumerable ways. Every part, every member, every pore of the body, as well as every faculty of the soul, may be an inlet to pain. A lesser degree of pain overcomes a greater degree of pleasure, and one trouble is enough to embitter many comforts. I take notice
notice of this to introduce another observation.

3. The Passions that have evil for their object (other circumstances being equal) work more violently, than those which terminate on positive good or pleasure. *Sunt enim, qui in rebus contrariis parum sibi consent; voluptatem severissime contemnant, in dolore sint molliores; gloriām negligent, fragmentur infamia; atque ea quidem non satis constantem.* "It is common to observe persons who in contrary circumstances do not preserve a consistent character of Virtue; they can steadily resist the solicitations of pleasure, but yield to the violence of pain; are indifferent to glory, but cannot stand against disgrace." We see these words of Cicero often made good. The hope indeed of a vast good may weigh more than the fear of a slight evil; but let the evil be considerable, and conceived to be approaching, men will do more to avoid it out of fear, than they will to secure an equal good that is the object of their hopes. The instruction to be drawn from hence regards the wise Providence of the Creator, since self-preservation is more necessary than affluence, the absence of evil than the presence of good, and pleasure may better be dispensed with than pain can be borne.

De Offic. L. 1. § 31.
Sect. XII. 4. The ill actions, which men are prevailed on to commit through their hatred of evil, are for the most part more excusable, than those which are done out of the love of pleasure. \(^a\) Exsudw μαλλον εϊκεν η Ακολογια της θεωλογιας, &c. "Incontinence has more of the Will in it than Fear; for the object of that is pleasure, of this pain. Now pain does as it were put a man besides himself, threatening destruction to nature; but it is not so in regard to pleasure, in regard to which therefore we are more voluntary." This justifies the observation of Cicero. \(^b\) Non est autem consen-taneum, qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi cupiditate: nec, qui invictum se a labore praesisterit, vinci a voluptate. "It is no way reconcileable with a virtuous character to yield to lust, when we conquer fear; and when have proved superior to la-bours, to be subdued by pleasure." For besides that Fear takes away more of our liberty than the other Passion; the excess of this last is reckoned an argument of a more corrupt and profligate temper, and to have a complacency in the vicious practice which the other has not. And as Reason, so Law, puts a difference between them; he that kills

\(^a\) Aristot. Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. 1. See also an excellent passage to the same purpose quoted from Theophrastus by Antoninus. L. 2. § 10.
\(^b\) De Offic. L. 1. § 20.
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kills a man out of anger shall escape better than another, who commits the same fact that he may succeed to the possession of his neighbour. He that steals to prevent starving shall have more favour, than one who robs to maintain his luxury.

Sect. XIII. 5. The Passions in which Love predominates are more agreeable to the original intention of nature, than those which are ranged under Hatred. This is plain from hence, that they have a more friendly influence upon the body, and tend, within proper bounds, to the preservation and happiness of life which the other do not. "It is a thing well known to Naturalists (faith Bishop Cumberland) that Love, Desire, Hope, Joy, especially when conversant about some great good, do mightily assist the motion of the Blood and Heart, which is necessary to animal life; so that the Arteries and Veins are filled with a fluid of a milder nature, and more fit for circulation; spirits of a more agile kind are generated, and the whole circulation of the Blood, and by consequence all the animal functions, are performed with greater freedom. On the contrary, in Hatred, Envy, Fear, Sadness, the motion of the Blood is obstructed, and the Heart so oppressed that it cannot exert itself.

\[De\ Legibus\ Naturæ. \ C. \ 2. \ §. \ 19.\]
itself as it should. From hence the countenance becomes pallid, and innumerable inconveniences follow in the intire economy of the body, more especially in the functions of the Brain and Nerves; as for instance, the diseases usually attributed to the Spleen and Melancholy.” After which having given, from Dr. Harvey, the history of a person who consumed away with the desire of a revenge which he could not accomplish, he makes this reflection. That men are admonished by the very nature of the animal affections, that it is for their advantage to be of as benevolent a disposition towards all as possible; since the hatred of a single person was so fatal to the man who harboured it.” To proceed now to particulars.

Sect. XIV. Love regarding its object as absent begets Desire; as present either immediately or in prospect, in reality or imagination, it breeds Joy. Love of Desire, abstractedly considered, is a simple tendency towards good, and retains its name of Desire. When considered as wishing the good desired to some Being or other, it is called Benevolence. These two are in fact inseparably united, it being impossible that any one should desire a thing for no one’s sake; however, it will be never the worse if we treat of them distinctly. Desire being a most
most vigorous and spirited principle is the original of Diligence and Activity. All the powers of nature without this would be dormant, and the most charming objects be unable to provoke us to the pursuit of them. The motion of the Heart in strong desires is extremely vehement, and from the Heart great forces of spirits are detached to the several members of the body, which dispose a man for action, and give a briskness and cheerfulness to his endeavours. For as my Lord Bacon says excellently, "Human life destitute of some great end, either really so, or in fancy, hath nothing of Race, nothing of vigour in it, but is faint and languishing for want of desire to animate it. Which shows the miserable case of Kings, who have few things to desire, and many things to fear. Whence it comes, that Princes many times make themselves desires, and set their hearts upon toys. The reason is, that the mind of man is more cheared and refreshed by profiting in small things, than by standing at a stay in great." As we would have Desire to be a blessing, and answer the ends for which it was planted in our nature, we must neither let it loose to objects that are not in our power, nor indulge it towards those that are to an excessive degree; which would create a pain greater than the

*Essay of Empire.*
pleasure of fruition amounts to; nay, and prevent the satisfaction which we should otherwise derive from the enjoyment; for this is found by constant experience to be always the less, in proportion as it was over-valued in the desire and expectation. Upon this account we should consider the end of this Passion; and seeing that is manifestly to excite and quicken us in the prosecution of some good, we ought as it were to suspend, or lay it aside, till we are upon the point of execution, lest it spend itself in fruitless efforts; the consequence of which will be, that the spirits will be exhausted, their edge blunted, and we shall have little heart or strength left when there is occasion for them.

Sect. XV. Benevolence or Desire considered as having at once some good thing in view, and some person on whose account this good is desired, either centers in a man's self, or in some other person; if in himself it is Self-love, if in another Charity, or Benevolence in the more usual acceptation of the word. Self-love is a word of itself innocent enough, did not custom apply it to signify a very bad thing; nor is the affection to be found fault with, when it is well regulated; for it can be no crime surely for a man to love himself. Self-love is inseparable from our Beings; and as to the general
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r al Passion no way in our power. "Prin-
cipio generi animantium omni est a Natura
tributum, ut se; vitam, corpusque tueatur,
declinetque ea, quae nocitura videantur, om-
niaque, quaecumque ad vivendum sint ne-
cessaria, inquirat, & paret. " This is the
first desire implanted in every kind of
animal by nature, the desire of preserving
itself, its body and life, and avoiding what-
ever appears hurtful, and of finding out
and procuring whatever is necessary for
supporting its life." Self-love is also
made the measure of that love we owe our
neighbour; and, as shall be shown in an-
other place, is the plainest and most com-
pendious rule that was ever thought on.
As they revile human nature who deny the
possibility of any such thing as a disinterested
Benevolence, so they, on the other hand,
seem not well to understand it, who allow
little or nothing to Self-love. Concerning
which w Cumberland hath this ingenious ob-
servation. " That they who would be
thought to neglect rewards, and endea-
vour to deduce all the Virtues from Gra-
titude only, are yet under a necessity of
acknowledging, that Gratitude flows from
the memory of benefits received. Now
it argues as much Self-love, that we are
excited to do well by benefits already
con-

conferred, as when we are influenced by the hope of the like to come. Yea, in some respects he acts more generously, who is excited by a good only hoped for (since hope always supposes something of uncertainty) than another, who does the same things for the sake of equal advantages, of which he has already the certain possession." That Gratitude shews more of Self-love than Hope does, or even as much, I cannot think with this Author; for though Gratitude supposes Self-love as a remote foundation, yet as the grateful person has no regard to his own advantage in being grateful, and the benefits he requites would be as much his own if he was ungrateful, it is but just to him to acknowledge, that Gratitude as such is disinterested, being excited by a sense of the goodness of the disposition, and directly terminating in the good of the benefactor. That Gratitude and Hope are plain indications that Self-love is a part of human nature is certain, and sufficient to our purpose.

Sect. XVI. Were it not for Self-love the Laws of God in the present degeneracy of mankind, would be of little or no force. Even that ingenuous obedience which good men perform to the divine Commands, tho' it be the immediate fruit of Love to God, had its first rise from Self-love. The Passion then
then is not possibly to be extinguished, and if it were, ought not to be so out of pru-
dence; but it is according to our manage-
ment of the natural affection, the measures
we take to gratify it, and the good or bad
principles upon which we cherish it, that
we make a Virtue or a Sin of Necessity.
There are these two Rules which ought ne-
ever to be forgotten in the government of
Self-love. The first is, that we do not
misapply it, mistaking one part of our com-
position, and that the worst too, for our-
sevies, being more careful for our bodies than
for our souls, for the interests of this life,
than about the concerns of eternity. The
second rule is, that we do not suffer Self-
love to ingross us so far, as to exclude the
love due from us to others, or the love of
God for himself, and the love of Virtue as
such; for as * Cicero well observes. Qui
Summum Bonum suis commodis, non bonefiate
metitur, si sibi ipfi consentiat, neque amici-
am colere posfit, nec juflitiam, nec liberalita-
tem. “He who places the chief happiness
of man in any private advantages or in-
joyments, separate from Virtue, if he be
consistent with himself, can neither be a
friend, juft, or liberal.” This minds me
of the other branch of Benevolence (to
which in common language the name Bene-
volence is confined) which is stiled.

Sect.

* De Offic. L. 1. §. 2.
Sect. XVII. Charity, or the love of others. Some have thought (as particularly Mr. Hobbes, who herein, as well as in many other of his opinions, was a follower of the Epicureans) that the love of others however disinterested it might sometimes appear, is only Self-love in disguise. But how little reason there is for such a narrow notion as this will be seen, if we only consider, that we are commanded to love our Neighbour as ourselves; which we are so far from doing (if Mr. Hobbes says true) that we do not love him at all. That Benevolence is a natural affection is thus easily proved. In all intelligent Beings, whose faculties are undepraved, it is natural for the affections to be conformable to right Reason. Where Reason directs one way, and the affections of the soul draw another, nature cannot be in its original rectitude. Now every man's Reason, at the same time that it directs him to seek his own happiness in the most likely methods of acquiring it, will tell him, that it is fit every other man, who has not forfeited his title to it, should be happy as well as himself, and that he should contribute to it, so far at least as he will not prejudice himself by so doing. This natural Reason dictates, and to this therefore the affections must be naturally inclined.

Sect.

y Luke x. 27.
 Sect. XVIII. But to proceed from Reason to matter of fact; the pity which naturally and immediately arises in the human bosom on sight of persons in distress, and the satisfaction of mind which is the consequence of having removed them into a happier state, are instead of a thousand arguments to prove disinterested Benevolence to be natural to man. We appeal to every man's own feeling, and may well trust the cause upon this issue. Did pity proceed from a reflection we make upon our liableness to the same ill accidents which we see befall others, it were nothing to the present purpose; but this is assigning an artificial cause of a natural Passion, and can by no means be admitted as a tolerable account of it; because Children, and persons most thoughtless about their own condition, and incapable of entering into the prospects of futurity, feel the most violent touches of compassion. If we reflect upon what passes within, do we not find our compassion for others, and desire of relieving them, and our good wishes for others, and joy in their prosperity, in a thousand instances going before, and unattended with any consideration of our being in any danger from their evils, or having any interest in their prosperity? Remove the scene to the most distant ages and nations, and we as naturally and readily feel for the
the unfortunate, and wish well especially to the honest, the kind, the brave, and well deserving, and enjoy peculiar satisfaction in their prosperity. And then as to that charming delight which immediately follows the giving joy to another, or relieving his sorrow, and which, when the objects are numerous, and the kindness of importance, is really inexpressible, what can this be owing to, but a consciousness of a man's having done something praise worthy, and expressive of a great soul? Whereas, if in all this he only sacrificed to vanity and Self-love, as there would be nothing generous in actions that make the most shining appearance, so nature would not have rewarded them with this divine pleasure; nor could the commendations which a person receives for benefits done upon selfish views, be at all more satisfactory, than when he is applauded for what he doth without design; because in both cases the ends of Self-love are equally answered. The conscience of approving oneself a benefactor to mankind is the noblest recompense for being so; doubtless it is, and the most interested cannot propose any thing so much to their own advantage; notwithstanding which the inclination is never the less unselfish. The pleasure which attends the gratification of our hunger and thirst, is not the cause of these appetites; they are previous to any such
such prospect; and so likewise is the desire of doing good, with this difference, that being seated in the intellectual part, this last, though antecedent to Reason, may yet be improved and regulated by it, and is no otherwise a Virtue than as it is so.

Sect. XIX. This love to others as it regards all in common still keeps its name of Charity, of which I shall have occasion to discourse more at large hereafter. As it is contracted like the beams of the sun in a burning glass, and falls in a more especial manner on some select person or persons, there are these two remarkable species of it, Friendship, and natural Affection. Though Friendship may seem too refined to be a Passion, yet that it is so is visible enough; for when two friends meet or part, the countenance puts on a different air, the heart beats faster or slower, and the spirits sink or rise after the most surprising manner. Few natures are so savage but we discern the seeds of this Passion in them, by the choice which they make of some particular companions or favourites, for whom they have a stronger fancy and kindness than for others. It has been very unjustly made an objection against Christianity, "that it has nothing in "commendation of Friendship," since the Founder of this Religion was himself an eminent example of it; who, together with the
the generous love he had for all mankind, and more especially for his Disciples, honoured one of them with the distinguishing character of his *beloved Disciple. By this Passion nature hath intimated the great importance of Friendship to human life, and the care which should be taken in the choice of a friend, and in the regulation of our commerce after he is chosen.

**Sect. XX.** The ζυγον of the Greeks, in English, natural Affection (as the word is translated Rom. i. 31.) is that Passion which endears natural Relations one to the other. The affection between Parents and Children is more especially denoted by this word.

*a* Commune animantium omnium est cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sunt. “There is “planted by nature in all animals an affection to their off-spring.” But there is a great difference betwixt the natural affection of mankind, and that of other animals to their young. These latter as soon as their young are capable of shifting for themselves abandon the care of them, while mankind extend their cares not barely to the preservation of their Childrens lives, but the adorning of their minds, and are prompted by an affection which dies not with their Childrens want of them, but outlives that, and

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* John xix. 26, 27.

and the Children themselves too. As Self-love was designed for the conservation of the individual, the intention of this was to perpetuate the species. This affection extends also to other natural Relations. \textit{b} Sanguinis autem conjunctio, & benevolentia devinctit caritate homines. Magnum est enim, habere eadem monumenta majorum, iisdem uti sacrís, sepulchra habere communia. “The ties of blood unite men strongly in affection and friendship. For it has great weight with “men, to have the same monuments of “their common ancestors, to use the same “sacred rites, and to have the same bury-“ing place.” These are the words of Ci- cero, upon which I shall make a Reflection which I judge to be well grounded. It is not merely the relation itself that ingages mens affections one to another, but the hav- ing an interest in the same progenitors, and perhaps not so much the former as the latter. The mutual respect for these common fountains in which they unite, creates an esteem for each other. A second thing I would

\textit{b} Cic. De Offic. L. i. §. 17.

\textit{c} In ipsis veterum ædibus erant Penates cuvis familie proprii, & eo ipso differebant a Laribus, quippe qui erant communis omnibus—Utrifque simulachra dedicata erant, & ara positæ ac foci, res in domo sanctissimae; a quibus nemo poterat fine ingente seletere abstrahe. Quemadmodum vero ad hæc facra non nisi illi admittebantur, ad quos aliquando trans- ditura esset facrorum hereditas; ita non ætior poterat esse conjunctio, quam qua quis in alterius gentem & facra transferat. Heineccii, Antiquit. Roman. Syntagma. V. i. p. 144.
would remark is, that this **Benevolence** generally springs from external considerations, such as those mentioned by **Cicero**, which makes me think, that there is not so much endearment now between Relations, as in those times when there were so many things common to persons of the same kindred and family. The same nature, the same country, the same blood, attract love, both as they are *common* and as they are *distinguishing*; and the affection is more intense the less common these are, and the more distinguishing.

**Sect. XXI.** It is worthy of observation, that the love is usually greater of Parents to their Children, than of Children to their Parents. This is a manifest proof of the *wisdom* of divine Providence, which has suited the degrees of this Passion to the ends which it was designed to serve; for the love of Parents to their Children is more necessary for the preservation of their helpless offspring, and of more consequence to society, than, *vice versa*; an equal affection in Children to their Parents. Parents can do more for their Children than their Children for them; and it is much seldomer that these need the help and direction of the other, than that the other are obliged to these. And from hence we learn what boundaries are to be set to this Passion. For the use-
fulness of it being what the Author of nature intended in planting it within us, we should never let it run to that extreme, which would make it prove an injury rather than a benefit, either to Parents or Children. This is done, when by over indulgence Parents ruin their Children while alive, or by their too passionate affection for them when dead (at what time it can never answer nature's end in giving this tenderness) prejudice their own health and tranquility. To this reason of the extraordinary Love of Parents to their Children I shall add two others.

1. The desire of immortality; which obtains so far, that there are few who would not be immortal in every thing belonging to them, and are not loth to die even in their names and memories. Hence it proceeds, that Children giving us a prospect of injoying this imaginary kind of immortality, our affection to them is raised to a higher degree than otherwise it would be.

2. There is in man, as a sociable creature, a desire of being beneficial to the world, and Children affording us hopes that they will prove serviceable in it (by which means we shall become useful, at least at second hand; the Parent having some kind of interest in his Childrens virtuous actions, if the effect of a good education) nature hath taught us, in pursuance both of the A a }
principles of Self-love and of universal Benevolence, to love Children likewise upon this account. So much for Desire, or Love, regarding its object as absent.

Sect. XXII. When the object is present, Love produces Joy or Delight. And a thing may be really present, or presented to the mind, and this two ways. 1. A good may as it were be made present by Faith and Hope, of which it will not be proper to treat here, but under the mixed Passions. 2. It may be made present by pure Fancy and Idea. Persons of a strong imagination can transport themselves into a Paradise of their own forming, and are often so taken up with the creation of their own brain, that they have scarcely the leisure to reflect, that it is otherwise than real. The folly of indulging to such imaginations you may see ingeniously expos'd in the Spectator, in the story of the Glass Man, and by Gay in his Fables. This extraordinary force of imagination is commonly seen in mad people; and it being necessary that there should be some degree of it in most of the productions of wit, especially those of Poets, hence came that saying, Nullum bonum ingenium sine mixtura Dementiae.

Great Wits to Madness still are near allied, And thin partitions do the bounds divide.

Dryden.
Sect. XXIII. As to these pleasures of Fancy we are to take heed. 1. That we do not entertain ourselves with them too often, least thereby we bring ourselves out of conceit with our real condition, and are kept from aiming to better it; which however strange it may seem, is the natural consequence. One would think that after having represented a fine and delightful scene to ourselves, and found how far it surpasses our real circumstances, the next thing we should do would be, endeavour to supply what is wanting. But on the contrary, the usual effect is, that we repeat those pleasures of the imagination the oftener, and cover the defects of our condition with gay but false colours; and thus content ourselves with a dream of Learning, Virtue, or Riches, while we are in reality ignorant, vicious, and poor. And as long as we can do this, we shall never be at the pains to lay a solid foundation of satisfaction. 2. When we give way to such imaginations, we ought never to indulge them so far, but that we should carry with us this reflection, that it is all mere imagination. It may be objected, that the pleasure will hereby be destroyed. It will be lessened, I confess, but not entirely taken away; and, which will more than balance this inconvenience, we shall by this method prevent the regret that
that would otherwise seize us when the play is over, and waking as it were out of this pleasant dream, we find ourselves to have been under a delusion.

Sect. XXIV. As to that joy which springs from the real presence of the beloved object, there are these two rules to be remembered. 1. Our joy should never exceed the value of the object. The reason is, that though joy may rise, as it is too apt to do, at the first possession above its external cause, it gradually subsides and sinks so much the lower, as it was before too high. When we see ourselves to have been in a mistake, we are always disgusted with that which led us, though innocently, into it. 2. Our joy should be less or greater in proportion to the fixedness or uncertainty of the enjoyment. The thing enjoyed may possibly be of considerable worth, notwithstanding which I should be very imprudent to let loose the reins to joy, if I am in danger every moment to be deprived of it. For who does not see, that the more I am taken up with the fruition, the less prepared I shall be for the loss; which will be felt the more, for the unallayed pleasure which I had in the enjoyment? What an unanswerable argument is this against the excessive love of this world and its good things, that
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that they are not only of little worth, but uncertain too.

Sect. XXV. Before I leave this head of joy, I would take notice of one peculiar sort of Delight, which arises from the contemplation of Beauty. Some appropriate the name of Complacency to this species of Delight, and confine it to the objects of Sense; giving this as the reason why those desires which arise from Complacency and Horror are the most violent, namely, because they are owing to sensible objects, which are always most forcible in their operation. But certainly there is such a thing as intellectual Beauty. Virtue is so, being nothing else than the symmetry, proportion, and good order of the powers and passions of the mind, and actions of the life, consenting among themselves, and with the Law of Reason and of God. And if it be natural for us to be charmed with corporeal Beauty, the design no doubt was, that by this we might be led to the love of intellectual, which our Reason will tell us must surpass corporeal, as much as the subject in which it is seated is nobler than the other. The Heathen Philosophers had the same sentiments of this matter; *Cicero* particularly exceeds himself when he talks of it. *Nec verò illa parva vis naturæ est, rationisque, quod*

\[ \text{De Offic. L. 1. §. 4, 5. §. 28.} \]
quod unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit, quod deceat, in factis, dicitisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae ad spectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit. Quam similitudinem natura, ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis, factisque conservandum putat: cavete que ne quid indecor, effeminatavet faciat; tum in omnibus & opinionibus, & factis, ne quid libidinosae aut faciat aut cogitet.—Formam quidem ipsam, Marce Fili, & tanquam faciem honesti vides; quae si oculus cerneretur, mirabiles amores, (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiae. "It is no small excellence of our "rational nature, that man alone of all "animals has an idea of order and decency, "and a harmony in words and actions. "Even in the objects of sight no other ani- "mal apprehends a beauty, regularity, and "proportion of the several parts; which "Reason transferring from the eyes to the "mind, and from sensible to moral objects, "determines that beauty, consistency, and "order are much more to be studied and "maintained in our designs and actions; "that we should avoid all indecency and "effeminacy of behaviour, and all immo- "desty of thought and action.—I have "sketched out to you, Son Marcus, what "I may call the form and countenance of "Virtue,
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"Virtue, which (as Plato says) if it could "be made visible to the eye would excite a "strong affection." I shall conclude the whole with an observation taken from Dr. More, which I believe to be just. By that deliquium, or failure of Sense, which is sometimes the effect of an extreme joy, nature seems to signify, that the soul is capable of greater pleasure and felicity, than the structure of these mortal bodies has fitted them to bear.

Sect. XXVI. I pass on to the consideration of Hatred, which I defined before, an endeavour of the soul to disunite from that which it apprehends to be evil. Hatred of an evil begets a desire of escaping it when distant; and supposing it to be past, or we find ourselves out of danger of it, joy. As much as to say, we should bear our sufferings the more cheerfully at present, because when they are over they will create joy in the reflection.

—Forsan & hoc olim meminisse juvabit.

"It will be pleasant hereafter to look back "on the dangers we are now encountering. "When the evil is present it produces Grief, together with a desire of getting clear of it. Grief is necessary in the present state to rouse us, and set us on our guard
guard against what is hurtful and destructive, to ballast the mind against a thoughtless levity, to temper our carnal joy, and as a silent monitor that we are not yet arrived at the region of happiness. The desire of escaping an evil may be considered as solitary, without desiring it may fall upon some other person, and then we term it a hatred of flight or aversion. They are only moral evils, or the evils of the next life, and troubles of our own creating, that we may desire absolutely to avoid. As to the outward troubles and afflictions of life, we should only desire to be kept from them, on condition the wise disposer of things sees it to be best. When with the desire of escaping an evil ourselves, there is joined a desire that it may befall some other person, it is called Malevolence, or hatred to the persons of others; which seems to be entirely unlawful, unless we could know a person to be absolutely abandoned of God, which it is impossible we should without a particular revelation; or unless we have good reason to think, the evil may prove a means of reforming the person, and thus produce a greater good. Though we may hate the vices of men we ought to wish well to their persons. As to Grief, if the cause of it be moral evil, or evil committed, it is a commendable Passion, and ought to be cherished so far, as that it may be a punishment of
of our folly and wickedness, and produce repentance and endeavours of amendment, but no further. As to the natural evils of this world, we ought to grieve very moderately for them, abstracting from the sins that procured them, because they are ordered by infinite wisdom and goodness, there is hope they will blow over, and it is certain at the furthest they will end in death.

Consult on this Chapter, besides the Books mentioned under the former,

Hutcheson's Inquiry of Beauty and Virtue.
   Treat. 2. Sect. 2.
— of the Passions. Sect. 3 & 4. 1 & 2 Sect.
   are proper to be read under the former Chapter.
Stubbs's Dialogue on Beauty.
Turnbull's Principles of Moral Philosophy.
Vol. 8. No. 588, 611.
CHAP. IX.

Of the mixed Passions, those that have Admiration blended with them, and those which are compounded only of the Passions which fall under Love and Hatred.

Sect. I. THE Passions hitherto discoursed of are simple in their nature; those yet behind are mixed and compounded. They may be ranked into two orders, such as have something of Admiration in their composition, and such as are compounded only of the Passions which fall under Love and Hatred.

1. There are Passions in the composition of which Admiration is a principal ingredient, viz. Ambition, Glory, Shame, Emulation, Horror, and Consternation.

Sect. II. Ambition is the Passion men have for grandeur; Admiration and Desire are the two parts of it. This Passion is not amiss if directed aright; on the contrary, it was
Chap. IX.  

Of Ambition.  

was infused into our natures as a fire to ferment and exalt them. \(^a\) Sallust has a most judicious reflection to this purpose. Primo magis Ambitio quam Avaritia animos hominum exercebat; quod tamen Virtum propius Virtutem erat. \(^c\) Ambition got footing in “the world before Avarice, being more “agreeable to nature; and though a Vice, “approaching nearer to a Virtue, and in- “deed capable of being easily transformed “into one.” Every man is filled with a certain vague and indeterminate idea of greatness, to which he aspires, and which, if he made a true estimate of things, he would find worldly grandeur to be so far from filling up, as not to deserve any share of his Ambition. This is the true reason that men are never satisfied with this sort of greatness, but still reaching higher. \(^b\) Ha- bet hoc Vitium omnis Ambitio, non respicit. “This is the universal fault of the ambiti- “ous, they are still looking higher.” No present greatness answers the idea they have within them, which represents something infinitely more noble and elevated; which something when it comes to be unfolded, is at bottom nothing else but that glory and perfection, to which the human nature shall be raised in the state of the blessed. This therefore should be the highest mark of our Ambi-

\(^a\) De Bello Catalin.  
\(^b\) Seneca.
Ambition, and subor. inate to this, a present dominion over ourselves, not over others. For as Cicero with his usual sagacity takes notice. 

"Veri videndi cupiditati adjuncta est appetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene a natura informatus velit, nisi præcipiunti, aut docenti, aut utilitatis causa, justè, & legitime imperanti; ex quo animi magnitudo exsistit, humanarumque rerum contemptio.

"To the desire of knowledge is joined in man a desire of superiority and independence, so that a mind that understands its own worth loves liberty, and cares not to be subject to any, excepting such as direct and advise him for his good, or ruling according to good laws injoin what is right, and for the common good. Hence arises greatness of mind, and a contempt of the world." By the word principatus in this passage Cicero means liberty and a freedom from all servile dependence, as appears by the explication that follows. This natural Passion for liberty shows the absurdity of all endeavours to enslave others, since all are alike fond of liberty, and have the very same right to it. A tyrannical Ambition has often the most fatal consequences, and gives every age abundant reason to curse it. And because this false Ambition is that which mankind generally

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De Offic. L. 1. §. 4.
Ibid. L. 1. §. 19.
rally run into, from hence it hath happen-
ed that *Ambition* is become the name of a *Vice.*

**Sect. III.** *Glory* and *Shame* have for their objects such things, as tend to procure men *Esteem* or *Contempt, Praise* or *Disgrace,* from themselves or others. *Glory* is made up of *Joy, Self-love,* and *Esteem.* No Passion is more natural to great minds; the pulse of the heart is not more necessary, than this noble pulse of the soul. *Etiam sapientibus cupido Gloriae novissima exuitur,* says Tacitus. *The desire of Glory is the last Passion a wise man puts off.* By kindling the hope of an honest fame, it is a spur to laudable and useful enterprizes. Let us remember to build our *Glory* upon *Virtue,* to prefer *Virtue* itself to the praise of it, that is, the substance before the shadow; and to act so, as that it may appear we do not so much pursue *Glory* as are followed by it; and can be satisfied with the approbation of *God* and of our own consciences, when through corruption, or out of envy, the world is unjust to us, detracts from our best actions, and loads us with censures and reproaches. There is something truly great in the character which *Salust* gives of *Cato.*

*e Hist. Lib. 4. And to the same purpose Simplic. C. 48.*

De Bello Catalin.
Cato. *Effe quam videri bonus malebat, ita quo minus Gloriam petebat, eo magis illam adsequebatur.* "He was more studious to be really good, than to appear so; and thus the less he aimed at Glory, the more he acquired." For the sentiment of Pliny on this head is very just. *Quanto majore animo bonis tatis fructus in conscientia, quam in fama reponatur, sequi enim Gloria non appeti debet.* "How much greater his mind, who places the reward of Virtue in the pleasures of a good conscience, than his who seeks it in fame; for Glory should be rather the consequence, than the motive of good actions." If we desire Glory therefore, let us do it not so much for its own sake, as for the capacity into which it puts us of doing more honour and service to the cause of Virtue and Religion; and within this limitation we shall preserve the innocence of this Passion.

Sect. IV. *Shame* is compounded of Sorrow, Self-love, with some mixture of Contempt. From this account of *Shame* it appears, that neither the best nor the worst men are capable of it. Not the best, because conscious to themselves that they make a right use of their faculties, and are above contempt; nor the worst of men neither, because through custom they have over-

* Ep. 8.
overcome the modesty of the rational nature. Among all the Passions there is not one more powerful than this, nor perhaps more serviceable to mankind. Such is the force of Shame as to over-rule the fear of death itself. Witness those of the female sex, who having given up their Virtue, to prevent the Shame which would attend the discovery of their lewdness, stifle the fruit of it in defiance to the Law, to which their lives are forfeited by the murder of their infants. Witness also the many thousands who meet death in the Field, or in the Breach, to avoid what appears to them more terrible, the reproach of cowardice. For I am verily persuaded, that to one who is acted by true courage, the love of their country, or the desire of glory, there are ten whom the dread of disgrace pushes forward in battle. Shame is a bridle upon corrupted nature, it restrains multitudes from doing ill, and brings others to repentance after they have done it. The first we may call antecedent, the other consequent Shame. This Passion may have some bad effects, as in those infamous women before mentioned; but if a woman here and there murder her innocent child to hide her Shame, how many of both sexes are kept from the sin that led to it, merely by this inward check? We may say of a man past Shame,
Of Shame. Part II.

Shame, that he is past Hope.  

Nam negligere quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti. “For to “ be wholly regardless what men think of us “ is the mark, not only of an arrogant, but “ an abandoned mind.” Whereas on the contrary, according to the observation of the  

Poet, a sense of Shame is a proof of some remaining sense of Virtue. Erubuit—Salva 

res est. “ He blushes—There is hope of “ him.”

Sect. V. There is a virtuous, a natural, and a vicious Shame. A virtuous Shame is that which secures us against secret sins from a reverence of the divine Omnipresence, and of our own Reason and Conscience. A natural Shame is chiefly caused by the consideration of our fellow creatures; concerning which there is this remarkable, that where there is Reason, though it be but in its dawn, as in Children, or blended with corruption, as in wicked men, we do not care to have it a witness of our follies and vices. A vicious Shame is that which makes men disclaim Religion and Virtue, when they have not the fashion or company of their side. This Shame argues a base and daftardly spi-


k Cic. De Offic. L. i. §. 28.

Teren. Adelp. Aet. 4. Sec. 5.

Chap. IX. Of Emulation.

rit, and has destroyed thousands. To be ashamed of what is in itself excellent, amiable, and praise worthy, out of regard to the wrong judgments of the thoughtless, the ignorant, and debauched, is as absurd and unreasonable, as it would be to swallow poison, and refuse wholesome food, out of deference to the opinions of a parcel of mad men, among whom we happened to fall.

Sect. VI. Emulation is a generous ardor kindled by the brave examples of others, to imitate, to rival, and if we can excel them. There is involved in this Passion esteem of the person whom we emulate, of the qualities and actions in which we emulate him, and a desire of resemblance, together with a joy springing from the hope of success. Every one must be sensible of the use of this Passion, as a motive to things great and praise worthy. There is in the animal part an aversion to labour, which makes us glad of any excuse for humouring our sloth, and ready to interpret what is a little difficult to be impossible. Now examples deprive us of this refuge; for what is done, or has been done by others, may be done by us, and we are ashamed to be in the rear of mankind, and to come short of those, who set out in the world with no greater advantages than ourselves.
Of Emulation.  

Part II.

Extremos pudeat rediisse. — 
Virg. Æn. L. 5.

"Let Shame at least prevent our being distanced by all." Theseus, Themistocles, Caesar, with many others, that might be mentioned from history, are celebrated instances of the power of this Passion. Nay, Emulation is not only of use to single persons, but to whole States. "The death of Epaminondas, General of the Thebans, during whose time Thebes even rivaled Athens, was no less fatal (as Dr. Potter well observes) to the Athenians than it was to his own Country; for now there being none whose Virtues they could emulate, or whose Power they could fear, they lorded it without a rival; and being glutted with too much prosperity gave themselves over to idleness and luxury, which at last ended in the destruction of their glory by Philip." Sallust makes the same observation as to Rome and Carthage, only that he ascribes the Virtues of the Romans not to Emulation but Fear. Metus hostilis civitatem in bonis artibus retinébat. "The fear of the enemy kept the city observant of useful arts and discipline." He might more justly have mentioned

1 Greek Antiq. V. r. p. 16. 
2 De Bello Jugurth.
tioned both as conspiring causes, if the word metus does not imply the other too. And Velius Paterculus mentions both. Remoto Carthaginis metu, sublataque imperii æmula, non gradu sed præcipiti cursu a Virtute desictum, ad Vitia transcursum. "The fear of "Carthage being removed, and the rival in "empire destroyed, the Roman people did "not decline gradually from Virtue, but "run headlong into Vice." The abuse we are chiefly to guard against in relation to this Passion is, that it does not betray us into Envy; that not being able to raise ourselves to the height to which others have climbed, we do not wish their fall, much less help to pull them down.

Sect. VII. Horror arises from the sight of objects that have something in them vast and frightful. It is a compound of Admiration and Fear; not without a mixture of Pleasure sometimes, from which if predominant it is denominated a pleasing Horror. Such a Horror seizes us at the view of vast and hanging precipices, a tempestuous ocean, or wild and solitary places. This Passion is the original of Superstition, as a wise and well tempered awe is of Religion.

o Jam tum Relligio pavidos terrebat agresjes. Dira loci; jam tum silvam saxumque tremebant. Hoc

n L. 2. §. 1.

o Virgil. Æn. L. 8. v. 342.
Of Horror.          Part II.

Hoc nemus, bunc, inquit, frondoso vertice collem (Quis Deus, incertum est) habitat Deus; Arcades ipsum
Credunt se vidisse Jovem, cum saepe nigrantem Ægida concuteret dextra, nimbosque cieret.

A reverent Fear, (such superstition reigns Amongst the rude,) ev'n then posseft the Swains.
Huge rocks and gloomy woods their minds dismay,
Some God they knew, what God they could not say,
Amidst these sacred horrors did abide.
Great Jove himself, 'tis said, they've seen to ride
The clouds in thunder, deal his bolts around,
And scatter tempests on the teeming ground.

The antient Heathens had a fancy that some God or other inhabited groves and unfrequented places; for such places naturally strike people with a kind of Horror, which disposes them to a secret dread of some invisible power. Both the fact and the reason of it are contained in the lines just quoted out of Virgil. In like manner all awful and extraordinary appearances in nature, as Thunder and Lightning, Eclipses, Comets, Earthquakes, and the like, fill vulgar minds, ignorant of the causes of them, with superstition, and are converted into omens and prodig-
prodigies, so that we can allow the Ῥαπαίτιος Poet to say.

*Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,*  
*Atque metus omnes, & inexorabile Fatum*  
*Subjecit pedibus, &repitumque Acherontis avari.*

Happy the man, who skill'd in Nature's laws,  
Of strange effects can trace the secret cause;  
Can prodigies and vulgar fears despise,  
*Styx fabled waves,* and cruel destinies.

And had *Lucretius* only attacked those phantoms of a scared imagination, he would have deserved the thanks of mankind; for Superstition is not a greater enemy to the peace of mens minds, and of the world, than it is to Religion. But when he makes all Religion to be Superstition, and has such lines as these following;

*Quippe ita formido mortales continet omnes,*  
*Quod multa in terris fieri caeloque tuentur,*  
*Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre Possunt, ac fieri divino numine rentuo.*

For groundless terrors mortal minds invade,  
Num'rous effects observing in the skies,  
And o'er the earth; for which their Reason Fails

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*Virgil, Georg. L. 2. v. 490.*  
*De Rerum Natura, L. 1. v. 152. &c;*
Of Horror.

Part II.

Fails well to account by known mechanic laws, Falsely ascribing them to pow'rs divine.

we cannot without detestation behold him thus in arms against the belief of a God and a Providence.

Primos in orbe Deos fecit Timor.

"An unreasonable Fear first created Gods," says this hardy Atheist; whereas on the contrary, God first planted Fear in the minds of men; it is his creature not his Creator. I confess, the Fear or Awe suggested by a survey of God's works, is one of the first things that prepares men to be religious, or to adore and obey a supreme Being; but this is not Superstition, it is Eusebia, a rational piety, and the most reasonable disposition in the world.

Hunc Solem & Stella, & decedentia certis Tempora momentis, sunt qui formidine nulla Imbuti, spectant.——

Horat. L. i. Ep. 6. v. 3.

This vault of Air, this congregated Ball, Self-center'd Sun, and Stars, that rise and fall, 'There are, my friend, whose philosophic eyes Look thro', and trust the Ruler with his skies; To him commit the hour, the day, the year, And view this dreadful all without a Fear.

Pope.
Chap. IX. Of Consternation. 375

If by beholding these things without Fear, the Poet means without any awe of the great Creator, they are not to be looked upon as Philosophers, who can so calmly view this astonishing frame, but the most stupid of mankind; if the superstitious only were levelled at, all men in their senses will approve what he says.

Sect. VIII. When Fear is so immoderate as in a manner to confound the faculties, and incapacitate a person for consultation and execution, it is then termed Consternation. The proper definition then of Consternation is an excess of Horror, owing to the ill government of our Admiration and Fear. The language of this Passion Dr. More thinks to be, that there is some latent evil in nature of a most formidable and prodigious size, for which we ought to be always prepared; whether this be each person's particular death or the dissolution of the world. I like the conjecture, and am of opinion it may be made use of to account for the universal prevailing of that notion, concerning the conflagration of the world among the antient Heathens. Let these famous lines of Ovid serve instead of other authorities, that might be brought to the same purpose.

B b 4. Esse

*Metamorph. L. i. v. 256.*
Of Conternation. Part II.

Esse quoque in fatis reminiscitur, affore tempus, Quo mare, quo tellus, correptaque regia Cæli Ardeat; & mundi moles operosâ laboraret.

There is an awful period fixed by Fate, When this wide Earth, the Seas, and vaulted Heavens, Shall form one general blaze, and fire destroy This grand and spacious frame.

For though the notion was probably conveyed down by tradition from Noah; yet that it was so readily entertained, took such deep root, and spread so far, is best resolved into a proneness in mankind to this Passion. Not that the Passion itself is to be allowed of; for since Conternation stupifies the mind, involves it in a maze, and disables it for providing against the coming evil; what does the discovery of the evil signify? It is just as if some ravenous monster should be making towards a person, and one standing by should warn him of his danger, but at the same time by chaining him down, put it out of his power to defend himself, or fly from his enemy. We should by a good conscience labour to fortify ourselves against such an amazing dread of the worst event that can befall us. An Hea-then Poet could say, speaking of a man of integrity.

Si

Chap. IX. Of Fluctuation.

Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinae.

"Should the whole frame of nature round him break,
"In ruin and confusion hurl'd;
"He unconcern'd could hear the mighty crack,
"And stand secure amidst a falling world.

Sect. IX. II. It remains that I now consider the Passions compounded of those which fall under Love and Hatred. For distinction sake we may divide them into two sorts, such as more immediately regard ourselves, and such as have others for their object. Of those which concern ourselves the following are the principal, Fluctuation, Resolution, Hope, Fear, Security, Despair, Jealousy, and Distaste. Fluctuation consists of Desire and Grief. The design of it was that we might not be too hasty in the choice of means, least we should mistake in our choice. "Omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate & negligentia; nec vero agere quidquam, cujus non possit causam probablem reddere. "All our actions ought to be clear "of rashness and negligence; nor should "we ever do any thing for which we can- "not give a good reason." The uneasiness caused

*Cic. De Offic. L. I. §. 29.*
caused by a suspension of mind is an advertisement of nature, that some things require more thought, and are of greater moment than others; as likewise that in settling our judgment and determinations concerning certain matters, we should employ our utmost circumspection; and after mature counsel having fixed our opinion, which before floated, should not easily recede from a purpose so well formed. The error into which men are apt to run upon this article is, that they are often over wary, and consume a deal of time about things, which either do not deserve or demand deep consideration. By this means that caution is thrown away upon trifles, which should have been reserved for things of weight and full of perplexity. They consider where there is no need, and perceiving their folly herein, run into another extreme, and act precipitantly where they should be most cautious.

Sect. X. Resolution is that Passion which encounters difficulties and dangers; when it has to do more peculiarly with dangers it bears the name of Boldness. Desire, Joy, and Sorrow enter into its constitution; but then Joy is by far the stronger infusion. There is a degree of sadness from the prospect of opposition and the possibility of miscarrying; but not equal to the pleasure which
which the greatness of the end proposed, and the well-grounded hopes of attaining it inspire; and which so dilutes the other that it is hardly perceived. This Passion is of excellent service to render the mind unmoved by all the assaults of temptation, and to carry it on in the pursuit of a worthy object, till it is in possession of it. Does some noble cause require our assistance, in which we must fight our way, and every step we advance carry our lives in our hand? There is nothing like this generous Passion to hearten and animate us. Our only concern here is, that we be engaged for Truth and Goodness, not to maintain our Mistakes, our Humours, or Vices. This is not so properly Resolution as Obstination, ἱπτωται, an unreasonable attachment to the opinions or designs we have once taken up.

Sect. XI. Hope is the desire of some good, attended with a belief of the possibility at least of obtaining it, and enlivened with Joy, greater or less, according to the greater or less probability of our possessing the thing for which we hope. Fear is a desire of avoiding some evil which it is apprehended may come upon us, the reflection on which causes Sorrow. Of what consequence these Passions are in human nature no one can be ignorant, they being the great handles by which it is turned and governed.
Of Hope. Part II.

Society could not subsist but by the succour it borrows from Hope and Fear; neither could Religion be kept up but by the same means. Nothing but these can ordinarily restrain men from Vice, or invite them to the practice of Virtue; and they are the main springs of action, and rewards and punishments are the weights that put these wheels and springs in motion. From hence, by the way, we learn the great excellency of the Christian Religion, which to engage us to observe its laws, has proposed to our Hopes and Fears objects so much superior to any, that are to be met with in the other Religions of mankind. And further, these being the leading Passions in our nature, so that these when wrought up to a height will tame and conquer other Passions that oppose them, and reduce one the other too, we see the wisdom of God in the formation of man, since by our Hopes and Fears our other Passions are easily managed. And this, as I hinted before, is one of the greatest arts in Morality, to set Affection against Affection, and by the help of one to master and reclaim the others. After the manner of expert Politicians, who balance and keep in order one party and faction by its contrary. What I have hitherto said regards these Passions in common, I have something to remark of each in particular.
Sect. XII. Scarce any Passion seems to be more natural to man than Hope, and considering the many troubles he is encompassed with, none is more necessary. For life void of all Hope would be a heavy and spiritless thing, very little desireable, perhaps hardly to be borne. Whereas Hope infuses strength into the mind, and by so doing lessens the burdens of life. If our condition be not the best in the world, yet we hope it will be better, and this helps us to support it with patience.

See, some fit Passion ev'ry Age supply, Hope travels thro', nor quits us when we die. 
Till then, Opinion gilds with varying rays
Those painted clouds that beautify our days;
Each want of happiness by Hope supplied,
And each vacuity of sense by Pride.
These build as fast as knowledge can destroy:
In Folly's cup still laughs the bubble, Joy;
One prospect lost, another still we gain;
And not a Vanity is giv'n in vain.

This forwardness to hope is an argument of the goodness of God, who hath provided this Passion as a remedy against excessive Grief and Sadness. By Hope nature does as it were say, though he be weak, sinful, afflicted, mortal, yet let not man despair. Yea,
Yea, supposing a man to live in the greatest prosperity, still he must hope for something beyond it, or he will be an unhappy man. The true reason of which is, that the things of this world not being designed for our happiness, do not satisfy us in the possession of them; and therefore be our present enjoyments never so many, leave us under a necessity of hoping for something further; of which, because it is distant, we think better than of the things we have in hand, and are apt to flatter ourselves that it will afford us more comfort and satisfaction. Were there no life besides this, it would perhaps be our wisdom to encourage such a hope, because though it be groundless, it helps nevertheless to pass away life the more pleasantly. But as things stand at present, it is a great folly to be always in hope of more happiness from new worldly acquisitions. We may indeed, whatever our condition in the world be, however easy and well accommodated, still hope for something better, nay, we cannot but do so; which makes it evident to me that there is such a happiness as we hope for to be attained; it not being conceivable that the great God, the Author of Nature, would drill us on with fallacious hopes. But our fault is, that we hope for this happiness from the enjoyments of this world, which is only to be looked for from the favour of God,
God, the satisfactions of a good conscience, and the perfect pleasures of a future life. Nor further, is it unlawful in affliction to hope, that we shall see the cloud disperse, and enjoy a brighter and clearer season. This without doubt is allowable, provided we do not limit the Providence of God as to the time or manner of our deliverance, or depend upon it as a thing certain, or make the hope of it our main stay and refreshment in adversity. And as Hope is the great comfort of drooping minds, so it is the life of industry and labour, and the support of a resolute perseverance. Alexander preparing for his Asian expedition, parted his hereditary Dominions among his Friends, distributing to some Villages, to others Boroughs, to others Cities, and being asked, "What he had left for himself?" replied, "Hope." I shall conclude with observing, that of all Hopes those are most unaccountable, which set by matters of present concern to take in a long hereafter, as if life was not measured by years but ages.

"Vitae summa brevis spem nos vetat inchoare longam.

"The short duration of human life forbids us to indulge Hopes which require a long train of years for their accomplishment." Men send their views into distant

* Horat. L. 1. Ode. 4. v. 15.
Of Fear. Part II.

Of instant futurities, and overlook the precipice that is just before them.

Sect. XIII. Fear too is of very great importance, not only as it is the original of Caution, but Humility. Is a man superior to creatures without Reason? Or in his condition advanced above those of his own species? The voice of his Fear is, let not man be proud. He has too many things to fear to be ever secure; and from these fears may be taught, that he is a poor, precarious, dependent Being, a worm that may be soon crushed, a bubble that may be quickly broken, and where is he? "God, (says an excellent Writer) seems to have intimated the use of this Passion in every motion of our natural Fears. Our natural Fears are either sudden or deliberate. The sudden are such as come upon us surprizingly, and without deliberation, and of these we may very often observe, that they are immoderate and ungovernable. But how unreasonable soever such Fears may seem to be, they carry a most reasonable admonition along with them, and upon each of their surprizing motions seem to whisper, thus it is that a man ought to fear God. Our deliberate and just Fears are as just to the same intimation, and in each of their motions

* Dean Young in his Sermon of the Wisdom of fearing God. Vol. 1. Ser. 3.
**motions point out God to the first glances of our reasoning. For if it be reasonable to fear want, how much more reasonable is it to fear him whose bounty is the fountain of all our supplies? And the like may be argued of all the evils and dangers that we fear.**

**Sect. XIV. Hope** when advanced beyond the fear of a disappointment ends in Security; **Fear** when it comes to be without any mixture of **Hope** issues in **Despair**. These two are of use in some cases, though but in few. The former to free us from the torment of needless care and thoughtfulness. Only we must be cautious on what grounds we bottom our **Security**; and that it does not betray us into a lazy neglect of the means necessary to our end, and of the accidents that may deprive us of it. **Despair** is of use to disengage the mind from the pursuit of things, which it sees an impossibility of compassing, that it may turn its activity to what is in its power. Though here again we must have a care, that our **Despair** be not the result of a laziness of temper, or meanness of spirit, and so make us relinquish a good that was attainable, and well worthy of our pursuit, for the sake of something which has little else to recommend it, but that it is easily come at.
Sect. XV. Jealousy is that peculiar uneasiness which arises from the fear that some rival may rob us of the affection of one whom we greatly love; or suspicion that he has already done it. If it proceed no further than a fear that this may be, it is of use to make us more vigilant in our conduct, more studious to please the beloved person, and to excel the competitor. If there be a suspicion that we actually are upon the losing hand, it is a most disquieting Passion. The first sort of Jealousy is inseparable from Love, before it is in possession of its object; for he that loves would be loved, and be to another what that other is to him, something essential to his happiness. This latter is often unjust, generally mischievous, always troublesome. Our concern is to watch against it as much as we can, that it may never make a part of our temper and character; as it does not, if we are only jealous when there is sufficient reason to be so; and to conceal the Passion that torments us as much as is possible; since nothing tends more to alienate the affection which we would secure, than perpetually throwing out expressions and marks of our Jealousy. The fear of being robbed of any good which we highly prize, is sometimes expressed by this name; but then we are jealous of our rival, as in the for-
Chap. IX. — Of Disgust.

mer case we are of the person, whose affection is in dispute.

Sect. XVI. Disgust or Satiety is a friend of Temperance, for generally speaking (as Dr. More thinks) we nauseate those things in which we have been guilty of too sensual indulgences, or in which there is danger of our being so. Besides this, we are taught by the Satiety which is bred by the use of all external sensible things, the wisdom of applying our contemplation and love to objects of a spiritual nature, and above all to the great God, whose infinite perfections and works will furnish scenes and pleasures ever new and transporting to eternity.

Besides the Books referred to under the preceding Chapters, consult,

Des Cartes De Passiionibus.

Seneca De Ira.

Watts on the Passions.

Smith's Select Disc. of Superst. & Atheism.

Spencer of Prodigies. C. 5.

Spectator and Guardian on the love of Fame, on Hope, Fear, Jealousy, &c. particularly Spectators, No. 19, 27, 45, 73, 77, 99, 139, 151, 188, 219, 224, 255.

Young's Universal Passion.

Pope's Temple of Fame, and Ethic Epistles, particularly to Lord Bathurst.
Of the mixed Passions which regard others, and of the improper Passions.

Sect. I. The Passions which express the temper of mind we are in towards others, are chiefly these, Irrision, Commiseration, Congratulation, Envy, Anger, Gratitude, and what the Latins call Desiderium, but we want a word to express in English. *Irrision* is that mirth which is raised in us by the sight of another's Absurdities or Misfortunes. It is made up of joy and hatred, hatred of Aversion, not of Malevolence; and if the evil be sudden and unexpected vents itself in laughter. Though we hate the evil, yet we rejoice that it is no greater, for (as Aristotle remarks) this Passion is only conversant about evils of a lighter kind. It may be of use to consider *Irrision* distinctly, as it has for its object the Follies, or as it regards the Misfortunes of others.
Sect. II. As to their Follies, Mr. Hobbes's account of it is, that it is nothing else but sudden glory arising from the conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others. This may be too often the reason why men do laugh at each other, but was never designed by nature, which cannot be supposed in any of its productions to have consulted the gratification of men's pride and ill humour. Nature or its Author seems rather to have intended this Passion, partly as a relief against the melancholy, which the mean figure that human nature makes would excite in a generous mind, did not this help a little to shake it off. Were it not for this Passion, every good man would be an Heraclitus. This Passion was designed also partly as a means of rallying people out of their Follies; and according to Dr. More was the original of Satire, as Love and Bravery were of Epic and Tragic Poetry. The Carelessness, Inconstancy, Humour, Affectation, Impertinence, and in short all the lesser follies and imperfections of mankind are fitly enough treated with ridicule; and as these are generally the subjects of Horace's Satires, one cannot but be pleased with that vein of pleasantry which runs through them.

Omne

* De Homine. See Spectator. No. 47.
Omne vaefer vitium ridenti Flaccus amico Tangit; & admisfus circum præcordia ludit, Callidus excufso populum suspendere naso.

Unlike in method with conceal'd design,
Did crafty Horace his low numbers join;
And with a fly insinuating grace
Laugh'd at his Friend, and look'd him in the face:
Would raise a blush where secret Vice he found,
And tickle whilst he gently prob'd the wound.
With seeming innocence the crowd beguil'd;
But made the desperate Passes when he smil'd.

*Dryden.*

Vice, as it signifies grosser faults, is not a thing to be laugh'd at, and therefore when Satire flies at these, Juvenal's way of assailing it with a virtuous indignation is much more agreeable; though he too by some images, which were better concealed, too frequently offends against the rules of decency. They are still more mistaken in the object of Iffion, who endeavour to laugh Virtue out of countenance. Nay, I will beg leave to say, that where there is substantial Virtue, though it be rough and unpolished, we should be cautious after what manner we divert ourselves with the persons in whom it is found, out of reverence to what

*Persi. Sat. i. v. 115.*
what is valuable in them; and least they learn to be more fashionable at the expense of their innocence. In a word, we should lay down this as a first principle of society, so to manage our whole behaviour, and particularly this part of it, as to convince others we do not insult them, or take any delight in exposing them, but are acted by pure good humour and benevolence. "Cicero in two words well expresses all the duties of conversation. Maximeque curandum est, ut cos, quibuscum sermonem conferimus, & vereri, & diligere videamur. "We should take the greatest care, that they "with whom we converse may see, that "we both esteem and love them."

Sect. III. Considered as to the Misfortunes of others, Irrision is, as it were, the voice of nature congratulating its own happiness, that when liable to the most fatal accidents, it is so ordered by a wise and good Providence, that we should only feel lighter or more tolerable evils. This construction of the Passion before us shews all such to be inexcusable, who can draw mirth from that which should move their compassion, a disfigured body, a mind distracted by fury or madness, and very grievous and afflictive accidents befalling others. Such men have neither gratitude nor humanity;
nity; neither gratitude to God, who has given them what others want; nor humanity to pity others, who are not so happy as themselves.

Sect. IV. Commiseration is a compound of Love and Sorrow. The necessity of this Passion is manifest, since the world as it is at present cannot be without it. Miserable objects meet us wherever we turn our eyes, and that they might not demand our succour in vain, the common Father of all hath put this soft advocate into our bosoms to plead in their behalf.

Compasion proper to mankind appears,
Which nature witness’d when she gave us tears:
Of tender sentiments men only give
Those proofs; to weep is our prerogative:
To shew by pitying looks and melting eyes,
How with a suffering Friend we sympathize.
By nature’s impulse (tho’ to us unknown
The sufferer be) we make the loss our own.

Who
Chap. X. Of Commiseration. 393

Who can all sense of others ills escape, Is but a brute at best in human shape.

This just and lovely account of human nature is given us by a heathen Satirist; but according to Mr. Hobbes, Commiseration is a selfish Passion, and wholly derived from narrow principles. The sight of another man's misfortunes begets compassion, not so much for him as for ourselves, whom we know liable to the same calamitous accidents. But though self-love may come in for a part in the pity of some men, yet that it is the most natural or adequate cause of it, I can by no means allow. We see men of the most generous dispositions, whose fortunes are well guarded, and their tempers proof against the darts of adversity when shot against themselves, yet strongly disposed to sympathize with others; and children and persons least capable of making reflections on their own danger most open to this tender passion. It is worth observation as we pass, that though all the miserable are protected by this Passion, especially those who are thought to suffer undeservedly, yet if on the one hand a person appears insensible of his calamity, either through stupidity, or a haughtiness of temper; or on the other hand, instead of bearing up against it, poorly sinks under it, makes his affliction greater than it is, or gives himself up to abject and unmanly
unmanly complaints, our pity is moved less strongly. A Stoical apathy real or affected seems to upbraid the common weakness, and therefore as it would be thought above the pity of mankind must not expect it. The stupid are disregarded, the proud opposed, and the effeminate scorned.

"We must grieve ourselves, if we will " have others grieve for us;" but after such a manner, that it may be seen, that we are not fond of shewing our grief, and though some of it will break out yet we retain the greater part behind.

Sect. V. Congratulations is that joy which our love to another makes us receive from the gifts of nature or Providence bestowed upon him, the flourishing of his reputation, the ease of his circumstances, and the success of his designs. It is a wise and a laudable Passion. He who is ever ready to felicitate others on their happy condition, as he deserves, so he is most likely to have the good wishes of the whole world, and to enjoy his prosperity with the approbation of all. Nothing more advances a man's own character, or sets his virtues in a more advantageous

*—Si vis me flere, dolendum est Primum ipsi tibi.*

*Horat. De Arte Poetica. v. 102.*
Chap. X. Of Congratulation.

vantagious light. * Pliny, speaking of Capito, who had erected Syllanus's Statue in the Forum, has these fine sentiments upon it. Scias ipsum pluribus Virtutibus abundare, qui alienas sic amat. Redditus est L. Syllano debitus honor, cujus immortalitati Capito prospexerit pariter & sua. Neque enim magis decorum & insigne est, statuam in Foro Populi Romani habere, quam ponere. "You may "be assured he is very virtuous himself "who manifests such a regard to Virtue in "another. L. Syllanus has received the "honour he merited, and Capito, while he "has thus endeavoured to render Syllanus's "fame immortal, has equally secured his "own. For it is not more an honour to "have a Statue in the Roman Forum, than "it is to confer this honour on the well- "deserving." Both this and Commiseration "are founded in Benevolence; for it being "supposed that we sincerely will another's "happiness, which is Benevolence, we com- "passionate him if he falls short of it, we re- "joice with him if he attains it.

Sect. VI. Of these two Passions, Delight in the prosperity of others, and Compassion for their distresses, it is judiciously observed by * Dr. Butler, "That the last is felt much "more

* L. i. Ep. 17.
* See his Sermons at the Roll's Chapel. Ser. 5. on Com- passion.
more generally (and I would add, much
more strongly) than the former. Tho'
men do not universally rejoice with all
whom they see rejoice, yet, accidental
obstacles removed, they naturally com-
passionate all in some degree whom they
see in distress, so far as they have any
real perception or sense of that distress;
insomuch that words expressing this lat-
ter, Pity, Compassion, frequently occur;
whereas we have scarce any single one by
which the former is distinctly expressed.
Congratulation indeed answers Condolence;
but both these words are intended to sig-
nify certain forms of civility, rather than
any inward sensation or feeling. This
difference or inequality is so remarkable,
that we plainly consider Compassion as it-
self an original distinct particular affec-
tion in human nature; whereas to rejoice
in the good of others is only a conse-
quence of the general affection of love
and good-will to them. The reason and
account of which matter is this. When
a man has obtained any particular advan-
tage or felicity, his end is gained, and
he does not in that particular want the
assistance of another; there was therefore
no need of a distinct affection towards
that felicity of another already obtained;
neither would such affection directly car-
ry him on to do good to that person.
Whereas
"Whereas men in distress want assistance, and Compassion leads us directly to assist them—Such is our make, and that of the world about us, that any thing may become the instrument of pain and sorrow to us. Thus almost any one man is capable of doing mischief to any other, though he may not be capable of doing him good; and if he be capable of doing him some good, he is capable of doing him more evil. And it is in numberless cases much more in our power to lessen the miseries of others, than to promote their positive happiness, any otherwise than as the former often includes the latter; ease from misery occasioning for some time the greatest positive enjoyment. This constitution of nature, namely, that it is so much more in our power to occasion and likewise to lessen misery, than to promote positive happiness, plainly required a particular affection to hinder us from abusing, and to incline us to make a right use of the former powers, i.e. the powers both to occasion and to lessen misery, over and above what was necessary to induce us to make a right use of the latter power, that of promoting positive happiness."
Sect. VII. Envy stands in direct opposition to Congratulation, or the joy we feel from the prosperity of others, being a composition of Sorrow and Hatred; not only as Hatred implies a simple Aversion, but as it signifies Malevolence, and for that reason ought to be entirely banished from the human heart. Envy, as I observed before, is nothing else but Grief mistaken in its object. Does a man merit and become his good fortune? Envy in this case is the most unreasonable thing in the world. Does he prosper in his wickedness? Still there is no room for Envy; he may be punished with success, or at worst is the instrument of Providence. So that upon the whole, Envy cannot be placed among the original Passions, and accordingly says Dr. Hickman (ingeniously enough) were the observation equally solid, "Envy and Malice make their abode not in the Heart, but in the Spleen; and the Spleen, they say, is the only superfluous part of the body, as these splenetic humours make the only useless Passions of our souls." Envy certainly is the basest, most mischievous, and the most tormenting Passion in the world. Every envious man is Heauton-timorumenos, a Self-

h See his Sermon on the Passions.

i That the Spleen is not superfluous, see Sir Richard Blackmore's Essay on the Spleen.
a Self-tormenter. It was wittily said by Bion, seeing a spiteful fellow look sad, "That he knew not what to think was the cause of his melancholy, whether some disast of his own, or some good fortune of another."

Sect. VIII. If we would prevent this Passion in ourselves, and not excite it in others, it may be our prudence to observe the following Rules. Would we preserve ourselves from envying others? Let us consider that the meanest of us injoys more than he can pretend to deserve. Instead of envying another for the advantages of birth, learning, or outward condition, let us labour to excel him in Virtue, and by contentedness of mind set ourselves above him. "Every man, says Cicero, cannot plead Causes, govern the Commonwealth, or manage a War; but let every man do what is in his power; let him be just, faithful, liberal, modest, and temperate; quo minus ab eo id, quod desit, requiratur; and no body will expect from him that which was never trusted to him."—Carefully shun a busy inquisitive temper.—Dwell more at home, and you will have less temptation to make invidious reflections upon others.—Aim not at an eminency in too many things, because this is the way to be out-

* De Offic. L. i. § 33.*
out-done in all; and thus we ourselves lay the ground-work of our own discontent.—Let the things we make choice of, in order to excel in them, suit our genius and abilities. *In immensum proderit nobis illud Democriti salutare praecptum, quo monstratur tranquillitas, si neque privatim, neque publice multa, aut majora viribus nosiris egerimus.* "The salutary advice of Democritus, "if we observed it, would be of inconceivable service to produce tranquility of mind, that we should never in private or publick undertake things above our abilities." ¹ Seneca cites these words by way of prevention against Anger, but I think they are more useful against Envy.—Finally, when we are disposed to envy another for some advantage, balance this either by some in opposite disadvantage in himself, or by some advantage you have of him in another respect. Would you decline the Envy of others? Let them not know by your behaviour, that you are sensible of your having the better of them. A privilege managed with vanity and ostentation is always envied.—And whatever advantages you enjoy show yourselves willing that they should be common, and assist others in their endeavours to participate of them.—Make suple—

¹ De Ira. L. 3. C. 6.
Chap. X. Of Anger.

superior learning, power, or riches publick blessings, and then superiority will produce general satisfaction not discontent, and you will be generally admired and beloved, not envied—These are the likeliest ways to avoid Envy, though after all a person eminent for merit and advantages must not expect to pass through such a world as ours, without being subject to this Tax, as my Lord Bacon calls it, for his distinction; according to the observation of a Horace.

—Diram qui contudit Hydram,
Notaque fatali portenta labore subegit,
Comperit Invidiam suprema sine domari.

He that kill’d Hydra, He design’d by fate
To quell the monsters rais’d by Juno’s hate;
Tho’ He, the mighty He, had always try’d,
Found Envy vanquish’d only when he dy’d.

Creech.

Sect. IX. Anger is subservient to Fortitude, by rallying the scattered spirits, and putting them into a lively motion, according to the observation of Theages. “Anger and Desire are both useful, this to provide what is good for the body, the other to guard it against evil; the former discharging the office of a Soldier, the latter of a Purveyor.” It is worth observation,

that

that Anger is far from being a selfish Passion, since it is naturally excited by injuries offered to others, as well as to ourselves, and was designed by the Author of nature not only to excite us to act vigorously in defending ourselves from evil, but to interest us in the defence or rescue of the injured and helpless, and raise us above the fear of the proud and mighty oppressor. Hatred, that is, a Hatred of simple Aversion, Desire and Self-love go to the forming of this Passion, when it regards damage or injury done to ourselves; Benevolence makes a part of it, when it is roused by injustice done to others. If it proceeds so far as Revenge, it bears the same relation to injuries, that Gratitude doth to benefits, both seek retaliation, but in one it is a Vice (unless where it aims at the correction and amendment of the offender, and the cure or prevention of injustice) in the other a Virtue. The excess of this Passion is not more pernicious to others than to ourselves. 

Dat pœnas dum exiguit, says Seneca, "it punishes the person himself, while he seeks to do mischief to another."

Sect. X. The directions for regulating our Anger concern the Passion itself, or the expressions of it. As to the Passion itself,
felf, regard is to be had to the occasion, to the degree, and to the continuance of it. To the occasion, that it be something considerable, and that the offence be voluntary, and done by one who was capable of knowing the evil of what he did. To the degree, that it never exceed the cause, or be so great as to discompose the mind, and put a man out of the possession of himself. To the continuance, that we never suffer it to lie fretting in the mind, till it rankle into settled malice. Anger may pass through the soul of a wise man, but a refeth only in the bosom of fools. The heighth and ferment of the Patiion ought not to out-laft the day, according to that divine command, r Let not the Sun go down upon your wrath; to the end we may be cool as the evening, and in calmness of soul offer up our devotions to a most merciful and forgiving God. That fire must not be spent in angry resentment, which should be consecrated to the altar, and is necessary to consume the sacrifice. As to the expressions of our Anger, we are, on the one hand, concerned to avoid those which would leffen our character, and render both us and our Anger contemptible; and on the other, all such as tend to irritate others, and procure us their hatred and ill-will; and the only sure way of preventing both.

a Eccles. vii. 9.

Of Gratitude.  Part II.

both those evils is to moderate the Passion itself.

Sect. XI. Gratitude is in such a sense a Passion, as at the same time to be a branch of natural Justice, as Cicero reckons it; for which reason I shall wave saying any more of it here, and only take notice, that Ingratitude, the contrary to this, is no Passion; for nature (as if abhorring it) has appointed no motion of the spirits whereby it might be excited, but a mere Vice arising from pride, stupidity, or narrowness of soul.

Sect. XII. Desiderium or Fondness for the memory of persons and things that have been greatly beloved by us, (to which we have in English no single word that answers exactly) springs from the reflection on a past good, which we despair of injoying again. It is of use by way of anticipation, to make us careful for the preserving of that, the loss of which is like to be followed with so much regret and sorrow; and to perpetuate the memory of it afterwards, if it deserve to live in our remembrance. The force of this affection is mostly seen at the death of friends.
Quis desiderio sit pudor, aut modus
Tam chari capitis?

"How can so valuable a friend be too
much regretted and lamented?" Says
Horace on the death of Quintilius; or of
such as were eminent for extraordinary qua-
lities of body or mind, or had been greatly
beneficial to the world. So that in this Pa-
sion we may seek for the rise of funeral
pomps, elegies, and orations. Hence the
idolatry of Heathens and Christians, the wor-
ship paid by the former to their dead Heroes,
and by the latter to departed Saints; which
makes "Laetusnius derive the word Super-
ification from hence. Superstitiosi autem vo-
cantur, non quia filios suos superflites optant,
omnes enim optamus, sed aut ii qui superflitem
memoriam defunctorum colunt; aut qui pa-
rentibus suis superflites colebant imagines eorum
domi, tanquam deos penates.

I have now done with the proper Pass-
fions.

Sect. XIII. The improper or secondary
Passions are next to be treated, which are
thus named because they seem to be some-
what allied to the former in their original,
and in the influence which they have on
the

\[ \text{L. 3. Ode. 4.} \]
\[ \text{De Vera Sap. L. 4.} \]
the mind. These, though they will not come within the definition of Passion, do yet challenge a place in Morality, for the share which they have in most of our actions. Now these bodily impressions, (for so I call them, after Dr. More) may be summed up under these two classes. First, Sensation, Imagination, Temper, and Custom. Secondly, Education, Idiopathy, and Prosopolepsia. Those of the first class, says my Author, agree in this, that they may be considered without any thing of proper Passion going with them; those of the second in this, that they are always attended with some such Passion. Though I must confess I see no clear ground for this distinction, I shall observe his division, and begin with those of the first class.

Sect. XIV. I. By Sensation in this place is not meant the immediate act of simple Perception, which is the most obvious import of the word; but that bias and propensity to error which takes its beginning from hence; so that Sensation is a bodily impression inclining the soul to think of things, as in their own proper nature corresponding to what they appear to Sense. Hence those errors in the Philosophy of the vulgar, that all between the Earth and the Clouds is empty Space, that the Sun moves and the Earth stands still, and that smells and other secondary
secondary qualities are in bodies without us. The giving too much credit to the reports of Sense prepared the way for several blunders in the Epicurean Physics and Morality. In their Physics, which agree mostly with the notions of things taken up by the common people, as that the heavenly bodies are little bigger than they show to fight.

"Nec nimio Solis major rota, nec minor arder Eʃe poteʃt, nosbris quam Sensibus esʃe videtur.

Nor can the Sun's bright orb be greater, or his heat
Be lesʃ, than what our faithful Senses teach.

In their Morality, as to instance only in that principle which is the foundation of it, that sensual pleasure is the chief happiness of man. I own that in a certain respect we may grant the Epicureans, that the Senses are not capable of being deceived; for besides that the structure of the organs, and the circumstances of objects considered, they ought not to represent things otherwise than they do; the Senses are purely passive, they receive impressions from surrounding bodies, but pronounce nothing concerning them, that is the business of the Mind, which delivers its opinion upon the diverse appearances of Sense, and too often not more hastily than

\[ \text{D d 4} \]

\[ \text{wrong.} \]

\[ \text{Lucret. De Rerum Nat. L. 5.} \]
Of Sensation. Part II.

When therefore we talk of the errors of the Senses, the meaning is, that things are many times in themselves quite different from what they appear to the Senses; and that they who take their measures of judging from the Senses will unavoidably be led into a thousand mistakes.

Sect. XV. The Reasons why people trust so much to Sense, I believe are principally these two.

1. If Sense may err, why not Reason; if one power and faculty may be deceived, why not all others? At which rate we shall have no criterion of truth, nor be in possession of certainty, but universal scepticism must bear down all before it. I answer, that because Sense may be imposed upon, it follows not that Reason may. In case Sense misleads us, Reason may set us right again, so that here God hath provided a higher faculty to correct the errors occasioned by the faculties below it. And perhaps the fallaciousness of our Senses was designed for this very end, that we might make the more frequent use of our Reason. But should Reason be deceived, there is no faculty above this to inform it better, and it must be deceived fatally and eternally. And are not the Goodness and Wisdom of God our security, that he would not frame us with such a constitution of mind, as should naturally lead
Of Sensation.

Chap. X.

lead us into error? Besides this, we are to consider, that the mistakes of Sense (when it does mistake) are not dangerous; it has little to do with Religion upon which depend our most important interests. But Reason rightly understood, and rightly managed, is to be the measure of our conduct, and consequently, if free from prejudices, we may be assured shall never err in matters of moment and consequence.

Sect. XVI. 2. If Sense may be deceived in one or more instances, why not in all? And if in all, we can be certain of nothing without us, the whole world may be a mere dream and apparition, and we ourselves no other as to our bodies. I answer, this way of arguing from our being deceived in some instances of Sense, that therefore we may be so in all is utterly inconclusive. We are misinformed in some cases it is acknowledged, and accordingly the wise Governor of the world has furnished us with Reason, that we might find out the mistake, and this by comparing things together it easily does. Wherefore if the Reason of mankind, after the most particular and diligent examination into things, does not charge any error on the Senses in the notices they give us at any time of outward objects, there is no sufficient cause why in these cases we should suspect our being deceived.
Of Imagination. Part II.

Notwithstanding which I shall recommend this Observation, as extremely probable, that our Senses were not given us to inform us so much what things are in themselves, as of the relation they bear to each other, and to our bodies.

Sect. XVII. Imagination is a bodily impression, which inclines us to believe (without any authority from Reason for such a persuasion) the present or future existence of things, which neither are nor will be. Persuasion is absurdly made the reason of Persuasion. Ask some people why they are so confident of certain matters, they can give no better account of it than this, that the thing hath made such an impression on their minds, that they cannot but give themselves up to it; so that their faith is resolved into itself. Sensation is the cause of the mistakes we run into about the nature, Imagination about the existence of things. For an instance of this you may take the dreams of some fanciful people, which leave such traces behind, that even when waking they will not allow themselves to doubt that things will come to pass, which their Imagination made future in sleep. Enthusiasm owes its being to the same cause. Persons of a heated fancy are liable to unaccountable impulses, and then verily believe themselves

* See Malbranche's Search after Truth. B. i. C. 5, 6, &c.
selves inspired. And as women and some men have tender and lively Imaginations without a due ballance of Reason, it is no wonder that they lie open to a thousand delusions. Apollo is certainly to be admired for his wisdom, in chusing to deliver his Oracles by a Priestess, rather than by a Priest. A Man could not so easily have been thrown out of the possession of his understanding, and had all his faculties disordered with an holy fury. A female Imagination was required for this. You need only read Virgil's description of the Sibyll to be convinced of the propriety of this remark.

Ventum erat ad limen, cum Virgo, poscere sata Tempus, ait; Deus, ecce, Deus! Cui talia fanti, Ante fores, subito non vultus, non color unus, Non comptæ mansere comæ; sed pectus anhelum, Et rabie fera corda tument; majorque videri, Nec mortale fonsans, afflata est numine quando Jam propriore Dei.

Now to the mouth they come; aloud she cries, This is the time, inquire your Destinies. He comes, behold, the God! Thus while she said,
And shivering at the sacred entry stay'd, Her colour chang'd, her face was not the same; And hollow groans from her deep spirit came; Her

Æneid. L. 6. v. 45, &c.
Her hair stood up, convulsive rage possest
Her trembling limbs, and heav'd her lab'ring breast.
Greater than human kind she seem'd to look,
And with an accent more than mortal spoke.
Her staring eyes with sparkling fury roll,
When all the God came rushing on her soul.

Sect. XVIII. The same observation may be made of the She Saints in the Romish Church, whose lives are stuffed with accounts of Raptures and Visions, such as St. Bridget, St. Catharine, St. Teresa, with many others, like to whom were Prisca and Maximilla, two famous enthusiasts in the second Century. We are also told by the Jewish Doctors, that the Scripture in prohibiting magical arts mentions a Witch only, because generally speaking those addicted to Magic were Women. And why Women more than Men? But on account of the overpoise of Imagination, which renders them more superstitious, and better disposed to believe a hidden virtue in spells and incantations. The same notion of Womens being ofteñest led away by these delusions seems to have obtained in the Heathen world, whence 2 Horace's Epodes on Canidia. The best advice I can give here is, for persons of a fertile Imagination to consider, they are no more to be governed by Imagination

2 See particularly Ode. 5. Epod.
nation than by Sense. That Sense is not so often deceived as Imagination—And as to the liveliness of the scenes represented on the stage of the fancy, it arises from pure mechanism, and is greater or less according to the temper which the body is in. The Imagination in short exerts itself most in the absence of Reason, as in the brains of madmen, and of persons asleep, which is abundantly enough to justify us in giving little heed to such a mimic.

Sect. XIX. Idiosyncrasy or Temper is a bodily impression owing to a particular complexion of nature, whereby the mind is either hindered or perverted in its contemplation of certain objects. It were easy to give a multitude of instances of this kind. I shall only exemplify it by those notions in Religion, which men most readily embrace, which generally speaking are suited to their respective tempers. Among the Heathens the Epicureans seem to have been of a sanguine complexion, fond of a life of ease and pleasure, and accordingly took care that their Gods should be of the same humour with themselves, negligent of the affairs of the world, and placing their happiness in their inactivity. The Stoicks, on the contrary, may be described as men of an opposite character, sour, unconvertible, and severe; which turned all their thoughts to Fate and Necessity.
Of Temper.  

Part II.

Necessity. I might observe the same of the Pharisees and Sadducees, and shall leave you to find out a like difference in the notions and tempers of some Moderns. The best way to guard against mistakes from this quarter is, to divest ourselves, as much as we can, of ourselves; and abstracting from their evidence, to be equally indifferent to all opinions, not wishing before trial (merely because we are inclined to have it so) that one may prove true rather than another. As in a contest between persons we should not take parties, till it appears on which side the right lies; though it is natural to do it, even when they are both or all strangers. In order to this we should reflect, that an opinion is not the more likely to be true, because agreeable to our inclinations, any more than the contrary opinion, because suited to another man's. But the only standard of notions by which we can with certainty determine, whether they are true or false, is their agreement or disagreement with that Reason which is common to men of all tempers and complections.

Sect. XX. Custom is a bodily impression which determines us with great violence to some thoughts or actions, for no other reason, but that we or others have been used to them. So that there is a Custom of thinking and a Custom of acting; there is like-
likewise a private and a publick Custom. A private Custom in thinking may be illustrated by this instance. A person having been used from his childhood to think, that a Vessel being emptied of its liquor, there is nothing remaining behind, this notion is confirmed by length of time, and makes him unwilling to admit a Plenum. Thus a man long accustomed to any particular way of life (especially if vicious) finds it difficult to break off from it, which is an instance of a Custom of acting, as the other was of thinking. Again, there is publick Custom; and how many of the notions and practices of mankind have been received upon this principle? Why did Polytheism so generally obtain, and hold out against the evidence of Reason; but because by degrees the world grew accustomed to the notion? What makes the National Religion in every Country to be embraced by the generality, right or wrong, but its being the established Custom? And as to actions, the most barbarous Customs have prevailed in some Countries; and their being Customs hath reconciled others to them, who had otherwise good nature and good sense enough to have abhorred them. It is hardly possible to find an example of the force of Custom, more remarkable than one recorded by *Herodotus*, who tells us of Darius,

*Thalia*. C. 33, 99.
That having asked the Greeks who were in his army, what sum of money would be sufficient to induce them to eat their deceased Parents, and they answering they could never be hired to commit so great a crime, he turned himself to the Indians, whose Custom it was to bury their Parents in their own entrails, and put the question to them, at what price they might be bribed to burn the bodies of their Parents, which was the manner of the Greeks; the Indians signifying the utmost abhorrence of the proposal said, they hoped the King had better thoughts of them." Some fed on human flesh, even that of their best friends, others scrupled eating of any flesh whatsoever. You have an instance of each in two Indian Nations mentioned by Herodotus in the same Book. To rescue ourselves from the tyranny of Custom, we must habituate ourselves more to the use of our Reason. A Custom in itself absurd is not a jot the more venerable for its antiquity or universality. Time or Numbers have no such power over Notions and Rites, as to change an error into a truth, or an absurdity into a reasonable practice. To proceed to the next class.
Sect. XXI. II. Education is only custom circumstantiated by some vigorous affection conspiring with it. For generally we are more bigotted to what we have been accustomed by Education to venerate and practice, than we are to other things. The reason of which is, our having been taught to look upon some things as too sacred to be called in question, and too important to be neglected. b Plerumque autem Parentium præceptis imbuti, ad eorum consuetudinem, moremque deductur. "The generality having rules of life instilled into them by their Parents from their earliest years, are insensibly formed to imitate their customs and manners."

"Of such importance is it what our early customs are." Hence results an obligation on Parents to take the greatest care in the Education of their Children, since nature being set wrong at first, generally retains that plie ever afterward; and on those who have had the privilege of a good Education, to be grateful to their Parents, and thankful to Providence. "From my Father and Mother I learned such and such Virtues,

b Cic. De Offic. L. 1. §. 32.
Of Idiopathy. Part II.

"Virtues, (says Antoninus) and to the Gods I am indebted for the happiness of such Parents." If our Parents, says another, have instructed us in such arts, we ought to give them the double honour of Parents and Tutors, and to reverence them as images of the Deity, since like God himself they have been the authors to us both of our Being, and of our well Being." Hence too arises an obligation upon all to Charity, notwithstanding their different sentiments and opinions. Doit thou esteem thyself in the right, and thy neighbour in the wrong, and this in points apprehended to be of great consequence? Was not the foundation of this difference laid in your different Educations? If so, I see a great deal of reason why you should pity the supposed mistakes of your neighbour, but none at all for persecuting him on that account.

Sect. XXII. Idiopathy differs only in degree from Idiosyncrasy; for when through the predominance of Temper we are carried to like some things with that excess of prejudice as to define all wisdom and happiness by the pursuit of them, what before was only Temper now commences Idiopathy. One man is an admirer of Music, another of

a Lib. 1.
Simpic. in Epic. C. 37.
of Poetry, and a third of the Mathematicks, and we would allow them to enjoy each his favourite study, so that they would but abstain from wondering that the whole world does not fall in with them, and not despise those who do not, as persons of no taste or judgment.

Sect. XXIII. Profopolepsia is that bodily impression which inclines us to the love or hatred, esteem or contempt of things or persons, on account of some slight and triv'ial circumstances attending them. Not that our Author would be thought to condemn the art of Physiognomy in so much repute with the Pythagoreans and others, for he does not question but a person well skil'd in this art may often hit the tempers and characters of people by perusing their faces. But when at first sight we are strongly prejudiced for or against persons or things, that are known to us only by some superficial circumstances, in which neither good nor evil is implied, and from which no argument can be drawn for the notions we take up of them; as when on the score of a person's name, or voice, or habit, or shape, and the like, we entertain a good or a bad opinion of him, we are then guilty of this unreasonable prejudice. So great is the weakness of human Reason, and so easily do we suffer ourselves to be deceived.
Consult on the subject of this Chapter,

*Cartes & More De Passionibus.*

*Seneca De Ira.*

*Horatii. L. 1. Satir. 1.*

*Watts on the Passions.*

*Butler's Sermons on Compassion, &c.*

*Grove's Sermon on Meekness. Vol. 5.*


*and No. 558, 559.*

*Guardian and Speculator on the other Passions,*

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